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Style investing is considered the holy grail of investment finance and portfolio 
management, as it avails numerous options to the portfolio manager to simply and 
persistently beat the market. This research investigates the impact of style investing on 
the performance of South African unit trusts, from the view of funds which remain true to 
their investment styles (consistent funds) against funds which drift their styles (drifters) 
over the period 2005 to 2014. The study examines the extent to which South African 
unit trusts drift from, or maintain, the styles stated in their mandates, and also explores 
which set of unit trusts deliver superior and persistent returns between the style 
consistent funds and the drifters. The Returns Based Style Analysis (RBSA) model is 
employed on a sample of 42 South African unit trusts, from seven of the most significant 
style-based strategies (style indices) on the JSE, to establish the true styles of the 
funds, that is, whether the funds are correctly classified as stated in their titles. The 
extent of drift amongst the unit trusts is then ascertained using the Style Drift Score 
(SDS) method, which derives its existence from the RBSA model. The Style Drift Score 
is calculated as the square root of the sum of the variances of style weights obtained 
from the RBSA model. Subsequently, the risk adjusted performances of the funds are 
evaluated using three models, which are, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
Fama-French 3 factor (FF3F) model and also the Sharpe ratio, whereas market timing 
ability is examined using the Treynor-Mazuy model. Furthermore, performance 
persistence of the funds is tested using contingency tables over 6 months, one year, 
two years and three years holding periods and, lastly, the chi-square test is employed to 
test predictability of future performances based on past performances.    
The study finds that the styles of the funds are, on average, correctly classified. With 
respect to the extent of drift, 62 percent of the funds are found to remain true to their 
styles (consistent), whereas 38 percent of the funds drift their styles. In evaluating 
performance, the consistent funds are found to outperform the drifters on two of the 
three models used (namely, the CAPM and FF3F). However, neither the consistent 
funds, nor the drifters, are able to successfully time the markets. Additionally, the 
drifters exhibit a higher relative performance persistence, albeit a negative one (that is, 
loser-loser persistence), over the short term period (6 months) which diminishes 
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considerably as the holding period lengthens to one year. Persistence disappears 
completely at two years and three years holding periods. The study does not find any 
conclusive evidence of the predictability of future returns based on past performances.  
It is observed from the results that drift causes an undesirable utility loss to investors as 
the drifters underperform the consistent funds and also exhibit negative performance 
persistence. This research finds similar results to the majority of studies done in style 
investing and concurs with most literature on the South African market. Therefore, the 
results have implications to both policy makers and the investment industry. Policy 
makers may have to regulate the unit trust industry more vigilantly to identify drift and 
also propose regulations to the investment industry for periodic disclosures of funds’ 
stock holdings in order to curb drift in those funds which claim to be following consistent 
investment strategies yet stray from their mandates. Likewise, plan sponsors may have 
to liaise more frequently with portfolio managers to swiftly root out drift and ensure that 
portfolio managers meet the pre-set investment targets. Regulators of the unit trust 
industry may also need to advise investors to be more careful, when investing in drifting 
funds, since drifting is also an investment strategy that is considered profitable under 
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It is widely believed, in the investment sphere, that the magic potion of investment 
finance could be described as a technique that enables an investor to plainly and 
persistently outperform the market. Fund managers and investors globally invest 
extraordinary amounts of resources and time in their search for such formulas and 
programs, aided by the discoveries of academic research. In this quest, it is very 
common for fund managers to categorise the numerous available investment options 
into classifications according to their preferences. The classification of a variety of 
objects and observations into different categories is a mechanism that is prevalent 
throughout the world, in all facets of life. Equivalently, the classification of objects 
into categories is also prevalent in the financial industry and this is especially true in 
the case of making portfolio allocations and investment decisions.  
According to (Chen and Wermers, 2005, Muller and Ward, 2013), investors and fund 
managers, in the process of making portfolio allocation decisions, begin by 
classifying the assets available to them for investment into a few broad classes. 
These broad asset classes used by investors are often referred to as ‘styles’, and the 
process by which investors allocate capital among different styles, rather than 
individual securities, has come to be known as ‘style investing’ (Strugnell et al., 
2011). This technique can be utilised as a tool to uncover the true on goings of a unit 
trust, and may hold useful predictive powers.    
Christopherson et al. (1998) and Wahal and Yavuz (2013) describe an equity style 
as an opinion of investing prevalent within a faction of fund managers who presume 
that going after a specific style will enhance returns. Predictably, the appeal of easy 
money has endowed an inventory of candidate styles; some with alluring theoretical 
grounding. Examples of such styles, or asset classes, would be value stocks, growth 
stocks, stocks of varying capitalization levels, and government bonds (Hoffman, 
2012). The investors then decide how to allocate their capital amongst assets within 
these specific broad categories. However, as with any model, there are inherent 
weaknesses, and these will be detailed in the study. 
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Pioneered by researchers such as Basu (1977), Fama and French (1992), 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) and a few others, studies on equity style strategies such as 
Korteweg (2010), Hoffman (2012) and Hsu (2014) have confirmed that firms with 
certain fundamental characteristics, such as low market capitalization or  low price-
to-earnings, systematically outclass the market. These characteristics are described 
as anomalies to the widely known hypothesis of markets being efficient. The results 
of such studies have spurred increased interest from practitioners as equity style 
management is deemed to be as essential as asset allocation in determining the 
return of equity portfolios (Gulen et al., 2011). Additionally, it avails a priceless 
instrument for enhancing the portfolio performance of mutual funds. In South Africa, 
mutual funds are referred to as unit trusts, hence these two phrases will be used 
interchangeably throughout this investigation. 
The recognition of such anomalies to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has 
sparked rigorous debate among scholars on the validity and possible explanations of 
these style premiums. Despite numerous contributions on the subject that apply 
either traditional finance measures or behavioural finance, the academic literature 
has not yet reached a consensus. Furthermore, recent empirical data, for example, 
Jame & Tong (2014) and Fama & French (2015), has documented substantial 
discrepancies in style premiums since the original studies. These unexplained 
appearances and disappearances in style premiums have questioned the continued 
existence of these style factors and their effects on the performance of unit trusts 
(Auret and Cline, 2011).  
In response, it has been hypothesized that systematic patterns exist in these 
fluctuations of style premiums, which may be explained by the investment style 
strategies employed by fund managers (Cumming et al., 2009). In this regard, 
managers can either choose to remain consistent with their investment style or 
alternate funds between different asset classes, which is known as style drifting 
(Eraslan, 2013). Such strategies require a fair amount of investment skill on the part 
of the fund managers. On occasions where genuine skill and expertise are essential 
to recognize investment opportunities, such as in a comprehensive examination of 
an intricate derivative product, it may be probable that such value creation 
possibilities persist over time. However, it is anticipated, in an efficient market, that 
straightforward trading rules, such as investing in shares with low price/earnings 
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ratios or investing in small capitalisation shares, would yield only momentary 
advantages. This study examines several of the more notable style-based strategies 
on the JSE to evaluate the magnitude of the potential benefit of the style investing on 
unit trusts and its persistence. 
The aim of this quantitative analysis is to determine what portion of variation in 
specific unit trusts are attributable to asset allocation – style – and what portion can 
be described by security selection, that is, the skill of the managers. Using Sharpe 
(1992)’s method of style analysis, the Returns Based Style Analysis (RBSA), this 
research seeks to detect patterns in return series that are inherent to style factors. In 
short, the study seeks to find out whether South African portfolio managers are able 
to add value after adjusting for style exposure. Employing the RBSA method 
together with statistical tools, this allows for the return series of unit trusts to be 
characterised by some combination of these factors - in order to assert the most apt 
combination that describes the portfolio’s constituents. The study, therefore, 
investigates the extent of style drift amongst South African unit trusts, the 
performance of unit trusts in South Africa and whether these performances persist 
over different time periods or not.  
 
1.2 The Mutual Fund Industry  
In recent decades, there has been rapid global growth in mutual funds (Pojanavatee, 
2013). According to Statista’s worldwide statistics portal, there were approximately 
79 669 mutual funds in the world by end 2014 with a combined total net worth of 
assets of approximately $31.38 trillion dollars under management. The advantages 
and benefits offered by mutual funds over other investment vehicles are believed to 
be the biggest drivers of the significant growth of this industry in recent times (Dawe 
et al., 2014). 
Mutual funds are open- ended, pooled investments in nature. They issue or redeem 
their shares at net asset value. In addition to that, they provide benefits related to 
liquidity, tax, administration, diversification and professional expert management of 
funds to their investors (Utz et al., 2014).  Specifically, these benefits include the 
ability to liquidate the investment on demand, the spread of risk across a broad 
portfolio of shares, low initial investment amounts, tax effectiveness and the 
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professional management of mutual funds to its investors (Bodie et al., 2013). Mutual 
funds also charge low transaction costs relative to other investment vehicles 
(Cabello et al., 2014). It is these kinds of advantages that enable mutual fund 
investors to enjoy economies of scale while gaining access to well diversified 
portfolios of securities (Cuthbertson et al., 2008). 
Mutual funds are often differentiated by their mandates or core objectives. These 
mandates determine the unique strategy that the fund follows, which is referred to as 
its style. According to Porter and Trifts (2014), styles are defined in relation to the 
type of stocks that the mutual funds buy and incorporate in their portfolios. 
Cuthbertson et al. (2010) allude that most often, the aim of the fund is to diversify its 
portfolio as much as possible in order to be efficient, that is, to minimize risk as much 
as possible, while maximizing returns. Therefore, fund managers choose their 
preferred style according to a variety of factors. Congruently, the prevalent set of 
factors managers choose from are the size factor, value factor and past returns of 
the stocks they wish to include in their portfolios.  Hereil et al. (2010) clarifies that 
under the size and value factors are small capitalisation stocks, large capitalisation 
stocks, value stocks and growth stocks. However, Enaw (2011) points out, correctly, 
that the risk to reward of any individual stock remains an important factor when 
selecting which stocks to invest into. 
According to the Association of Savings and Investments South Africa (ASISA), the 
South African mutual fund industry, also known as the Unit Trusts industry, is part of 
a large industry of pooled investments called Collective Investment Schemes. ASISA 
documents the South African mutual fund industry to be worth around R1 744 billion 
as at 30 June 2015 (ASISA, 2015). Oldert (2005) records that the first unit trust that 
launched in South Africa in 1965, the Sage fund, had assets in the region of 
R600 000 under management on commencement. The growth in the industry over 
the years has indeed been meteoric (STATISTA, 2015). In profiling the development 
of the unit trust industry in South Africa, Oldert (2005) postulates that, by the end of 
1965, two funds had already come into existence with a joint value of R3 million in 
assets. However, between 1965 and 1980, ten more new funds were established, 
although growth was subdued around the late 1960’s owing to the stock market 
collapse in 1969. Nonetheless, by 1990 the industry’s growth had picked up 
momentum with 36 funds, worth R7.5 billion, in existence (Viviers et al., 2009). 
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The deregulation of the industry in 1998 encouraged huge inflows of investments 
which propagated a huge upsurge in the industry. In the opinion of Meyer-Pretorius 
and Wolmarans (2006), this deregulation was indeed a highly significant turning 
point in the growth that was to follow. By the end of the year 2000, there were 334 
funds which grew to 943 funds in 2010 (ASISA, 2015, Saini et al., 2011). Currently 
around 1211 unit trusts exist in South Africa, which are broken down into global 
funds, regional funds, funds of funds, and general domestic equity funds. Precisely, 
ASISA (2015) reports that its database contains 157 global funds, 357 fund of funds, 
1028 general domestic equity funds, and 26 regional funds. The acceptance, 
recognition and embracing of mutual funds amongst South African households 
clearly demonstrates the funds’ popularity as one of the most preferred savings 
channels (Hoepner et al., 2011a). Such observation evokes the curiosity of whether 
investing in mutual funds is worthwhile or not and also the inquiry into how fund 
managers invest their clients’ monies. Mutual funds are actively managed by fund 
managers who attempt to outperform the market index and achieve higher returns 
relative to the market for their investors (Massa et al., 2010).  
Schiff (2011) asserts that investors have expectations that this relative 
outperformance of funds should persist in order for them to continue investing with 
that fund, otherwise they will change funds and invest with winning funds. In short, 
they expect persistence in performance, obviously good performance. Fund 
managers, thus, have to ensure they meet these expectations or else they may 
experience huge outflows of investment from their funds. In pursuit of persistent top 
performances some managers, therefore, choose to stick to a certain style of 
investing and remain consistent with it. This is termed being style consistent (Idzorek 
et al., 2012). Others resort to altering their style according to prevailing market 
conditions and this is called style drifting (Glode, 2011). It is of huge interest to 
determine the extent to which South African unit trusts drift or maintain their styles. 
More importantly, investors would like to know which set of unit trusts deliver 
persistent and superior returns between the style consistent ones and those which 
drift their styles.  
The most common motivations for drifting among fund managers can be broadly 
categorized into the following: the agency problem, tournament effect (where 
managers compete against each other), changes in stocks held in the portfolio and 
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the rebalancing of portfolios as some stocks change characteristics, for example, a 
value stock changing into a growth stock (Sensoy, 2009). Other reasons may be that 
fund managers are seeking better opportunities in their areas of expertise, 
economies of style, neutrality element, acting on arbitrage opportunities and the 
continual search for different returns over time (Cici, 2012). Style drifting, therefore, 
is the exercise of purposely diverging from the stated plan to accomplish excessive 
relative performance.   
Bodson et al. (2010) allude that diverse opinions and postulations exist with respect 
to outperformance and persistence of mutual funds, however, with no obvious 
agreement in most of these studies undertaken. Yu (2008) attributes these 
discrepancies to the different methods and market benchmarks used in the various 
studies. This study, therefore, sought to analyse the South African Mutual fund 
industry and, hopefully, shedding some light on the underpinnings of this rising 
industry and also the possibility of predicting future market movements by investors. 
In this regard, Hereil et al. (2010) points out vividly that investors are typically 
dependant on managers’ past risk-adjusted performances in order to evaluate their 
potential to produce excess returns above the risk-free rate of return. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Mutual funds in South Africa (sometimes referred to as Unit trusts) are growing very 
fast. Households and institutions are buying into them due to their pooling and 
diversification effects. However, some funds have a tendency to drift from their 
stated mandates, or styles, while others consistently maintain theirs. From these two 
alternative fund management methods it remains unclear which one delivers 
superior and persistent returns relative to the other. Most literature on style investing 
postulate a positive relation between style consistency and investment performance. 
However, contemporary studies such as Walkshausl & Lobe (2012) and Van 
Heerden (2014) advance the perception that changes in market conditions can 
positively affect style drift to flourish and earn positive returns in variable economic 
cycles. Therefore, investors seek clarity as to which of these two strategies is more 
advisable to adopt in order to persistently outperform the markets and earn positive 
abnormal returns.  
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1.4 Research Objectives 
The objective of this research was to:  
1. Establish the extent to which South African unit trusts drift or maintain their 
stated mandates or styles.  
2. Ascertain which set of unit trusts delivers superior returns between the style 
consistent funds and those that drift their styles. 
3. Ascertain which set of unit trusts between the style consistent funds and the  
drifters deliver persistent results relative to the benchmark index 
1.5 Research Questions 
The research sought to provide answers to the following questions: 
1. To what extent do South African unit trusts drift from their stated styles? 
2. Which of the two alternative fund management approaches (style consistent 
and style drifting) produce superior results relative to each other? 
3. Which of the two alternative fund management approaches (style consistent 
and style drifting) deliver persistent results relative to the benchmark index? 
  
1.6 Significance of the research 
The study intends to investigate South African unit trusts’ performance from the 
perspective of the Returns Based Style Analysis (RBSA) investment technique 
crafted by Sharpe (1992). This model deals with the analysis of managed portfolios, 
in terms of asset allocation (also known as style) and asset selection, which is also 
known as the skill of the manager. 
Asset allocation, or style analysis methods, are extremely useful tools for 
consultants, plan sponsors and investors for various reasons. Investors want to know 
the investment style so they can construct an effective combination of diversified 
assets that fits their preferences. Consultants and plan sponsors are concerned with 
how well the portfolio manager meets the pre-set investment targets. Investors, in 
general, are also interested in sifting the winning funds from loser funds in order to 
astutely invest their hard earned monies. The RBSA model is called upon to solve 
the puzzle.    
8 
 
The RBSA model proposes an equitable style model based on asset factors or 
classes. It presumes that a mutual fund’s return is surmised to be a function of 
several diverse factor exposures and firm-specific risks (Bodson et al., 2010). The 
sensitivities to these factor exposures determine the style or asset allocation of the 
fund (Domian and Reichenstein, 2009). Hence, from employing this model together 
with other performance measurement models, this research will be able to establish 
if managers are able to add value after adjusting for style exposure.  
The study aimed also to clarify whether future returns can be predicted based on the 
persistence of performances. The outcome of this investigation will aid in shaping the 
investors’ choice for the appropriate fund to invest with from the thousands of funds 
available in the investment universe. It also strives to bring clarity on whether 
investing passively, e.g. in Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), is more preferable to 
investing actively, that is, if there is less value or utility derived from investing 
actively. 
 
1.7 Scope of the study 
The study focused on investigating the true on-goings in the operations of unit trusts 
in South Africa and assess whether investors are rewarded fair value for their money 
with respect to the risks undertaken in such investments. Keeping in mind the 
pervasive practice of style drifting amongst fund managers, it was of interest to 
determine the magnitude of drift in the South African unit trust industry and whether 
this drift is justifiable or not, based on the performances (and performance 
persistence) of the drifting funds relative to consistent funds. More importantly, the 
study sought to uncover whether South African fund managers are able to predict 
future returns based on past performances, since most investors choose funds to 
invest with based on the funds’ past performances. Most unit trusts have the 
disclaimer that past performance should not be used to gauge future performance, 
yet at the same time they use their past records to lure investors into investing with 
them. The study clarified if there is any basis in such claims, and advised 




1.8 Limitations of the study 
The study employed historical data in all its analyses, which is more retrospective 
than predictive in nature, and may not fully project what the future holds for South 
African fund managers. Some of the funds sampled did not have complete data for 
the whole duration of the 10-year observation period, due to the fledgling nature of 
the South African market. Additionally, studies covering style investing in the South 
African market were not that much relative to international studies, that is, there was 
not enough literature which one could use to thoroughly compare the findings of this 
research against.    
      
1.9 Structure of the research 
The research design flows chronologically in the following format:  
Chapter 2 - Literature Review: this section details the advent of style investing, the 
Returns Based Style Analysis model as a broadly embraced analytical tool, a 
discussion of style drift and style consistency, and a review of the most commonly 
applied performance evaluation measures in investment and portfolio management. 
The section also analyses market timing and its pertinent measurement models, the 
style analysis and stock selection ability of fund managers and the strengths and 
weaknesses of style analysis. It closes off by reviewing an empirical analysis of the 
performances of unit trusts, the persistence of unit trusts’ performances and also an 
account of the prevalent phenomenon called survivorship bias.          
Chapter 3 - Data and Research Methodology: the chapter introduces the various 
data sets to be analysed, the econometric models used for analysing the data, the 
specific unit trusts to be analysed and details of how the different returns will be 
calculated. It also covers the methods to be used and a description of the portfolio 
data inputs into the models.     
Chapter 4 - Results and Analysis: the chapter presents results obtained from utilising 
the models in chapter 3 and a detailed analysis of the results.  
Chapter 5 – Conclusion and Recommendations: the chapter summarizes all the 
findings, draws conclusions from these findings and also offers recommendations for 
further research in this area of study.  
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1.10 Chapter summary 
The chapter explored the aims and objectives of this study, as well as the grounds 
on which the inquiry is based. It profiled the background of the South African mutual 
fund industry and its phenomenal growth over the years. This chapter also 
highlighted the problem statement regarding the reason why the study was 
undertaken, what the study hopes to achieve, the significance of its inquiry, the 
scope of the study and the limitations of the study. Additionally, the chapter laid the 
foundation for how the presentation of the subsequent chapters will flow from one 
another. The next chapter (chapter 2) presents the home of the study, that is, it’s 
theoretical grounding and reviews the literature that has been reviewed on style 
investing in the international scene, as well as in the South African sphere, and a 




















2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The study is based on the Financial Intermediation Theory, which derives its roots 
from the economic perspectives of classical and neoclassical economics. The theory 
postulates that the presence of financial intermediaries can stimulate robust 
economic activity and benefits to an economy (Mehra et al., 2011). A financial 
intermediary is, typically, an institution that facilitates the channelling of funds 
between lenders and borrowers indirectly (Philippon, 2015). This is basically an 
institution or individual that serves as a middleman for different parties in a financial 
transaction. In common terms, financial intermediaries generally refer to private 
sector intermediaries, such as banks, private equity, venture capital funds, leasing 
companies, insurance and pension funds, and micro-credit providers. As such, Farhi 
et al. (2009) alludes that financial intermediaries channel funds from people who 
have extra money, or surplus savings (savers), to those who do not have enough 
money to carry out a desired activity (borrowers). 
Financial intermediaries are meant to bring together those economic agents with 
surplus funds who want to lend (invest) and those with a shortage of funds who want 
to borrow. In doing this, they offer the benefits of maturity and risk transformation 
(Greenwood et al., 2013). Therefore, specialist financial intermediaries ostensibly 
enjoy a related cost advantage in offering financial services, which not only enables 
them to make profit, but also raises the overall efficiency of the economy (Woodford, 
2010). The financial intermediaries’ existence and services are explained by the 
"information problems" associated with financial markets. Sadorsky (2010) alludes 
that current theories of the economic role of financial intermediaries build on the 
economics of imperfect information that began to emerge during the 1970s. Financial 
intermediaries, thus, exist because they can reduce information and transaction 
costs that arise from an information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders 
(Mehra et al., 2011).  
It, therefore, follows that financial intermediaries assist in the efficient functioning of 
markets, as any factors that affect the amount of credit channelled through financial 
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intermediaries can have significant macroeconomic effects. Amaral and Quintin 
(2010) suggest that financial intermediation can reduce the cost of channelling funds 
between borrowers and lenders, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources 
through the provision of liquidity and their ability to transform the risk characteristics 
of assets. 
Accordingly, the home of the study is based on the financial intermediation theory, 
which builds on the notion that intermediaries serve to reduce transaction costs and 
informational asymmetries. Hence, practitioners view financial intermediation as 
value-creating economic processes (Scholtens, 2013). Bean (2010) allege that 
Joseph Schumpeter proposed in 1911, that the services provided by financial 
intermediaries, which are; mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, 
monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions; can stimulate technological 
innovation and economic development. In his presentation, Schumpeter presumed 
that various measures of financial development are strongly associated with both 
current and later rates of economic growth.  
Hassan et al. (2011) allege that Schumpeter’s views are strongly shared by Gurley 
and Shaw who in the 1950s and 1960s postulated that, at low levels of development, 
most investment is self-financed. Gurley and Shaw (1954) allude that, as per capita 
income rises, bilateral borrowing and lending becomes more important. With further 
increases in per capita income, Gurley and Shaw (1954) propose that banks and 
similar financial intermediaries become prominent in financing investment. 
Eventually, more sophisticated financial markets, such as equity markets, arise. Kar 
et al. (2011) observe that, in the Gurley and Shaw view, rising per capita income and 
increasing financial depth reinforce each other. Therefore, Gurley and Shaw (1954) 
argue that a model of the joint evolution of per capita income and the banking 
system must allow usage of banks to be endogenous, and the level of per capita 
income and usage of banks must be determined simultaneously (Hassan et al., 
2011, Sadorsky, 2010). Mutual funds are an important part of financial intermediaries 
in any economic system, since they accept funds from investors and invest them on 
their behalf, making the economy robust (Woodford, 2010). The study, therefore, 
appreciates the increasing economic importance of financial intermediaries in a 
financial system, and subsequently focuses on how mutual funds, specifically South 
African based funds, invest their assets. 
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2.2 Style Investing 
Most portfolio managers distinguish themselves as advocating for a particular style. 
Institutional investors often employ multiple domestic equity managers and select 
managers that provide superior performance within a particular “style” category.  
Chen and De Bondt (2004) allude that an investment style is the distinct, most 
significant, ingredient of success in active equity portfolio management and the 
investment community is well aware of, and appreciates, this fact. Investing with 
style, therefore, refers to a manager's selection of some pre-defined and definite 
asset allocation strategy. The popularity of style investing is seen in the conception 
of multiple style  indices (Ahmed and Nanda, 2000). Portfolio managers assert style 
investing to be a useful tool for product differentiation that enables the fund 
management universe to better organise their investment activities. 
Investors and portfolio managers alike, are of the opinion that, style investing holds 
potent powers for diversification and prediction of future returns. This begs the 
question whether a stipulated number of risk factors can explain the dynamics and 
structure of asset returns, or whether these are attributable to economy wide 
systemic factors (Froot and Teo, 2008). Fama and French (1992) and Massa and 
Zhang (2009) propose that cross sectional discrepancies in anticipated stock returns 
is explained by three prevalent factors, each with its own related risk premium. 
These factors suggested are the portfolio representing the market (also known as 
the market-oriented investment style), the portfolio simulating for value (HML) which 
is also known as the value/growth style of investing and also the portfolio mimicking 
for size (SMB), also known as the size style factor. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
adds the momentum strategy or style of investing as another possible explanatory 
variable for the discrepancies observed in anticipated stock returns. These variables 
are also known as anomalies, and they will be detailed in the following subsections. 
Fundamental models for pricing assets, like the Capital Asset Pricing Model, have 
postulated for a long time that returns to a stock are attributable to systemic wide 
factors in the market and the risk of the stock, proxied by its beta (Qian and Shi, 
2010). However, a large amount of financial literature examining stock market 
anomalies has come forth to dispute such claims. Hsu (2014) describes anomalies 
as empirical results that seem to be contradictory with sustained theories of asset 
pricing behaviour.  
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2.2.1 Value Style Investing 
The value factor is one such anomaly, which was first documented by Basu (1977). 
The value investor focuses on identifying companies that have the potential and 
fundamentals to increase in price, due to having a current, lower than expected, 
price only because of adverse investor sentiment surrounding the company. Du Toit 
(2012) states that such investors pick on underrated stocks using contrarian 
strategies and factors like high dividend yields and low price multiples. 
In accordance with valuation metrics, securities within the value factor usually 
possess higher dividend yields and low price ratios, like price-to-book values (P/B), 
price-to-earnings (P/E), price-to-sales (P/S) and price-to-cash flow (P/CF) ratios 
(Jame and Tong, 2014). Such stocks are commonly linked to firms operating in a 
mature industry, experiencing strenuous operating conditions or conditions that 
negatively affect such firms' performance. In numerous studies of the mutual fund 
industry, researchers have confirmed that anomalies, like the value factor and the 
size factor, are indeed valuable descriptors of style (Jame and Tong, 2014). The 
value factor compares the value/growth characteristics of a stock, measured by 
fundamental ratios like Book value to market value of equity, the P/E ratio, etc. 
whereas the size factor is measured through market capitalization.  
Basu (1977) conducted a study of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), between 
April 1957 and March 1971, and finds that over a long period of time, portfolios with 
low Price-Earnings (PE) ratios tend to outperform portfolios with high PE ratios. The 
study finds that this outperformance is in both absolute and risk adjusted terms.  
 
2.2.2 Growth Style Investing 
Growth investors, on the other hand, emphasize the growth prospective of the 
underlying investment, therefore making use of stable earnings growth and 
momentum strategies (Cronqvist et al., 2015). These investors identify firms with 
above-average prospects for growth, and pay a premium for these growth prospects 
(Du Toit, 2012). Therefore, growth shares may even appear costly at current levels, 
but they can still be bought if the likelihood of considerable future growth is present. 
When categorizing growth shares with respect to valuation metrics, they are on the 
other side of the scale when compared to value stocks, with high price ratios 
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Schneeweis et al., (2012). They possess higher P/B (price-to- book), P/E (price-to-
earnings), P/S (price- to-sales) and P/CF (price-to-cash flow) ratios. Growth shares 
regularly have reasonable profit margins and higher than average cash reserves to 
protect them in unfavourable times (Swamy, 2013). Swamy (2013) adds that these 
shares, generally, function in aggressive industries with above average profiles and 
they attract considerable institutional following, research and investment. Ahmed and 
Nanda (2000) suggest that value and growth investing strategies can supplement 
each other in choosing top quality stocks, instead of being mutually exclusive. 
Ahmed and Nanda (2000) present evidence that increases in Earnings per Share 
(EPS) present a more relevant way to capture growth than utilising a measure of low 
Earnings to Price (E/P) ratio.  
In attempting to find out exactly which variable proxies for growth, Ahmed and Nanda 
(2000) and Walkshäusl and Lobe (2012) suggest that a strategy concentrating on 
investing in shares that possess the paired attributes of a high Earnings to Price 
(E/P) ratio and high growth in Earnings per Share (EPS) outperforms a strategy of 
high E/P alone. Their studies present some proof of persistence in performance for 
shares having the dual quality of high growth in EPS and high E/P ratio. Bertolis and 
Hayes (2014) analyse the South African market and observe that a favourable 
outcome from investing in value and growth strategies is subject to aggregate 
business and economic states at that point in time.  However, Chen and De Bondt 
(2004), in an earlier study, contrasts such kinds of approaches, advocating their 
susceptibility to deceptive, ex-post relationships that may be a product of the data 
employed. Chen and De Bondt (2004), therefore, propose utilising stock attributes 
such as spread in earnings yields and earnings growth rates between value and 
growth firms as benchmarks for the appeal of any certain style strategy.  
 
2.2.3 Market Oriented Investing 
The market-oriented style category of investing encapsulates those investors with no 
overriding preference for either of the growth or value styles, preferring instead to 
hold diversified portfolios consistent with prevailing market averages (Idzorek et al., 
2012). Early evidence supports the popular Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), as 
well as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) theories, pioneered by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). The CAPM presumes that various stocks have 
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varying anticipated rates of return due to their differing non-diversifiable risks (betas). 
Nonetheless, Hodnett et al. (2012) contrasts this on the grounds that the evidence of 
anomalies casts uncertainty on the soundness of the dual (EMH-CAPM) hypothesis.  
 
2.2.4 Size Style Investing 
With respect to the size style, managers base their investment decisions on the 
market capitalization rate of firms. Banz (1981), Chan and Chen (1991) and 
Jegadeesh (1992) are some of the early researchers who first documented the size 
anomaly on the US market, although contemporary studies have added more 
impetus on this factor like those of Bender et al. (2013) and Van Gelderen and Huij 
(2014). They all note that small capitalisation firms tend to outperform large 
capitalisation firms and post superior returns. Mutooni and Muller (2007) argue that 
the most popular size based stocks among unit trusts are the small cap shares, as it 
is believed that there is lesser emphasis placed on these shares which results in a 
greater potential to outperform.  
Strugnell et al. (2011) analysed the effects of beta, size and value factor on the JSE 
between 1994 and 2007, continuing on the previous work of Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003). Rensburg and Robertson (2003) had found unrelenting size and 
price-earnings effects in the cross-section of returns on the JSE and had, 
surprisingly, also found that beta is inversely related to returns. In the updated 
analysis, Strugnell et al. (2011) adds weight to the earlier findings by Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003) and deduce that beta has no forecasting power for returns on the 
JSE. Both researchers’ findings invalidate the CAPM based on a market proxy of the 
JSE All Share Index. Interestingly, they further unearthed that the size premium is 
concentrated in the small-scale stocks on the JSE and also find provisional proof that 
this premium has been diminishing over time. 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) emphasize the usefulness of investing with style within 
the mutual fund industry. They suggest that style benchmarks aid in performance 
appraisal and in controlling for risk. However, they warn that no solitary style, or mix 
of styles, is perfect for all periods and conditions. Researchers like Jansson et al. 
(2011) and Dickson (2016) have well documented that the different types of styles 
perform differently over time. In this regard, it is ordinary practice among investors to 
pursue investment styles that have functioned well over the recent past. Since 
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money managers rival each other for fund flows, they have strong motivation to 
adjust their investment strategies, regardless of future return and risk (Ye, 2012).  
 
2.2.5 Momentum Style of Investing 
Style momentum strategies, as documented by Carhart (1997) and Asness et al. 
(2014), are a type of style rotation that can perform this objective. Fund managers 
purchase stocks with attributes that are currently trending and sell those whose 
characteristics are out of favour. Therefore, these factors, namely; market, value, 
size and momentum, form the basis of most studies on style investing. Style 
investing can, thus, be classified into these discrete strategies; size, value, growth 
and market-oriented investing (Israel and Maloney, 2014). The advent of investing 
with style has shook core financial theories that have been religiously followed 
among investors for decades, one of those being the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
which postulates that no investor can earn abnormal returns above the market. With 
style investing, if one could determine and time a style cycle, it may be feasible to 
earn superior returns (Vayanos and Woolley, 2013).  
Boyer (2004) describes how, in concept, a style sponsor can utilise style cycle 
knowledge to refine strategic asset allocation. He accounts that style investing 
explains the returns of a stock from two components; tactical asset allocation and 
asset selection, which is also referred to as a manager’s skill. As managers compete 
for clients, they will do anything to attract funds flows and stop funds from flowing out 
of their funds. They will go as far as advertising past superior performance to attract 
more money, although, it is usually stated that past performances are not reliable 
predictors of future performance. Wang et al. (2010) allude that some funds even 
change their names and literature documents that, in such instances, these funds do 
experience a change of fortunes. However, the most common activity by fund 
managers to keep funds flowing in, is that of moving money across different styles 
depending on their performance, which is called style drifting (Bryant and Liu, 2011).  
As much as this activity of drifting across styles seems plausible, Barberis and 
Shleifer (2003) and Eling and Faust (2010), are of the belief that chasing past 
winners and dumping losers may attract externalities and consequences. Examples 
of such could be transitional term momentum and lengthy reversals in prices at the 
style level, since previous style returns help to clarify the cross section of anticipated 
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returns for individual stocks (Moneta, 2015). While most studies support style 
investing as an important tool for explaining fund returns and fund flows, some 
studies contrast these hypotheses. Pomorski (2004) and Cuthbertson and Nitzsche 
(2013) investigate the influence of style-level information on mutual fund flows, as 
alluded to in previous studies, and they discovered that the style investing 
proposition of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) inadequately illustrates the behaviour of 
mutual fund flows. Pomorski (2004) further asserts that mutual fund investors utilise 
styles to gauge separate fund returns, while ignoring to account for style-level 
information which maximizes the convexities in the performance-fund flow 
connection. From this analysis, Liwei and Peng (2012) conclude that fund flows are 
more responsive to low returns, which minimizes the convexity, other than equity 
styles. The next section discusses the links between style investing and asset 
allocation. It also lays down the proponents of the Returns Based Style Analysis 
(RBSA) method of investing, which is the principal method used in this study. 
 
2.3 Returns Based Style Analysis 
Style analysis can be described as a statistical evaluation which identifies viable 
investment opportunities in indices that closely replicate the true performance of a 
fund over a period of time (Gilbert and Strugnell, 2010). This section discusses the 
dynamics of style analysis, the functions of this technique and the specific types of 
style analysis available, together with a collective comparison of these types. The 
primary objective of style analysis is to separate a portfolio manager’s returns into 
two components, namely: style and skill. According to Fung and Hsieh (1996), style 
is the factor caused by market movements, whereas skill is manger-specific, that is, 
it relates to the expertise of a manager that contributes to earning a higher return. 
The different asset classes, or styles, used by investors usually share a dominant 
common characteristic (Patton, 2009).  
These characteristics can be based on things such as, regulation of asset, markets 
in which asset is traded, or the fundamental characteristics of the asset (Barberis 
and Shleifer, 2003, Verbeek and Wang, 2013). It has been found that the cash flows 
emanating from assets that share a common style are highly correlated in some 
cases, while in other cases, they tend to be largely uncorrelated and unrelated to 
each other (Weng and Trück, 2011). The styles that are used differ in time frame, 
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ranging from the relatively permanent government bonds, to the shorter frame small 
stocks (Cronqvist et al., 2015). New styles are created quite frequently, due to 
increased levels of financial innovation prevalent in the world today. Mortgage-
backed securities, which led to the occurrence of the sub-prime crisis, were one of 
the more recent styles to garner wide acclaim (Frijns et al., 2013).  
When a group of assets are identified as producing superior performance to the 
market, investors quickly latch on to this fact, and search for other assets that share 
similar characteristics to these assets. This can lead to the inception of a new style, 
as is evidenced by the discovery of the small firm effect by Banz (1981), and the 
subsequent prominence of small stocks as an investment style (Fama and French, 
2012). In style analysis, factors are first characterized into market indexes that 
represent numerous asset classes (styles) of investing.  Fletcher and Forbes (2002) 
define an asset class as a collection of assets which show a degree of economic 
homogeneity. These assets have similar attributes which distinguish them from 
alternative assets not included in the class.  
The asset class categories are derived by evaluating the characteristics of the assets 
at hand. For example, financial assets can fall into large, medium or a small-cap 
category. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Cao (2012) contend that, thereafter, 
investors select the asset class that they wish to invest in, by allocating funds into 
these classes as opposed to placing funds in individual assets. There are two main 
approaches taken in conducting a style analysis when investing, as portfolio 
managers attempt to describe the allocation of funds between different styles. These 
are the holdings-based and the returns-based approaches. Kaplan (2003) points out 
that the selection of either approach to use lies on the relative accuracy of each 
method and the preference of the researcher. In the holdings-based style analysis 
approach, the features of the portfolio, or fund, in question are derived from those of 
the individual assets that the portfolio contains over various periods in time (Bodson 
et al., 2010).  
Researchers who have employed this method, such as Kaplan (2003) and Bodson et 
al., 2010), though, have noted that it is very difficult to analyse assets at the 
individual security level, due to all the noise in what happens to that particular 
security. Holmes and Faff (2008), in particular, discovered that the holdings-based 
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technique requires the upkeep of very costly databases, and the expensive nature of 
this technique has meant that only a few firms actually perform the holdings-based 
technique. A more popular, and lower-cost technique to analyse the risk adjusted 
performance of mutual funds in style analysis, is the aforementioned Returns Based 
Style Analysis (RBSA) initiated by Sharpe (1992). In this approach, a multi factor 
asset class model is developed to explain fund returns. The portfolio or fund’s 
historical returns are regressed against a set of passive reference portfolios. The 
factors of the asset class model are the underlying asset class and style returns, 
which are derived from benchmark portfolios (Eddy, 2014). These passive reference 
portfolios are each representative of different styles (Domian and Reichenstein, 
2009). The coefficients of the reference portfolios are then taken, and the weighting 
used to form a custom portfolio, which is used as the benchmark portfolio for the 
fund in question. Since entire portfolios are analysed, the noise affecting individual 
securities is reduced substantially (Glode, 2011). The RBSA model measures the 
fund’s exposure to variations in the returns of the factors.  
Wahal and Yavuz (2013) posits that the returns-based approach is much cheaper 
and easier to perform, only limited by having to source historical information on the 
passive portfolios and the portfolio being analysed. RBSA has grown to be a broadly 
embraced analytic tool, by both practitioners and academics. Apart from diagnosing 
mishaps related to misclassification as observed by Brown and Goetzmann (1995) 
and Otten and Bams (2000), RBSA has other very useful purposes. The model can 
also be engaged in addressing issues related to performance assessment and the 
style drifting of portfolios. Sharpe (1992) contends this model to be equally useful in 
the construction of diversified portfolios.  
Researchers, like Fung and Hsieh (1996) and Kurniawan et al. (2011), ascertain that 
the RBSA model is convenient when constructing well organized portfolios of mutual 
funds with defined factor loadings. They assert that its usefulness in assessing short 
term risk of portfolios and hedge funds, as well as in evaluating their styles, is 
paramount. This research, thus, consequently focused on Sharpe (1992)’s concept 
of returns based style analysis. A key assumption of factor models, such as the 
RBSA, is that the error term, or rather the non-factor return, for one asset is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term of every other asset (Walkshäusl and 
Lobe, 2012). This leaves the asset factors themselves as the only source of 
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correlation among returns. The asset class factor model, as used by Sharpe (1992), 
can be considered a special case of a factor model, where the factor loadings, or the 
coefficients, need to sum to one as representative of a market portfolio. The return to 
a fund is then represented as the return to the portfolio of underlying asset classes 
and styles plus a residual error (Fuerst and Marcato, 2009).  
For the purpose of style analysis, Sharpe (1992) and Braga (2016) describe the 
return to the portfolio of underlying asset classes and styles, as the return 
characterised by style and market exposures. The error term component of return is 
viewed as the return attributable to stock selection or the manager’s skill. The 
practical functionality of an asset class factor model is heavily reliant on the asset 
classes selected for its implementation. While not obligatory, McDermott (2009) 
alludes that it is recommendable that the asset classes are 1) mutually exclusive, 2) 
exhaustive and 3) have returns that have low correlations with one another or, if not, 
then differing standard deviations.  Otten and Bams (2000) state that the appropriate 
choice of benchmarks is a critical element that may heavily impact the results of a 
return based style analysis. 
 
2.4 Style Drift and Style Consistency 
‘Do fund managers remain true to their stated mandates on their prospectuses?’ 
Style classification is very important for every fund in attracting fund flows and is 
highly dependent on the extent to which fund managers comply with self-reported 
fund indicators (Ainsworth et al., 2008 ). As the fund’s active stock holdings are huge 
determinants of its actual style inclination, the variation between actual and self-
stated investment style is of great significance. This ensures that the rewards of any 
given fund accrue to its investors. A fund style gives an account of the stock holding 
attributes of the fund and has, thus, turned into an important feature for investors in 
choosing a fund. Therefore, style drift can also be described as a situation where a 
mutual fund deviates from its stated investment style on its prospectus, or from its 
objective, and shifts towards another investment style (Kurniawan et al., 2011). 
Literature such as Wang et al. (2010) and Jansson et al. (2011), has on record noted 
that the movement between styles is based on the belief that diversification across 
styles presents a critical control of manager-specific risk, that is, the alpha forecast 
accuracy. Hence, this activity of moving finds between styles is concerned with the 
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objective of guaranteeing that the aggregate portfolio achieves its required risk-
return target. Evidence of fund managers straying from their declared investment 
style has been documented in several studies. Brown and Harlow (2002) propose 
that the motivation behind style drift is driven by fund managers’ desire to chase 
short-term outperformance over their rivals and to attract new asset flows and earn 
greater income for themselves. 
Although fund aggregation or drift presumes that separate fund managers hold 
superior stock-picking skills in their specific areas of expertise, this method comes 
with its own perils. Dawe et al. (2014) argue that since the portfolio of the drifting 
fund is now weighted with assets belonging to other styles, the portfolio is exposed 
to inappropriate levels of risk resulting in an unexpected risk/return trade-off for the 
fund holders. As a consequence, Dawe et al. (2014) forms the impression that style 
drift brings about an unexpected utility loss to investors and potentially results in a 
real economic loss in extreme market conditions.  
Kurniawan et al. (2011) observe that the habit of drifting amongst American mutual 
funds is so severe that investor advocacy groups and financial planning 
professionals in the US took the stance of petitioning the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC). These groups advocated that the SEC require mutual funds to 
disclose complete portfolio holdings more frequently with the aim of exposing any 
style drift in an effort to protect investors. According to DiBartolomeo and Witkowski 
(1997), style consistency is an important component in enabling a concentrated 
manager to create a blended portfolio with the ex-ante desired risk-return 
characteristics. For example, if managers tilt their portfolios away from stocks 
declared in their self-stated style specialisation, then this may lead to an increase in 
potentially diversifiable risk in the overall portfolio. Fowler et al. (2010) remark that 
such actions can lead to the extent that the managers’ active positions may correlate 
highly with other managers.  
Frijns et al. (2013) observe that style drift could, thus, have harmful effects on the 
underlying fund’s risk, performance and other fund characteristics. They therefore 
suggest that a fund manager’s self-stated investment mandate should accurately 
project information to the investor about the actual internal management of the 
portfolio. The Sharpe (1992) asset class factor (RBSA) model is often prominent in 
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discussions of consistency, style drift, definition and measurement of a fund’s style. 
In examining style consistency and drift, the R2 value from a regression of a fund’s 
returns against style benchmarks and the resultant error term from the model are 
normally used. However, some studies, e.g. Grinblatt and Titman (1992), (Andreu et 
al., 2009), Wermers (2000), Chan et al. (2002) and Baker et al. (2010) employ 
holdings based multi factor models (highlighted in the previous section) in measuring 
drift and these methods make use of rolling window graphs. These graphs aid in 
observing the change in composition of the portfolio over time, through adding 
subsequent returns as they accrue while dropping the same number of earlier data 
points.  
The main drawback, though, of the holdings based approach is that, in most cases, 
information on actual mutual fund holdings is not readily available (Andreu et al., 
2009). In addition to that, mutual fund portfolio holdings are ordinarily only available 
on a quarterly basis, hence, timely information on holdings may prove burdensome 
to obtain (Das and Uma Rao, 2013). Therefore, Kaplan (2003) argues that, if mutual 
fund managers carry out window dressing practices, inferences from reported 
portfolio holdings might be deceptive. As an alternative, Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) 
propose a different model for measuring drift called the Style Drift Score (SDS) 
whose premises are grounded on Sharpe’s (1992) style analysis model.  From the 
resultant regression of Sharpe’s (1992) RBSA model, the square root of the sum of 
the average variances of each asset class coefficient defines measure of drift of any 
fund.  
Wermers (2000) investigates style drift from the holdings based portfolio 
management perspective, through breaking down drift into both passive and active 
constituents. He found that more consistent managers (style-disciplined) were 
outperformed by their less style-consistent counterparts (drifters). However, the 
findings note that the managers as a grouping permit the portfolio’s composition to 
drift over time rather than engage in active trading to preserve a given style 
orientation. Wermers (2000), and Herrmann and Scholz (2013), confirm the widely 
held opinion that funds’ active trading, in reality, increases a portfolio’s drift. Chan et 
al. (2002) show that funds can display constancy in their stated styles through using 
the correlation among factor loadings over time from the Fama and French (1992) 
three-factor model. From separate comparisons of the size and value-growth 
24 
 
dimensions, Chan et al. (2002) and Jansson et al. (2011) observe that those funds 
that appear to drift away from their stated styles are the underperforming funds. 
Consequently, this has notable implications for multiple manager portfolio structures. 
From their discovery that managers are largely unsuccessful in timing their styles, 
Chan et al. (2002) recommend that style drift is an inevitable fund trait that requires 
monitoring. 
Contrary to this, Lau (2007) and Hsu (2014) observe that style consistency is not 
primarily a necessity for a portfolio manager for delivering performance, but rather 
suggests style rotation as a viable alternative that can improve returns. Cao (2012) 
examined hedge funds in the US for consistency and discovered that style consistent 
funds do not necessarily beat funds that exhibit less style consistency. The 
theoretical work of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Massa and Zhang (2009) 
contributes some intuition on whether style drift indeed enhances value to investors 
or not. They initiate a model of style investing with implications that stocks which 
change styles frequently are more probable to display price behaviours comparable 
to their new style cohorts. Therefore, Massa and Zhang (2009) allege that, if fund 
managers do not modify their holdings timeously and appropriately, then their 
portfolios will start drifting away from their present style orientation. 
Chen and Wermers (2005) and Van Gelderen and Huij (2014), support the notion of 
enhancing returns based on the style drift perspective of investing. In examining the 
style movement of individual stocks, that is, the shifting of stocks between style 
categories, Chen and Wermers (2005) report that such stocks attain superior returns 
in relation to their style-matched benchmarks. From a consistency point of view, their 
finding is very significant, since style migration gives rise to drift. Thus, Verbeek and 
Wang (2013) deduce that the style of a fund will tilt if fund managers do not adjust 
their portfolio on time. Style drift may, therefore, be considered reasonable on such 
grounds, in order to realize the superior yields exhibited by these high style-shifting 
stocks. Style drift may also be considered plausible under variable economic cycles 
since different stocks perform differently with any slight or marked variation in the 




2.5 Traditional Measures of Portfolio Performance 
The following models in this section are the most commonly applied performance 
evaluation measures in investment and portfolio management: 
 
2.5.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)   
The conventional theory of performance measurement prescribes that returns must 
be adjusted for risk before they can be meaningfully compared. An effortless, and 
the most common way, to adjust returns for the portfolio risk is to compare rates of 
return with those of other investment funds with similar attributes (Bodie et al., 2013). 
Absolute measures of performance are not adequate when measuring portfolio 
performance and, more specifically, manager performance (Eling and Faust, 2010). 
The establishment of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) set the foundation for modern finance and forms 
the basis of many traditional performance measures. It is set out as:  
 
               𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) +  𝑖𝑡                                                                           (1)                                                                                 
Where; 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡  = the return of the fund in excess of the risk free rate 
 𝛼𝑖    = Abnormal return of the stock, 
 𝛽𝑖    = beta of the fund 
 𝑅𝑀𝑡 = the return of the market 
 𝑅𝑓𝑡   = the risk free rate  
 𝑖𝑡 = the error term  
 
The model postulates that, in an efficient market, all of the variations in share returns 
can be explained by one single factor - the returns of the market portfolio (Džaja and 
Aljinović, 2013). This gives rise to the notion of the Efficient Market Hypothesis which 
states that market security prices fully reflect all available information on the value of 
an asset (Brown, 2011). Yu (2008) posits that this then implies that the market 
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portfolio is mean-variance efficient and an average investor cannot consistently 
outperform a simple buy-and-hold strategy of the market portfolio in the long term. 
Empirical tests on the validity of the CAPM, such as Asness et al. (2012) and Clark 
(2013), however, have identified numerous 'anomalies', which are variables other 
than the market beta that have displayed evidence of the ability to predict security 
returns beyond that explained by the market portfolio. This is one of the criticisms of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
 
2.5.2 Jensen’s alpha 
Jensen’s alpha, developed by Jensen (1968), evaluates the average return of the 
portfolio over and above that predicted by the CAPM, given the portfolio‘s beta and 
the average market return. Basically it is a risk-adjusted performance measure that 
computes the average return on a portfolio or investment, above or below, that 
predicted by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) given the portfolio's, or 
investment's beta and the average market return. This metric is frequently referred to 
as Jensen's alpha, or simply alpha. It is expressed as follows; 
 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  [𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 (𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡)]                                                                          (2) 
Where; 
𝑅𝑖𝑡   = the realized return of the portfolio 
𝑅𝑀𝑡 = the realized return of the appropriate market index   
𝑅𝑓𝑡  = the risk free rate  
𝛽𝑖 = the beta of the portfolio of investment with respect to the chosen market 
index. 
 
A positive alpha value denotes a portfolio whose returns are above those suggested 
by its level of systematic risk and, thus, superior performance (Lai and Lau, 2010).  
In a similar manner, negative or zero values designate inferior or neutral 
performances respectively. In essence it can be inferred that, if Jensen’s alpha is 
significantly positive, it signals evidence of a genuinely skilled fund manager, whilst a 
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significantly negative Jensen’s alpha signals evidence of a poorly performing fund 
manager making investment decisions to the detriment of fund value (Capelle‐
Blancard and Monjon, 2014).  
Hence, investors are looking for positive alpha funds where it infers that fund 
managers are making positive investment decisions that are adding value to the 
fund.  Akinjolire and Smit (2003) suggest that the alpha parameter is of noteworthy 
value, since its sampling distribution is inferred from the least-squares regression 
theory. This then enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the statistical 
significance of any specific alpha estimate. Le Sourd (2007) criticizes the Jensen’s 
Alpha in that its results are dependent on the choice of reference index. Additionally, 
Le Sourd (2007) and Ho et al. (2014), allude that alpha only accounts for systematic 
risk and, therefore, is only appropriate when ranking portfolios within peer groups, 
since these are managed in a homologous manner and, thus, have comparable 
levels of risk. 
 
2.5.3 The Sharpe Ratio 
Sharpe (1966) presents a risk-adjusted measure commonly used for performance 
evaluation known as Sharpe’s ratio. It computes the quotient of the average portfolio 
excess return over the observation period divided by the standard deviation of 
returns over that period. It measures the reward to total volatility trade-off, or 
sometimes termed as the reward to variability ratio. It is expressed as follows; 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓)
𝜎𝑝
                                                                                                  (3) 
Where; 
𝑅𝑝 = expected return of the portfolio 
𝑅𝑓  = risk free rate  




Basically, the Sharpe ratio is a measure for calculating a risk-adjusted return, and 
has become the industry standard for such calculations (Bailey and Lopez de Prado, 
2012). The Sharpe ratio is the average return earned in excess of the risk-free rate 
per unit of total risk or volatility. The risk-free rate is subtracted from the mean return, 
and, therefore, the performance related to risk-taking activities can be identified. The 
intuitiveness associated with this calculation, is that a portfolio engaging in “zero risk” 
investment, like an investment in U.S. Treasury bills (for which the expected return is 
the risk-free rate), will have a Sharpe ratio of exactly zero (Homm and Pigorsch, 
2012). In general, the larger the value of the Sharpe ratio, the more appealing the 
risk-adjusted return. 
However, the Sharpe ratio has been criticized as being unreliable when implemented 
in portfolios whose expected returns do not have a normal distribution. Homm and 
Pigorsch (2012) contend that most portfolios are found to have a high degree of 
kurtosis, or negative skewness. Bayraktar et al. (2009) criticizes the Sharpe ratio on 
the grounds that it falls short in the analysis of portfolios possessing significant non-
linear risks, such as warrants or options. Different risk-adjusted return methodologies 
have surfaced over time to fill this rift, and these include the Treynor Ratio, Sortino 
Ratio and the Return over Maximum Drawdown (RoMaD). 
The Modern Portfolio Theory, proposed by Harry Markowitz, proclaims that adding 
assets that have correlations of less than one with each other to a diversified 
portfolio can lower the overall portfolio risk without forfeiting return (Swamy, 2013). 
Therefore critics argue that such kinds of diversification may serve to inflate the 
Sharpe ratio of a portfolio. Another observation noted by critics of the Sharpe ratio, is 
that it can also be manipulated by portfolio managers and hedge funds seeking to 
improve their risk-adjusted returns history. Low (2012) contends that managers can 
manipulate the Sharpe ratio by extending the evaluation interval, which results in a 
lesser estimate of volatility. An example of such, is the annualized standard deviation 
of daily returns which is ordinarily excessive compared to that of weekly returns, 
which is, in turn, higher than that of monthly returns. Bai et al. (2011) remarks that 
fund managers can also exploit the Sharpe ratio by compounding the monthly 




Additionally managers may influence the ratio by writing out-of-the-money calls and 
puts on a portfolio (Chen et al., 2011a). This tactic can probably inflate the return by 
accumulating the option premium without paying off for several years. Strategies 
involving undertaking huge risks (e.g. liquidity risk, default risk, or other forms of 
catastrophic risk) have similar potential to disclose an upward biased Sharpe ratio. 
Studies like those of Schuster and Auer (2012) and Rapach et al. (2013) put forward 
the 1998 liquidity crisis as an example of such occurrences, where the Sharpe ratios 
of market-neutral hedge funds changed drastically, pre- and post the crisis. Their 
studies find that managers were utilising particular derivative instruments to smooth 
returns and were also employing pricing models that downplay monthly gains or 
losses. Asness et al. (2012) adds that the irregular marking to market of illiquid 
assets can greatly decrease reported volatility. From their study they discover that 
getting rid of extreme returns can influence the Sharpe ratio, since such returns 
inflate the reported standard deviation of a hedge fund. Thus, a manager may 
choose to eliminate the top and the least monthly returns yearly to lessen the total 
volatility. 
 
2.5.4 The Treynor Ratio 
Treynor (1965)  proposed his own risk adjusted measure, which evaluates excess 
return per unit of risk. The measure utilises systematic risk instead of total risk and is 
called the Treynor ratio. The Treynor ratio, also known as the reward-to-volatility 
ratio, presents returns above those that might have been gained on a riskless 
investment, per each unit of market risk (Le Sourd, 2007).  It is calculated as follows: 
      
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓)
𝛽𝑝
                                                                                               (4) 
 
Where: 
𝑅𝑝 = expected return of the portfolio  
𝑅𝑓 = risk free rate 
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𝛽𝑝 =  beta of the portfolio. 
   
This measure makes use of the relation that exists between risk and annualized risk-
adjusted return. Essentially, the ratio seeks to evaluate how successful an 
investment is in delivering compensation to investors, considering the risk level for 
the investment. The Treynor ratio is dependent on beta, which is, the sensitivity of an 
investment to movements in the market to measure risk. This metric is grounded on 
the premise that risk characteristic to the entire market, as represented by beta, must 
be penalized, since diversification will not remove it (Rahman and Uddin, 2009). 
Whenever the value of the Treynor ratio is high, it is indicative that an investor has 
produced high returns on each of the market risks undertaken. Meyer-Pretorius and 
Wolmarans (2006) allude that the Treynor ratio enables an awareness of how each 
investment within a portfolio is performing. More so, it clarifies to the investor how 
efficiently capital is being utilised. 
However, critics have argued that the Treynor ratio does not incorporate any added 
value obtained from active portfolio management, saying that it is merely a ranking 
criterion. Le Sourd (2007) contends that a list of portfolios, ranked based on the 
Treynor ratio, is convenient only when regarded miniature portfolios, which are 
actually sub-portfolios of a bigger, fully diversified portfolio. Otherwise, portfolios with 
differing total risk, but similar systematic risk, will be rated or ranked exactly the 
same. Another weakness pointed out about the Treynor ratio, is its backward-looking 
nature (Dhanda et al., 2012). Therefore, investments will inevitably perform 
differently in the future than they did in the past. 
 
2.5.5 The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
Subsequently, Ross (1976) introduced the Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 
which is commonly known as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) model. The theory 
became instantly popular in estimating asset prices due to its inherent assumptions. 
It assumes that the return of an asset is dependent on various macroeconomic, 
market and security-specific factors.  
Specifically, the theory states that a particular security's returns may have 
statistically significant sensitivities to a number of factors and, hence, exposure to 
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most of these factors can be eliminated through the process of diversification 
(Sadorsky, 2010). The factors that cannot be diversified away, result in investors 
requiring a risk premium in the form of higher expected returns. Since the number 
and nature of the systematic factors are not specified, the APT has stimulated 
numerous investigations attempting to identify potential variables that have predictive 
powers over share prices. The model is expressed as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑟𝑗) =  𝑟𝑓  +  𝑏𝑗1𝑅𝑃1 +  𝑏𝑗2𝑅𝑃2 +  𝑏𝑗3𝑅𝑃3 +  𝑏𝑗4𝑅𝑃4 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑗𝑛𝑅𝑃𝑛                                   (5)                             
             
Where: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑗) = the asset's expected rate of return 
𝑟𝑓          = the risk-free rate 
𝑏𝑗𝑛     = the sensitivity of the asset's return to the particular factor n 
𝑅𝑃𝑛   = the risk premium associated with the particular factor n. 
 
The conventional idea behind the APT is that two things can capture the anticipated 
return on a financial asset: 1) macroeconomic/security-specific influences and 2) the 
asset's sensitivity to those influences (Hillier et al., 2011). This relation takes the form 
of a linear regression formula, as shown above. An unlimited number of security-
specific factors may influence any given security at any point in time. These factors 
include exchange rates, Gross National Product (GNP), inflation, production 
measures, investor confidence, market indices and changes in interest rates. It is the 
analyst’s discretion to decide which influences are pertinent to the asset being 
analysed. 
Ruf (2013) asserts that once the analyst obtains the expected rate of return of the 
asset from the APT model, he can establish what the "correct" price of the asset 
should be by inserting the rate into a relevant discounted cash flow model. The APT 
model is thus applicable to portfolios, as well as specific securities, since a portfolio 
can have exposures and sensitivities to certain kinds of risk factors as well. Ross 
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(1976) explains that, at the time, the APT was a revolutionary model because it 
allows the user to adapt the model to the security being analysed. He further asserts 
that, as with other pricing models, it enables the user to decide whether a security is 
undervalued or overvalued so he can profit from this information.  Basu and Chawla 
(2012) add that the APT is also very useful for building portfolios, because it enables 
managers to examine the exposures of their portfolios to particular factors. 
Various studies like those of Shaw et al. (2008) and Gromb and Vayanos (2010) 
have argued that although the APT may be more customizable than the CAPM, it is 
also more strenuous to apply, because ascertaining which factors impact a stock or 
portfolio takes a substantial amount of research. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) 
hypothesize that it can be extremely impractical to identify every influential factor, 
much less discern how sensitive the security is to a certain factor. However, Gromb 
and Vayanos (2010) add that getting "close enough" is often good enough, since, in 
fact, some studies note that about four or five factors will generally explain the bulk 
of a security's return. The commonly suggested factors are investor confidence, 
shocks in inflation, GNP, and shifts in the yield curve, that is, the term structure of 
interest rates (Blitz et al., 2012). 
 
2.5.6 The Fama-French 3 Factor Model  
Building on this perspective, Fama and French (1993) proposed a 3 factor model to 
describe fund returns. Their model incorporates the market factor, value factor, size 
factor and an error term that proxies for returns not attributable to the model. The 
generally accepted interpretation of the market and Fama and French (1993) factor 
model, particularly based on US data, is that it represents risk factors, or proxies to 
risk factors, and its use justifies a risk based interpretation. It is expressed as follows; 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽1𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡)  +  𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +   𝑖𝑡                                           (6)                                             
Where;  
 𝑅𝑖𝑡       = return of fund 𝑖 at time t in excess of the risk free rate 
𝛼𝑖  = abnormal return of the fund 
𝛽1𝑖  = beta of the fund 
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𝑅𝑀𝑡  = the return of the market measured by the relevant market index 
𝑅𝑓𝑡       = the risk free rate 
𝛽2𝑖       = sensitivity of the funds returns to the size factor 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  = the small capitalization portfolio less the large capitalization portfolio 
(size factor) 
𝛽3𝑖       = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the value factor  
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  = the high book-to-market funds less the low book-to-market funds 
(value factor) 
𝑖𝑡  = the error term or residual term 
Basically the Fama and French 3 Factor Model expands on the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) by adding size and value factors to the market risk factor in CAPM. 
The model takes into account the assertion that small-cap and value stocks 
outperform markets on a frequent basis. With the inclusion of these two additional 
factors, the model adjusts for the outperformance trend, which is perceived to make 
it a better tool in assessing manager performance (Das and Uma Rao, 2013). 
However, there is plenty of debate about whether the outperformance trend is due to 
market efficiency or market inefficiency.  
On the efficiency side of the debate, the outperformance is predominantly described 
by the excess risk that small-cap and value stocks encounter as a result of their 
higher cost of capital and greater business risk (Chen and Zhang, 2010) . On the 
inefficiency side, the outperformance is explained by market players incorrectly 
pricing the value of these companies, which gives the excess return in the long run 
as the value adjusts (Eraslan, 2013). Literature notes that investors who subscribe to 
the body of evidence ascribed by the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), are more 
likely to side with the efficiency side. 
However, Fama and French (1993) are quick to point out that, while value 
outperforms  growth and small stocks outperform large ones, over the long term, 
investors should be able to withstand the excess short-term volatility and periodic 
underperformance that may transpire in a given short-term time frame. Investors with 
a long-term time horizon of 15 years or more, will be compensated for any pain they 
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might suffer in the short term. Fama and French (1993) conducted numerous studies 
to test their model, using thousands of random stock portfolios. They discovered 
that, when size and value factors are merged with the market factor, these could 
then explain as much as 95% of returns in a diversified holding of stock portfolio.  
Hence, the three factor model developed by Fama and French (1993) has been 
widely accepted to explain the performance of mutual funds more efficiently. In 
addition to the market proxy, the further two influences which are used to capture the 
risk premium (size and value) have been found to be very significant in explaining 
asset returns. However, critics like Taneja (2010) have argued that, while the Fama 
and French (1993) three factor model already enhances the average pricing errors 
experienced by the CAPM model, it is incapable of determining the cross-sectional 
disparities in momentum sorted portfolio returns. Carhart (1997) updated this model 
with the addition of a fourth factor, the momentum factor to proxy for momentum 
strategies employed by fund managers in buying recent past winners and selling 
recent past losers. 
 
2.5.7 The Carhart 4 Factor Model 
Consequently, the four factor model developed by Carhart (1997) improves the 
Fama and French (1993) three factor model by including an additional factor that 
incorporates the momentum variance captured by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).  
The resultant model incorporates four risk factors which is a consistent market 
balanced model. In addition, this four factor Carhart (1997) model can be construed 
as a performance attributive model shown as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽1𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡)  +  𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑖𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡  +  𝑖𝑡                     (7)
   
Where 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  = is the return of the fund in excess of the risk free rate 




𝛼𝑖  = abnormal return of the stock 
𝛽1𝑖  = beta of the fund  
𝑅𝑀𝑡  = the return of the market measured by the relevant market index  
𝛽2𝑖        = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the size factor 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  = the small capitalization portfolio less the large capitalization portfolio 
(size factor) 
 𝛽3𝑖     = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the value factor 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 = the high book-to-market funds less the low book-to-market funds 
(value factor) 
  𝛽4𝑖     = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the momentum factor 
𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 = the returns of a portfolio with past winners less the returns of a 
portfolio with past losers  
𝑖𝑡 = the error term 
 
2.5.8 The Fama-French 5 Factor Model  
More recently, Fama and French (2015) have introduced a five factor model, adding 
two more factors into their original 1993 model, with the hope of better performance 
in capturing variability patterns in stock returns, although it is still a work in progress. 
Their reasoning behind this move is from the criticism of the three factor model.  
Critics had been complaining about the three factor model, saying that it is an 
insufficient model for measuring expected returns, since all three factors fail to 
account for much of the variation in average returns associated with profitability and 
investment. Inspired by such reasoning, Fama and French (2015) add the 
profitability and investment variables to the original three factor model and their new 
look five factor model can be expressed as follows; 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽1𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡)  +  𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +





𝑅𝑖𝑡  = is the return of the fund in excess of the risk free rate 
𝑅𝑓𝑡  = the risk free rate measured by the yield on a 3 month (91 day) 
Treasury bill 
𝛼𝑖  = abnormal return of the stock 
𝛽1𝑖  = beta of the fund  
𝑅𝑀𝑡  = the return of the market measured by the relevant market index 
𝛽2𝑖        = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the size factor 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  = the small capitalization portfolio less the large capitalization portfolio 
(size factor) 
 𝛽3𝑖     = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the value factor 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 = the high book-to-market funds less the low book-to-market funds 
(value factor) 
𝛽4𝑖      = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the profitability factor 
𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 = difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks with 
robust and weak profitability (profitability factor) 
𝛽5𝑖      = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the investment factor 
𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 = difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of the stocks 
of low and high investment firms, usually called conservative and aggressive 
(Investment factor) 
𝑖𝑡 = the error term        
Since their model is relatively new, it is still being subjected to thorough scrutiny and 
investigation of its applicability by scholars and practitioners alike. However, Fama 
and French (2015) themselves have made it clear that their model is far from perfect. 
They highlight that the five-factor model’s biggest challenge is its inefficacy to 
express accurately the low average returns on small stocks, whose returns act like 
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those of firms that invest a lot in spite of low profitability. Fama and French (2015) 
further add that the model’s performance is not sensitive to the way its factors are 
defined. Hence, with the inclusion of the profitability and investment factors, the 
value factor of the three-factor model becomes redundant in explaining average 
returns in the sample they investigated. 
Critics have already been weighing in with thorough analyses of the model, most of 
which are fault-finding. Opinions on the main implications of the model are divided, 
with most voicing their discontent that the addition of the two quality factors is still 
premature. Other critics point out that the new model still ignores low volatility and 
momentum. However, as the authors have highlighted, their work is still in progress, 
hence, improvements on this model might be effected soon.        
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the effectiveness of all the traditional 
performance models highlighted in this section is benchmark dependant. 
Researchers Researchers like Cici (2012) and Braga (2016) have noted, over time, 
that the outcomes of any regression are highly conditional on the choice of 
benchmark indices used. The divergence in most results is often due to the differing 
proxies for the market benchmark and the risk free rate employed in that specific 
study. Von Wielligh and Smit (2000) lends weight to this view by adding that 
conclusions reached in any one study of performance are model and benchmark 
dependent.  
In a South African context, Van Rensburg (2001) found out that, when accounting for 
market risk, two individual factors, as opposed to one general market factor, better 
describes this risk. Van Rensburg (2001) builds on prior research by Van Rensburg 
and Slaney (1997) which had found that, using the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
model, two factors most appropriately describe market risk in the JSE. These two 
factors were said to be the JSE All Gold and Industrial Indices. Van Rensburg (2001) 
updated these two factors to the Resources and Financial-Industrial Indices. 
    
2.6 Market Timing 
Market timing is generally viewed as the ability of the fund manager to profitably 
move from one asset class to another. The original Jensen technique to calculate 
alpha, whether from the market model or from multi-factor models, does not 
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distinguish between market timing and fund manager skill in security selection 
(Moneta, 2015). Skilled fund managers, in addition to trying to select the most under-
priced stocks given the risk objective of the fund, can also increase returns by timing 
the market based on their expectations of future market movements. Clark (2013) 
posits that fund managers can exhibit market timing skills by switching into 
defensive, low beta stocks in bear markets and aggressive, high beta shares in bull 
markets. If fund managers can successfully time the market, then returns to the fund 
will be high in bull markets due to investment in aggressive stocks and still relatively 
high in bear markets due to switching to defensive stocks.  
Various performance measurement models endeavour to distinguish security 
selection capability from market timing ability, or the ability to forecast the market 
returns. Although alpha ordinarily measures both, market-timing models were 
developed to distinguish between these two aspects of performance. The two most 
common tests for market timing used in the literature are those of Treynor and 
Mazuy (1966) and Henrikson and Merton (1981). These have been used extensively 
in recent studies like those of DeAngelo et al. (2010), Kostakis et al. (2011) and 
Bolton et al. (2013). However, it has been noted that most fund managers are not 
able to successfully time the markets, and thus, such actions may have dire 
consequences since investors are now exposed to a higher level of risk per unit of 
return than they were willing to take initially (Qian and Shi, 2010).      
 
2.6.1 The Treynor-Mazuy Model 
The Treynor and Mazuy (1966) test of market timing imposes a quadratic term in the 
factor model to capture market timing and is famously referred to as the Treynor-
Mazuy model. Numerous studies on market timing ability, such as Patton (2009), 
Kostakis et al. (2011) and Hoffman (2012), normally boost standard factor model 
regressions with a term that captures the convexity of fund returns derived from 
market timing. In the single factor model the quadratic term attempts to capture the 
nonlinear relation between excess fund returns and excess market returns. With 
regard to the Treynor-Mazuy model, the sign on the estimated coefficient of the 
quadratic term, and whether it is statistically different from zero, captures market-
timing ability. Kostakis et al. (2011) asserts that if the market timing coefficient is 
significantly positive then it represents a convex, upward sloping regression line and 
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indicates a confirmation of successful market timing by the portfolio manager. Thus, 
the coefficient will be positive if the manager raises beta upon acquiring a positive 
signal about the market. The hypothesis of no timing ability suggests that the 
coefficient ‘Ƴ’ on the quadratic term is zero or negative. The model is expressed as 
follows; 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽1𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) +  Ƴ(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡)
2
+   𝑖𝑡                                                            (9)                                                  
  
Where the formula follows the same format as the CAPM model, with the only 
exception being the addition of the squared market risk premium term preceded by 
the coefficient ‘Ƴ’ for market timing.                   
 
2.6.2 Henrikson - Merton Model 
Henrikson and Merton (1981) developed an identical model (popularly known as the 
Henrikson-Merton model) of market timing by capturing the convex association 
between the return of a successful market timer's portfolio and the market return. 
However, their model allows the portfolio's beta (risk) to oscillate between two levels 
conditional on the size of the market's excess return.  
The Henrikson-Merton model tests for market timing ability using a similar regression 
to the Treynor-Mazuy model, with the only difference in the quadratic term being a + 
sign for the superscript instead of the 2 for the squared term. This term represents 
the maximum eigenvalue between zero and the market risk premium, and, thus, if its 
coefficient (δ) is significantly positive then it indicates evidence of successful market 
timing by the fund manager (Bodnaruk et al., 2015). The model is expressed as 
follows; 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽1𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) +  𝛿(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡)
+
+   𝑖𝑡                                                         (10)                                                
           
Where (𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡)
+
  = Max (0,𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡)                                                            (11)    
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In essence, both market timing methods try to capture the non-linearity of fund 
managers performing better than expected in bull markets and not performing as bad 
as expected in bear markets. Expression (11) above can also be written as (𝑅𝑀𝑡 −
 𝑅𝑓𝑡)
+
  = (𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡)𝐷 where D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when 
(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) positive and 0 otherwise. The magnitude of 𝛿 computes the disparity 
between the target betas, and will be positive for a portfolio manager that 
successfully times the market.  
In other words, Henrikson and Merton (1981) advocates that the beta of the portfolio 
takes only 2 values. If the excess return on the market is positive, (𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡)
+
 will 
be 1, otherwise it will be zero. Hence the beta of the portfolio is 𝛽1𝑖 +  𝛿  in bull 
markets and 𝛽1𝑖 in bear markets from equation (10). 
A large body of evidence such as Blitz et al. (2012), Clark (2013) and Philippon 
(2015), exists which corroborates the EMH in reference tests of the market timing 
capability of portfolio managers. Accordingly, literature has it on record that future 
market movements are implicitly uncertain and, thus, investors who do not precisely 
forecast the market would face grave consequences (Malhotra, 2012). 
 
2.7 Style Analysis and Stock Selection Ability 
Several researchers, such as Taneja (2010), Thomas (2012) and Keywood (2015), 
have come out in support of the value added by active mutual fund management 
through proper stock selection. Wermers (2000) conducted a study on mutual fund 
performance on the US markets to find out whether mutual fund managers who 
actively traded stocks do add value or not after adjusting for style exposure. He 
decomposes returns into style, stock-picking talent, transaction costs and talent. The 
study finds that the stocks held in most of the funds outperform the market by 1.3 
percent annually, however, their net returns underperform the market by one 
percent. Wermers (2000) adds that, out of the 2.3 percent difference between these 
results, 0.7 percent is attributed to the underperformance of non-stock holdings, 
whereas 1.6 percent is due to expenses and transaction costs. In his conclusion he 
noted that the funds under study select stocks well enough to conceal their costs and 
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that high-turnover funds consistently beat the Vanguard Index 500 fund on a net 
return basis.  
Bodson et al. (2010) make two important distinctions in identifying the main uses of 
the style investing technique, which are performance analysis and style analysis. 
They identify style investing as a key means of evaluating the performance of 
different professional fund managers. Their method is based on the premise that the 
creation of a style automatically created a peer group of managers who also pursue 
that particular style. The performances of the managers within that group can thus 
be compared to each other, in order to ascertain which managers were 
outperforming the market and which were not.  
This observation has led to managers increasingly being evaluated relative to a 
particular relevant performance benchmark index. Muller and Ward (2013) adds that 
style analysis may also be used to determine the relevant factor exposures of a 
particular fund. This deals with issues such as identifying the type of assets that are 
being invested in by the fund manager, what style of asset the particular fund 
behaves like overall, and whether a fund-specific benchmark could be established. 
 
2.7.1 Strengths of Style Analysis 
Lau (2007) provides support for and advocates using Sharpe’s return-based style 
analysis technique, in an attempt to pursue more useful and suitable performance 
information. Using this technique, one is able to perform a more effective peer 
comparison of manager performance than would otherwise not be the case. Funds 
that display discrepancies between the stated investment style objectives and the 
actual investment style of the fund can be identified easier (Schneeweis et al., 2012). 
The only data needed to perform style analysis is historical return data, which is 
much easier to collect than holding data, a requirement of the alternative holdings-
based analysis (Lucas and Riepe, 1996, Domian and Reichenstein, 2009). This 
results in the style analysis being able to be performed without access to data that is 
only available to insiders of the company, as return data can be sourced from a 
number of outside sources. Fowler et al. (2010) add that Sharpe’s method is less 
costly than other methods, and much quicker, since it is based on timely information. 
Due to its simplistic nature, in circumstances in which a manager’s style is stable and 
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consistent, this style analysis can be very useful if applied correctly as alluded to by 
Christopherson et al. (1998) and Wahal and Yavuz (2013). 
2.7.2 Weaknesses of Style Analysis  
The return-based style analysis, proposed by Sharpe, also poses a few problems for 
investors looking to undertake it. There are problems arising from the classes of 
asset styles chosen, including the makeup of the style indices used to represent a 
particular style, as well as the extent of correlation that exists between the different 
indices (Pattarin et al., 2004, Weng and Trück, 2011). This multicollinearity in the 
index’s data may result in inconsistent factor weightings, as well as results that are 
insignificant. Using this regression-based technique to classify manager style, 
implies that the future behaviour of the fund manager will be consistent with their 
historical performance (Christopherson, 1995, McDermott, 2009). This is not 
necessarily always the case, and the style analysis is flawed in that sense. 
The inherent assumption in the style analysis, that the exposures to the different 
styles stay constant over time for the portfolio, or in other words, that the obtained 
results from the analysis are representative of the average allocation of funds across 
the various styles over a certain period, creates problems due to this not being the 
case in the real world (Annaert and Van Campenhout, 2007). Issues exist with the 
limitations placed on the coefficients by the non-negativity and sum to one clauses, 
as these are very often violated in the real world.  
DiBartolomeo and Witkowski (1997) and Schwindler and Oehler (2011) identify the 
use of an arbitrary cut-off point for determining when a fund’s style is misclassified as 
being a pitfall in the usage of style analysis for classification. This cut-off point is 
highly subjective, and is greatly open to bias by the analyst. Style analysis is based 
on the assumption that a linear relationship exists in the investment strategy of the 
fund being analysed. Brown and Goetzmann (1997), Ainsworth et al. (2008 ) and 
Wahal and Yavuz (2013) assert that, while it is often the case that funds follow non-
linear strategies, this usually creates misclassifications in the results of the analysis. 
  
2.8 Unit Trusts Performance 
Numerous researchers have noted varying patterns in average stock returns when 
profiling the performance of unit trusts relative to their benchmark indices. Since 
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these patterns in average returns, apparently, are not captured by the CAPM, they 
are often referred to as anomalies. Additionally, they are perceived to play a huge 
role in determining mutual funds’ performances (Fama and French, 1996, Norma et 
al., 2010). In profiling outperformance of the index benchmark by mutual funds, 
differing opinions and conclusions arise with no clear consensus. Various studies 
attribute this to different factors, such as, the location where the study was 
conducted, the performance evaluation measures used, proxy for market 
benchmark, and the type of the risk free rate employed in the analysis.  
Literature has proposed varying postulations and methods that could possibly help 
explain the performance of mutual funds. Most studies have employed the standard 
performance evaluation measures in evaluating performance, which are the Sharpe 
ratio, Jensen alpha, Fama and French 3-factor model, Carhart 4- factor model, the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model and also the Arbitrage Pricing theory model. 
Cuthbertson et al. (2008)  argue that market timing, luck or manager skill, type of 
data used, size, power, false discoveries, benchmark portfolio etc., play a role in 
determining performance. Using the Carhart 4-factor model, they conclude that 0-5% 
of funds, in the UK and US, do record positive alphas whereas about 20% of funds 
record extremely poor alpha performance. Cuthbertson et al. (2008) postulates the 
key drivers of performance to be load fees, expenses and turnover. 
Hassan (2005) applied the CAPM, and Fama and French 3 factor model, in 
evaluating the performance of a sample of 470 UK unit trusts between 1986 and 
2001. His analysis yields that fund managers underperform the market after 
controlling for risk factors and suggests investing in a passive index as a better 
option. Following on this work, Clark (2013) examined UK equity unit trusts between 
1980 and 2007 using the CAPM and Fama-French model too. He also finds little 
evidence that UK equity unit trusts produce abnormal returns, which adds weight to 
the earlier reasoning by Hassan (2005) that passive investing is better than active 
investing. Fletcher and Marshall (2005), Gregory and Tonks (2004), Giles et al. 
(2002), Bashir and Nawang (2011) find similar results of underperformance of UK 
unit trusts relative to the market. 
Low (2012) analysed unit trusts performance in the Malaysian market using the Net 
Asset values of 65 unit trusts, the 91 day Malaysian Treasury bill for risk free proxy 
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and the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index for the market. Applying the market timing 
model of Henrikson and Merton (1981), Low’s (2012) analysis discovered that large 
funds, in essence, enhance managers’ timing returns, reflecting the efficiencies of 
large funds in responding to market-wide movements. However, Low (2012) attests 
that, as the size of the fund gets larger, managers find it more challenging to identify 
worthwhile investments which results in poor selectivity performance. In South 
Africa, the picture is not vividly clear whether mutual funds underperform or 
outperform the market. Akinjolire and Smit (2003) analysed the South African mutual 
funds’ performance and their strategies in a changing economic climate from 1989-
2002. As per the trend in most studies, they found no conclusive evidence of 
outperformance. Akinjolire and Smit (2003) applied the Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
model to a sample of 7 general equity unit trusts, the lagged dividend yield of the 
FTSE/JSE ALSI, and the term structure of interest rates as market factors in their 
analysis.  
In a recent actuarial society publication paper, Bertolis and Hayes (2014) 
investigated 92 South African general equity unit trusts, during different economic 
periods, between 1994 and 2012. Employing the CAPM and Jensen’s alpha 
techniques, they report that unit trusts are shown to have underperformed in 
economic downturns and outperformed in periods of robust growth, while no 
conclusions could be made about unit trust performance during periods of average 
growth. Overall, their finding is that unit trusts showed slight outperformance, but this 
was not found to be persistent. These contrasting findings motivated this study in 
order to fill in the gaps in vital information that investors need for formulating their 
investment decisions. 
 
2.9 Evidence of Persistence 
Wessels and Krige (2005) studied the performance persistence of equity funds in the 
South African Unit Trust Industry against the ALSI index benchmark over the period 
1988 to 2003. They found that few funds exhibited extraordinary persistence - either 
in out-performing or under-performing. In general, they found that, over the short 
term, i.e. month-to-month and quarter-to-quarter basis, there is a tendency that the 
current performance of a fund would be repeated.  That is, there is a greater 
tendency among the top performing funds to remain top performers. Interestingly, 
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Wessels and Krige (2005) discovered that, when the persistence of fund 
performance is measured on a year-to-year basis, there is less consistency identified 
among the funds. They, hence, warn investors of the danger of placing their trust in 
only one active manager in that, in the long run, the performance ranking of 
managers can assume a random nature if manager skill is not persistent. 
Von Wielligh and Smit (2000) used the CAPM model, a two factor APT model and a 
three factor APT model, to analyse the performance persistence in South African unit 
trusts from 1988 to 1997. They found evidence of both short term and long term 
persistence, however, they noticed that the APT models were more powerful than 
the single factor CAPM model in explaining the relative returns of the portfolios. This 
is on account of the APT models explaining almost all the cross-sectional variations 
in expected returns. In their study, Von Wiellligh and Smit (2000), unearthed that the 
worst performing unit trusts tend to stay worst performers, average performers had 
the potential of becoming top performers while top performers over time tended to 
become average performers. Viviers et al. (2009) arrived at a similar conclusion in 
their study of performance persistence amongst South African mutual funds. 
Nana (2012) examined a sample of 151 South African domestic equity unit trusts 
from 2001 to 2010, to investigate whether these unit trusts are able to outperform the 
market and if such performance persists. Using six different models, Nana (2012) 
found no conclusive evidence of outperformance by the unit trusts, although 
evidence of short run persistence was found. This persistence seemed to decrease 
over the long run and diminishing completely in some cases. With respect to 
European markets,  Eriksson and Persson (2012 ) found that performance 
persistence on the Swedish market did actually exist when they tested 8 Swedish 
mutual fund categories for one-year persistence on the risk- neutral returns. Their 
study used both an auto-regression of present returns on past returns, and a cross 
product ratio test between 1992 and 2011. They asserted that notable proof of 
persistence was found in funds investing in Sweden, Europe and globally.  
In the South African context, Keywood (2015) examines the potential for 
outperformance and persistence among South African unit trusts using the 
Recursive Portfolio Approach to test for persistence.  Results from his study are 
largely in line with South African literature findings, as short term persistence is 
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established for equity, balanced, and fixed-income funds, but not for property funds 
or other funds. Keywood’s (2015) findings also confirm the South African 
phenomenon, that persistence is observed to diminish over longer investment 
horizons. Thomas (2012) improves on an earlier study by Collinet and Firer (2003), 
in which they had  investigated the characteristics of performance persistence 
amongst South African general equity unit trust funds. Thomas (2012) focused on 
testing whether the performance of a fund in one period can be used to predict the 
performance of that fund in a subsequent period. He made the interesting discovery 
that results for performance persistence studies over longer time periods are highly 
sensitive to the beginning and ending dates selected in the test being performed. 
Thus, from his analysis, no conclusive evidence is found that performance persists 
over the 1, 2 and 3 year holding periods tested. 
Using a sample free of survivorship-bias covering the period 2000-2010, Schiff 
(2011) found strong evidence of persistence when examining performance 
persistence of US mutual funds investing in Latin America. The study observed that 
Latin American funds performing poorly (or well) in any quarter, tend to underperform 
(or outperform) the market in the subsequent month to a much higher degree than 
reported for US and alternative emerging market funds. Schiff (2011) suggested that 
this positive persistence in abnormal returns of formerly well performing funds could 
be an indicator of the relative inefficiencies in the Latin American equity markets. 
This would, in turn, present fund managers with ample opportunities to take 
advantage of market inconsistencies. However, some South African studies find 
contrasting results. Scher and Muller (2005) are of the opinion that South African 
funds are incapable of outperforming the market, when exposure to market, size and 
value were considered. Their study investigated 106 funds from all equity categories 
from January 1990 to December 2002, with regard to equity style and persistence of 
performance.  
In particular, Scher and Muller (2005), Hoepner et al. (2011b) found that value funds, 
and small caps, exhibit negative performance persistence which extends for, at least, 
two years, whereas small stocks unit trusts are consistently the worst performers, 
followed by value funds. Their findings imply that portfolio managers are unable to 
exploit inefficiencies of small cap and value shares and thus a passive portfolio 
investment would be better. 
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2.10 Survivorship Bias 
The mutual fund industry has, over time, been suspected of methodically and 
substantially overstating portfolios’ performances in a way that deceptively portrays 
actively managed mutual funds as competitive, relative to the indexes.  According to 
Barret and Brodeski (2006), survivorship bias is a type of grade inflation for mutual 
funds that happens when the worst performing portfolios are made to disappear from 
the database while robust performers are put forward. This results in skewed 
performance figures that make the prevailing active managers seem superior. Poor 
performers are made to fade away before they can pull down the overall 
performance figures for the indices (Ruf, 2013). Only a handful of investors are 
aware of survivor bias, but it is indeed a serious issue.  
In a study conducted by Barret and Brodeski (2006) on 42 US domestic equity funds, 
they found that, when the survivor bias factor is taken into account, actively 
managed mutual funds lagged their related indexes from 1995-2004. Barret and 
Brodeski (2006) observed that the survivor bias effect worked to inflate fund returns 
in all but one of the 42 narrower Morningstar fund categories.  Their analysis shows 
that the purging of the poorest funds from the Morningstar database improved 
ostensible returns by 1.6 percent per year on average over the 10-year period. 
In profiling this (survivorship) phenomenon in detail, Gilbert and Strugnell (2010) 
examined the effects of survivorship bias by conducting an analysis on the mean 
reversion of share returns on the JSE, from 1984 to 2007. They updated the 
previous work by Bailey and Gilbert (2007), which had established the existence of 
mean reversion of relative returns on the JSE. Bailey and Gilbert (2007) had found 
that share portfolios which had tended to outperform recently (being those with high 
P/E ratios), significantly underperformed over five years against low P/E ratios share 
portfolios. The results of their study validated the presence and actuality of the 
effects of survivorship bias within the JSE. Correspondingly, Gilbert and Strugnell 
(2010) observed that the returns earned on funds chosen from presently listed 
shares were notably higher than the matching returns on funds chosen from all 
shares. From this analysis they advised that, while survivorship bias does not 
certainly influence the inference of mean reversion patterns revealed in earlier 
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studies, it is a potentially important issue in any empirical financial research, and 
efforts need to be made to avoid it. 
2.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduces the theoretical grounding of this research and explores the 
pertinent financial theories on which this investigation is based. The home of the 
study is the financial intermediation theory, which builds on the notion that 
intermediaries serve to reduce transaction costs and informational asymmetries, and 
thus practitioners view financial intermediation as a value-creating economic 
processes. Therefore, the study appreciates the increasing economic importance of 
financial intermediaries and subsequently focuses on how mutual funds (specifically 
South African based funds) invest. The chapter highlights the advent of investing 
with style as adopted by an increasing number of fund managers and further 
expands on the Returns Based Style Analysis technique. It then touches on the 
perspectives of style drift and style consistency approaches of investing, and 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of style analysis. The traditionally widely 
used performance evaluation measures are elaborated upon, with the evidence of 
performance and persistence in different markets presented. Finally, the chapter 
closes off with discussing the pervasive phenomenon of survivorship bias which is 
prevalent in unit trust performance evaluations. The next chapter introduces the 
research methodologies and the data to be utilised in the study and a detailed 











DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This section details how the proposed objectives are to be achieved. The main 
purpose of this study is to investigate the performance, and also performance 
persistence, of unit trusts in South Africa from the Returns Based Style Analysis 
perspective. This will enable one to establish if fund managers are able to add value 
after adjusting for style exposure or not. It will also clarify whether future returns can 
be predicted based on the persistence of performances. More importantly, the 
section details the methodologies employed to test the proposed objectives, whose 
robustness and validity were verified by the nature of the results of the study. 
This chapter introduces the dataset that is analysed and discussed in Chapter 4, 
from which the benchmark indices in the methodology section are derived. The 
dataset used in this study consists of (1) share returns of JSE listed unit trusts, (2) 
total returns of JSE published indices, and lastly the (3) portfolio return data for the 
portfolios to be constructed, based on the value (HML) and size (SMB) style factors.  
These three datasets are described separately in this chapter.  
Microsoft excel, Stata and the Econometrics Views (E-Views) statistical software 
packages are used conjunctively in performing the analyses for this research, 
although E-views was mostly used for the more detailed regressions analyses 
throughout the study. The data was first subjected to the usual diagnostics of proper 
cleaning in order to avoid phenomena prevalent in financial time series data. Before 
interpreting the results, diagnostic tests were performed to ensure all econometric 
properties are met. The results passed all these stability tests, which were the tests 
for stationerity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and normality. This step was very 
important in order to avoid getting results which are spurious and also 
uninterpretable statistics. For stationerity, the study conducted the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test together with the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 
test. For Autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson tests was conducted, and for 
heteroscedasticity, the White-test was conducted. Lastly to check for normality, the 
Jaque-Bera test was conducted. The E-views software was able to take care of all 
50 
 
these tests and the results from these tests were obtained with the summaries from 
the regression outputs. Basically the software package used to estimate the models 
took care of all the robustness tests. Subsequently, a time series data analysis 
approach was employed as done in most studies of this nature.   
  
3.2 Unit Trust Data and Sample Selection 
The required data for the study is retrieved from McGregor BFA library and 
Bloomberg terminal. Monthly returns and interest rates are continuously 
compounded, unless stated otherwise. The unit trust data consists of 42 South 
African domestic equity style (or sector) unit trusts over the period of the evaluation 
that does not suffer from survivorship bias. The justification of these choices is given 
below.  
These unit trusts are carefully selected from seven significant categories of style 
indices provided by the JSE. These categories of funds, by sector index in the JSE, 
were verified using McGregor BFA, Bloomberg and also Fundsdata South Africa. 
The style categories of South African unit trusts are formally arranged in their 
respective indices or industry sectors in these financial portals. From each of these 
seven core style indices (which are the Large Caps, Small Caps, Growth, Value, 
Financials, Resources and Industrials), six unit trusts were selected based on a 
balanced overview of their most recent performances. Of the six selected unit trusts 
per style index, two are poor performers, two are average performers and the last 
two are top performers, based on the most recent performance rankings provided by 
Morningstar South Africa for South African unit trusts. This was done to get a 
balanced and as normally distributed portfolio as possible, without running the risk of 
skewness on the data.  
In line with previous studies conducted on the persistence and performance of unit 
trusts in South Africa, such as Thomas (2012), Muller & Ward (2013) and Keywood 
(2015), this study utilizes a database of purely domestic equity unit trusts listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Monthly performances of these South African 
domestic equity unit trusts are acquired and these figures are all-inclusive of re-
invested dividends as alluded in the studies of Gill et al. (2010) and Korteweg (2010). 
The study covers a 10-year period and uses monthly closing share prices from 
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January 2005 to December 2014, which are converted into continuous compounded 
returns. As suggested in previous studies, e.g. (Collinet and Firer, 2003), the period 
under review should be as lengthy as possible for sufficient observations and a 
satisfactory amount of data points.  
The beginning date of the study is chosen on the basis that the JSE introduced two 
important indices, the Value (J330) and the Growth (J331) style benchmarks in 
August 2004, hence the beginning of the year 2005 is viewed as a proper time to 
start analysing their performances. Most literature on style analysis documents 
studies are done for a period of 60 months, like the original style analysis study by 
Sharpe (1992). Hence, the 120 months used in this study is deemed to be a 
sufficient period for a thorough analysis. 
For persistence to be observed, the period of observation should be broken into two 
equal parts, being the formation period (also called evaluation period) of the fund 
and then the holding period (also called ranking period) (Scher and Muller, 2005; 
Cuthbertson and Nitzsche, 2013;  Porter and Trifts, 2014). Therefore, the study 
utilizes 6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years formation and holding periods to test 
for persistence of performance between the formation and holding periods as done 
in the studies of Collinet and Firer (2003) and also Thomas (2012). In selecting the 
funds, only unit trusts with a performance history of more than one year at the end of 
December 2014 are included in the sample. This allows the observation of at least a 
6-month formation period and a 6 month holding period. It should be noted that not 
all the funds have the complete data for the entire 10-year evaluation period, since 
some of them only came into existence as late as 2009, while other funds were 
discontinued. These were also included to eliminate survivorship bias in our sample 
as much as possible.  
In order to utilize the Returns Based Style Analysis approach, Sharpe (1992) original 
study advocates that 60 months is an adequate period for a proper examination. This 
study has gone a step further and utilized a longer period to thoroughly test the 
phenomenon of drift, performance and persistence. Hence, all of the funds in the 
study have at least 6 years of available data to test for persistence, using a 3-year 
formation- and a 3 year holding period. The databases used encompass all data, 
even for discontinued funds and fledgling funds, which are still relatively new and 
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have incomplete data for the whole 10-year period. These funds were included in the 
study’s sample to eliminate survivorship bias as much as possible. Funds of funds 
were removed from the sample to avoid the issue of double counting and, similarly, 
index tracking funds were excluded, since their performances are highly correlated 
with benchmark indices (Blitz et al., 2012). 
Due to the relative infancy of some of the JSE sector indices and the blurred 
demarcation between them, some stocks may be found to overlap between two or 
three different indices. This unclear distinction between indices is sometimes 
attributed to the characteristics of a stock changing over time, e.g. value stock 
changing into growth or a small cap stock growing into a large cap stock. Examples 
of such occurrences are Standard Bank and Anglo American shares, which are 
found in more than one style index (Bertolis and Hayes, 2014). 
Thus, from these seven style indices, six unit trusts under each index are chosen to 
give us the sample of 42 funds for the study. The sample chosen for the study is 
highly representative, from a general equity style index perspective, on the JSE. This 
is because most of the unit trusts in South Africa have various holdings in their 
portfolios, for example, blended funds, global funds, fund of funds and bond funds, 
as fund managers attempt to diversify risk.  
Table 3-1 below shows the full list of the unit trusts to be used for the study, their 
JSE codes and the respective sectors from which they were sampled. For simplicity 
of inputting data to the spreadsheets used for the analyses, these funds were 
categorised using the letters from A to F (the six funds in each category), since some 
of them have very long names. Hence Table 3-1 will be constantly referred to for the 
actual names of the funds. This approach of grouping funds according to their style 
orientations follows other studies like Bender et al. (2013) and Cronqvist et al. 







TABLE 3-1: List of full names of unit trusts to be used  
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the selected unit trusts used for this 
study. 
 
3.3 Share Return Data  
The study utilizes monthly data, since it reduces noise and volatility considerably 
when compared to daily data (Petajisto, 2011). In order to construct the portfolios for 
the style analysis, the following data for each fund was collected for the prior and 
selected sample period (Rapach et al., 2013); 
 Monthly closing prices (or the Net Asset Value) – for calculating percentage 
monthly returns for the funds, 
 Monthly market capitalisation values, and  
 Monthly Price-to- book ratios. 
FINANCIALS FUNDS RESOURCES FUNDS
FULL NAME JSE CODE FULL NAME JSE CODE
FUND A Coronation Financial Fund CNFG FUND A Investec Commodity Fund Class R INVC
FUND B Momentum Financials Fund A RMFS FUND B Momentum Resources Fund A SAGR
FUND C Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A UALA FUND C Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R SYMR
FUND D Sanlam Financial Fund SANF FUND D Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R OMTM
FUND E Sanlam Financial Fund B1 SAFB FUND E Old Mutual Gold Fund R OMTG
FUND F ABSA Select Equity Fund ASEF FUND F Stanlib Resources Fund R Class GDBR
GROWTH FUNDS SMALL CAP FUNDS
FUND A FNB Momentum Growth Fund A FNBG FUND A Coronation Smaller Companies Fund COSG
FUND B Foord Equity Fund FEQF FUND B Investec Emerging Companies R INVE
FUND C Investec Growth Fund Class A FGGA FUND C Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   RMEC
FUND D Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A SYGA FUND D Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R NDBE
FUND E Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R HLMK FUND E Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R OMSC
FUND F Old Mutual Growth Fund R OMGR FUND F Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class GDSC
INDUSTRIALS FUNDS VALUE FUNDS
FUND A Coronation Industrials Fund Class A CNCG FUND A Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A AHMF
FUND B Momentum Industrial Fund A RMCF FUND B Element Islamic Equity Fund A FIEU
FUND C Old Mutual Industrial Fund A OMCF FUND C Investec Value Fund Class R INVF
FUND D Sanlam Industrial Fund A SIFA FUND D Stanlib Value Fund A Class LIVA
FUND E Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class GDKI FUND E Momentum Value Fund A RMVF
FUND F Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class LIIA FUND F Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A BOVA
LARGE CAP FUNDS
FUND A Absa Large Cap Fund ABRF
FUND B ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class ARPCB
FUND C Momentum Top 40 Index Fund RMBT
FUND D Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    OMSA
FUND E Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 PEQF




The monthly total return indices computed by McGregor BFA are utilized throughout 
this study. A total return index (TRI) takes into account both changes in share prices 
(that is, capital gains) and any distributions, such as, dividends (Lizieri et al., 2012). 
Whenever a company announces a distribution, the dividend declared is assumed to 
be reinvested in the share in question on the ex-dividend date. In other words, the 
TRI is equivalent to share prices adjusted for dividends. 
In the calculations of a fund’s returns for every other month t, Thomas (2012) and 
Willenbrock (2011) assert that the respective monthly returns (𝑅𝑡) are calculated 
using the Net Asset Value (NAV) price at the end of each month as follows: 
  






) − 1                                                                                                      (1)    
     
Where; 
𝑅𝑡    = monthly return of the fund 
𝑃𝑡      = NAV price at the end of the month 
𝑃𝑡−1 = NAV price at the end of the previous month 
𝑑𝑡     = Distribution per unit paid during the month 
𝑃𝑡𝑟   = Price at which the distribution was reinvested. 
 
All the fund returns are computed using the net asset value (NAV) price, which is net 
of portfolio expenses like audit and management fees. These monthly returns are 
then converted into continuous returns by taking the log of the value relatives, that is, 
the natural log of (1+𝑅𝑡). The return for one or more holding periods can be 
computed by taking the inverse of the log of the sum of the continuous monthly 








𝑅ℎ  = return of a holding period 
 
3.4 Benchmark Return Data 
Most empirical studies in the South African context have used the JSE All Share 
Index as the market proxy. However, the bulk of recent literature on fund 
performance, such as Hsieh et al. (2012) and Yu (2008) suggest that, if the market 
proxy can be represented by the specific sector index of a fund, then the results 
would be more meaningful and high in precision. In this regard, the market proxy for 
each fund used would be its specific sector or style index. For example, when 
evaluating performance for a fund under the financials, the proxy for the market used 
was the Financials index.  
However, the study performed two sets of regressions; one with the ALSI benchmark 
and the other one with the specific style benchmark. The motivation for this move is 
that the study sought to compare the results of the models when a style benchmark 
is used and also when the general market index is utilised in order to properly 
observe the effects of style investing. The compounded monthly total returns for the 
indices was calculated from their monthly closing prices as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 =  (
𝑉𝑡 −  𝑉𝑡−1
𝑉𝑡−1
)                                                                                                                     (3) 
 
Where; 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 = the monthly return of the market benchmark 
𝑉𝑡  = closing value of the index at time t 
𝑉𝑡−1 = value of the index at period t-1 or previous month. 
These returns will be logged for the effect of compounding in returns. 
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3.4.1 Description of the Selected JSE Indices 
Seven published JSE indices’ data is collected over a 10-year period from 1st 
January 2005 to 31st December 2014, from McGregor BFA, to be used as sector 
proxies for the market benchmark when evaluating performances of the various unit 
trusts. As mentioned before, this is on the basis that the JSE introduced two 
important style indices, the Value (J330) and the Growth (J331) style benchmarks in 
August 2004, hence the beginning of the year 2005 is viewed as a proper time to 
start analysing their performances. The seven indices are selected on the basis of 
being dominant JSE sectors, or style indices, under which most stocks are housed. 
The selected indices will be used to proxy for Large caps, Small caps, Value stocks, 
Growth stocks, Industrials stocks, Financials stocks and also Resources (Gladysek 
and Chipeta, 2012).  
The J200- Top 40 index is used to proxy Large Caps, J202 index- Small Caps, J330 
index- Value stocks, J331 index- Growth stocks, J210- Resource 10 index to proxy 
for Resources, J211- Industrial 25 index to proxy for Industrials and, lastly, the J212- 
Financial 15 index to proxy for Financials. These indices are in line with top industry 
benchmark indices, as published by the Stock Exchange News Service (SENS), the 
issuer services division of the JSE that deals with communication to investors.       
 
3.4.2 Risk Free Rate 
The study utilized the South African government 91 day Treasury Bill (R203) to proxy 
for the risk free rate of return as done in most studies on South African unit trusts, 
such as Thomas (2012), Van Heerden (2014) and Yu (2008). The data for the risk 
free rate was obtained from the Reserve Bank of South Africa.  
 
3.5 Portfolio Data 
In constructing the portfolios for the size factor and the value factor, the study follows 
the method used in the original study of Fama and French (1993) for their 3 factor 
model. The size factor measures the returns difference between small capitalization 
and large capitalization stocks (Chen et al., 2011b). The JSE has organised and 
sorted indices for both these types of stocks. All small capitalization stocks are listed 
under the Small Caps index (J202). Large capitalization stocks are listed under the 
Large Caps index, that is, the JSE Top 40 (J200). Thus, the size factor was 
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constructed from subtracting these two indices. Similarly, for the value factor, it is 
defined as the difference between high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-
market stocks. The JSE also has indices for both high- and low- book-to-market 
stocks. High book-to-market stocks are termed as value stocks and their index is the 
Value index (J330). Low book-to-market stocks are termed as growth stocks and 
their index is the Growth index (J331). Therefore, the difference between these two 
indices was calculated to construct the value factor. Published South African studies, 
which have followed similar approaches in constructing their portfolios, include for 
instance Viviers et al. (2008) and Muller and Ward (2013). 
 
3.6 Methodology 
This section covers the methods to be used in achieving the proposed objectives. 
The research design and theoretical underpinnings to support the selected 
methodology is also detailed in this section. 
 
3.6.1 Establishing Fund Style 
The basis of this study is to establish the style of the funds, the extent to which 
mutual funds in South Africa drift from their stated styles, an analysis of their 
performances and whether these performances persist. Various pieces of literature 
have documented that multifactor models can be useful in this regard (Fowler et al., 
2010, Vayanos and Woolley, 2013). Two models are predominantly used; the 
holdings based method and the return based style analysis approach. However, the 
bulk of literature documents that the return based style analysis (RBSA) models 
performs better in explaining the sources of returns of the funds (Norma et al., 2010, 
Schneeweis et al., 2012, Braga, 2016). This is, of course, with respect to the style it 
is most exposed to (asset allocation) as compared to the holdings based approach. 
Consistent with previous studies, like those of Eddy (2014), Holmes and Faff (2007) 
and Brown and Harlow (2002), the study adopted the RBSA model to establish the 
style factors responsible for the funds’ returns, that is, to which most returns of the 





3.6.1.1 Returns Based Style Analysis (RBSA) - The Model and its 
Associated Constraints 
Sharpe's RBSA model: 
Sharpe (1988) established a model that provides an objective analysis of the 
manager's actual style, as opposed to the style classification reported by the 
manager. This method is known as return-based style analysis (RBSA) which he 
also updated in his famous (Sharpe, 1992) study. It is expressed as follows: 
𝑅𝑖 =  [𝑏𝑖1𝐹1 +  𝑏𝑖2𝐹2 + ⋯ +  𝑏𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑛] +  𝑒𝑖                                                                               (4) 
                                                                        
 Where; 
               𝑅𝑖= excess return (net of fees) of a given portfolio or fund 𝑖 
             𝐹𝑛 = excess return in relation to each benchmark index 𝑛 
               𝑏𝑖𝑛 = unit trusts 𝑖 sensitivity to benchmark index 𝑛 
             𝑒𝑖 = error term or random disturbance term. 
The error term is usually the residual component of the equation return for unit trust 𝑖 
that is not explained by unit trust 𝑖 exposures to the returns on the benchmarks 
indices. It is the difference between the return on the fund (actual values) and that of 
a passive portfolio with the same style (fitted values). It is also regarded as returns 
accrued from the manager’s skill, that is, those returns which are not explained by 
the style attribute (Jame and Tong, 2014). 
 
3.6.1.1(a) Constraints on the Portfolio 
Even though style analysis is a specific example of a multiple linear regression, it is, 
however, distinguished by the imposition of specific constraints on the coefficients 𝑏𝑖𝑗 
such that they can be directly construed as factor loadings or weights (McDermott, 
2009). These are also known as style factor sensitivities that define a given fund. 
The coefficients 𝑏𝑖𝑗, or passive mix of underlying assets of each unit trust, are 
determined by normal constrained least squares methods, with at least two 
constraints generally imposed:  
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(i) Portfolio weighting constraint: the estimated factor loadings need to sum to 
one, that is, the sum of the coefficients 𝑏𝑖𝑗 must be equal to one;   
(ii) Positivity constraint: the coefficients 𝑏𝑖𝑗 must be positive, that is, all of the 
loadings must be non-negative.  
 
3.6.1.2 Quantitative Analysis of the RBSA Factor Model 
The objective of this quantitative analysis is to determine (1) what portion of variation 
in specific unit trusts are attributable to asset allocation, that is, style and (2) what 
portion can be described by security selection. Sharpe’s method of style analysis is 
able to detect patterns in return series that are inherent to style factors (Dickson, 
2016). Using statistical tools, this allows for the return series of unit trusts to be 
characterised by some combination of these factors - in order to assert the most apt 
combination that describes the portfolio’s constituents (Frijns et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, by implementing the Style Drift Score method, (3) the study was able to 
detect the existence of a “style drift” (Idzorek et al., 2012). The three aforementioned 
applications allude to the practical value of Sharpe’s Style analysis – which are  
further elaborated. 
Sharpe’s Style analysis is relatively simple to calculate compared to other factor 
models. The data used to achieve the study’s objectives consists of monthly returns 
of the unit trusts, as well as the monthly returns that are representative of the twelve 
style factors. For this reason, it is often deemed an “external” analysis, as opposed 
to an internal analysis, which may make use of data that is not freely available. The 
returns were obtained by using the closing share prices over a 120-month period, 
from January 2005 – December 2014.  
The choice of period was as a result of requiring current and relevant information, as 
well as finding out the trends in the unit trust industry over the past 10 years, 
therefore, 120 months of data held obvious validity. Furthermore, the model is 
designed as a tool to facilitate prediction, despite being backward-looking and hence, 
with more recent data inputs, it is more likely to yield greater predictive power. The 
Sharpe’s Style Analysis method presents an aggregate view of the portfolio’s style 
component over the chosen period. Consequently, a period duration of 120 months 
is likely to capture relevant trends, without neglecting any significant return 
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movements in the less recent past. As alluded to, emphasis is placed on choosing 
data parameters that would yield insightful and predictive results that are not heavily 
biased by the distant past.  
Yet, the research also seeks to mirror the phenomenal growth of the South African 
unit trust industry and its performance through the financial crisis of 2008 and 
beyond. This period duration for the study is in line with other academic studies on 
the topic, but more so as an extension to the period of the original paper by Sharpe 
(1988) for a proper examination of style analysis when the time frame is doubled. 
The research acknowledges the commentary given by Sharpe himself in 1994, in an 
interview dubbed “Setting the record straight on Style Analysis” to determine that 
monthly returns were a superior measure as opposed to daily returns. During this 
interview, Sharpe advocates the use of monthly data as a means of noise reduction.  
Daily data is too detailed to give an aggregate overview of a portfolio’s components, 
as the inherent noise results in poor estimates. As alluded before, the research 
selected 42 unit trusts that are suspected to be conducive to insightful analyses. 
These funds have been studied in previous research, with some of them being 
deemed past consistent top performers in their categories, for example, Foord Equity 
Fund. Others are deemed to be average performers from unit trust rankings while 
some are categorised as weak, for example, ABSA Select Equity Fund. Of particular 
interest, for example, are the constituents of these funds, such as those in ABSA’s 
portfolio, as this fund is usually ranked as poorly performing under a risk-adjusted 
analysis like the Sharpe ratio.  
These are some of the additional motivating factors for the inclusion of some funds. 
If the study acknowledges that fund performance is largely determined by its asset 
exposures, then a Style Analysis may prove insightful in determining what exposures 
resulted in these funds’ performances, that is, their styles. Most of the funds chosen 
have style assertions inherent in their titles, such as FNB Growth Fund and Sanlam 
Financial Fund, and these allow for priori expectations to be formed and to confirm if 
such assumptions are fulfilled. Literature supports suspicions that the titles of mutual 
funds may be misleading, as the funds may follow objectives that are inconsistent 
with their titles, for example, the studies by  Barberis and Shleifer (2003), (Schiffres 
and Parmelee, 1995). This is reinforced by the views of Brown and Goetzmann 
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(1997), who found that sometimes investors do not get what they think they are 
paying for. This investigation uncovers if such claims are valid for the unit trusts 
under consideration.  
Furthermore, past studies like those of Jansson et al. (2011) and Ye (2012), have 
suggested that unit trusts should have the majority of their funds invested in assets 
that yield returns that are of a similar nature to the returns of the style factors. This is 
necessary so that the regression accurately estimates what style factors are 
responsible for returns and also for the results to be statistically significant. 
Consequently, this research attempts to widen the exposure to all factors, that is, 
even those that are not encompassed by the twelve style factors. This has been 
done by selecting unit trusts that invest primarily in South African based assets. 
 
3.6.1.3 Selected Style Factors for the RBSA Model 
This sub-section elaborates on the much mentioned twelve style factors. Sharpe’s 
principle of style analysis differs from the underpinnings of factor analysis models, in 
that it neglects designating asset classes to specific sectors of the economy such as 
industrials or resources. Sharpe (1992) purports that if a fund is adequately 
diversified in industries and economic sectors then the inclusion of sector return 
factors will not contribute any descriptive power to a model that explains fund returns 
(Low, 2012).  
However, the South African market is heavily influenced by sectors like the 
Industrials, Financials and the Resources. Van Rensburg (2001), in his study of 
decomposing style based risk on the JSE, reinforces this notion by using the FINDI 
(combination of financials and industrials) and Resource 10 (for resources) indices 
as market proxies in his 2 factor model. Therefore, the classes chosen for this study 
differs substantially from Sharpe’s original study, since it was done in a different 
market with dissimilar characteristics from the South African market. 
Accordingly, Sharpe (1992) asserts that the applicability of an asset class factor 
model relies on the asset classes chosen for its implementation. In order for this 
model to be of any significant power, while not necessary it is desirable that the 
asset classes are; 
1) Mutually exclusive,  
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2) Exhaustive, and  
3) Have returns that have low correlations with one another and, if not, then different 
standard deviations.  
These above mentioned 3 conditions mean that the factors must completely describe 
investable options available to the funds, without any areas of overlap. To achieve 
this, the study follows the RBSA method as it is set out. The purpose of using the 
RBSA model is to test, or check, the direction of each fund so that the funds can be 
separated accordingly, that is, growth stocks, value stocks, low cap, mid cap, large 
cap, and real estate stocks. Once portfolio managers are certain of which asset class 
they are going to invest in, it is crucial that they determine the rate of exposure of 
each component so that they can gauge the movements in their portfolios’ returns. 
Since the study is based on domestic general equity unit trusts, the asset classes 
chosen constitute JSE listed indices only. Some studies on style analysis like 
Mutooni and Muller (2007) and Du Toit (2012), used balanced funds which employ 
international equity indices (for example, MSCI World) and bond indices (such as, 
the STEFI index) to proxy for the diversified holdings. The seminal study of Sharpe 
(1988) also employs a bond index as one of its factors. However, adjustments in this 
research were made due to the analysis being of general domestic equity South 
African funds, unlike mixed asset funds like those studied in the US research on 
style. As previously mentioned, the unit trusts under consideration should hold a 
majority of assets whose returns are adequately described by the style factors. This 
means that a shift of focus from US mutual funds to SA unit trusts warranted a 
different set of investable asset class factors. Some of style factors have remained 
the same, with only the relevant indices used to proxy them having changed in 
relation to Sharpe’s style analysis.  
Twelve factors or style indices are therefore selected for the right side of equation (4) 
that is, (𝐹1,…..…, 𝐹𝑛 ) as per Sharpe (1992) model and their monthly returns were 
regressed against past monthly returns of the unit trusts on the left side of the 
equation, that is, 𝑅𝑖. The style indices or factors are selected from the FTSE/JSE 
indices list according to the exposure of most unit trusts to them. Keeping in mind 
that the study’s sample is purely South African domestic equity funds and not 
balanced funds or funds of funds which Sharpe (1992) used in his original study, 
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bond indices were not used in this study.  The equity indices used in this study and 
their justifications are as follows: 
 
1. Short term treasury bills (SA Govt. 91-day T-bill, R203):  with maturities of 
less than 3 months: The study uses the South African 91-day Treasury Bill 
rates obtained from the South African Reserve Bank. Whilst an index of this 
style factor is recommended, the study justifies its deviation from Sharpe’s 
recommendation by citing the fact that the unit trusts are South African and 
their investments are largely purported to comprise of SA assets (Viviers et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, this factor is often given weight when the funds under 
analysis hold cash on reserve to meet regulatory requirements and liquidity 
needs, and hence they invest in money market instruments (Van Heerden, 
2014). The most accurate weighting will thus be obtained when limiting this 
factor to characteristics inherent to South African Bills, as movements in 
international interest rates are only likely to convolute the calculation of 
weightings (Saini et al., 2011). This data was obtained from the Reserve Bank 
of South Africa.       
Consequently, a portfolio’s composition in relation to what type of stocks it 
includes is pivotal to any analysis on returns (Lau, 2007). The study continues to 
follow Sharpe’s guidelines, recognising that domestic stocks can fall into one of 
four categories. Initially, stocks are divided into three groups by market 
capitalisation – creating three distinct categories: large capitalization (cap), 
medium cap and small cap stocks. 
The large cap stocks are further deconstructed into one of two categories, based 
on their book to market ratio. High book to market ratio stocks are deemed Value 
stocks, whilst stocks with lower book to market ratios are growth stocks. Any 
positive holding of all four categories of domestic stock falls into the area of 
Sharpe’s triangle: 
  




FIGURE 3-1: Sharpe’s triangle 
SOURCE: Sharpe (1988) pp27.  
2. Large Cap stocks: J200 Top 40 index - the Top 40 stocks in the JSE by 
market capitalization 
  
3. Value stocks: J330 index - Large capitalisation stocks from the JSE Top 40 
with high book to market ratios are grouped into the value index, J330. 
 
4. Growth Stocks: J331 index - Large capitalisation stocks from the JSE Top 40 
with low book to market ratios are grouped into the growth index, J331. 
 
5. Mid Cap Stocks: J201 index - The J201, is a Mid Cap Index that consists of 
the next 60 largest stocks by market capitalization which are not in the JSE 
Top 40, but are in the All Share Index. 
 
6. Small Cap Stocks: J202 index - The J202, is an index of equity stocks that 
forms part of the ALSI, but with market capitalisation values smaller than that 
of the mid and large capitalization stocks. 
In order to fulfil the requirements of creating an exhaustive list of potential investment 
options available to the unit trusts, the study considered the dominant sector indices 
on the JSE in which most stocks are invested. These included: 
 
7. Resources stocks: J210 Resource 10 index - JSE index that benchmarks the 
top 10 resources stocks. 
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8. Industrials stocks: J211 Industrial 25 index - benchmark index for the top 25 
industrial stocks in the JSE. 
 
9. Financials stocks: J212 Financials 15 index - index that benchmarks the top 
15 financial stocks in the JSE. 
 
10. Property stocks: J253 SA Listed Property index - index of property based unit 
trust returns, it proxies the returns earned from property investments. 
 
11. Consumables stocks: J530 Consumer Goods index - JSE index for consumer 
goods. 
 
12. Technology stocks: J590 Technology index - The index comprising 
technology stocks listed in the JSE. 
 
The R2 values, obtained from the regression, measures the part of the variance of 
returns explained by the style factors, or the extent of accuracy with which the 
Sharpe model replicates return exposures. The statistical significance of the 
coefficients contributes in explaining the probable style to which those returns can be 
attributed (Cuthbertson et al., 2010).  
The returns across these twelve style factors selected above, were compiled and the 
returns for each fund for the 120-month period sorted into tables. This served as the 
data input for the study’s regressions. The regression’s independent variable was the 
monthly return of a single unit trust, whilst there are twelve dependent variables 
which are the returns of each style factor for the monthly period. The study illustrates 
the Sharpe RBSA factor model again from equation 4 (repeated for ease of 
reference). 
 




Where 𝑅𝑖  represents the monthly return on the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  unit trust; 𝐹𝑛 represents the return 
of the 𝑛𝑡ℎ style factor and 𝑏𝑖𝑛, which is the coefficient to the 𝑛
𝑡ℎ  style factor, 
indicates the weighting/exposure of the unit trust to this factor. The error term (𝑒𝑖) is 
used to denote the tracking error of the funds. If the study assumes that this error 
term is uncorrelated with the factors, then a claim can be made that this term 
denotes the portion of return due to selection (or skill), whilst the sum of the factor 
weightings is the return attributable to style (Kurniawan et al., 2012).  
A more implicit characteristic that can be seen in this regression is the omission of 
an intercept term (Dickson, 2016). This ensures that the portfolio weightings are fully 
accounted for by the style weightings from the regressions. This is equivalent to 
controlling for non-style factors, in the sense that now only the weightings can be 
varied to represent a unit trust’s composition – subject to the restrictions imposed on 
the model (Eddy, 2014). 
The initial regression is termed the unconstrained regression, as the weights of the 
factors do not sum to one and some of these weights are negative (Froot and Teo, 
2008). Negative weightings indicate that the fund has taken a short position to these 
asset factors – which is often prohibited in terms of their mandates. Consequently, 
the study must constrain these regressions in excel with the use of the solver 
function, which was done. In order to derive feasible weightings to the twelve asset 
classes that provide significant results with out-of-sample data, the study must 
impose the following constraints which have already been highlighted earlier:  
• The first is that the individual weightings must fall into the range of zero 
and one; 
• The second constraint is that the sum of all twelve weightings must 
equal one;  
• A further, more implicit, constraint is the minimisation of the residual 
sum of squares, which is not automatically done by an Excel 
regression. This is achieved by using the solver function on a cell that 
has summed up the squared residuals, in order for it to be manually 
minimised. 
The results of the constrained regression will be grouped by their return and risk 
profiles, and discussed in the next chapter. 
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3.6.2 Determining Style Drift 
After confirming which funds respond to which asset class (styles), the study then 
further investigates the extent of style drift amongst these chosen funds. This section 
addresses objective number one of the study, which deals with determining the 
extent of drift amongst South African unit trusts. The following three methods were 
used to ascertain the extent of drift: 
3.6.2.1 The R2  Statistic 
The R2   statistic usually measures the goodness of fit for the model, that is, how well 
the model explains the variable of interest being researched (Gromb and Vayanos, 
2010). With respect to Sharpe’s (1992) Returns Based Style Analysis, [1-R2] 
captures the portion of the fund’s return variability that is not systematically related to 
co-movements in the returns to the style benchmarks. Accordingly, [1-R2] serves as 
a proxy for the extent to which the manager is unable to produce returns consistent 
with a tractable investment style. Therefore, a high R2 value designates a style 
consistent fund, whereas a low R2 value infers style inconsistent investing (Brown 
and Harlow, 2002, Hoffman, 2012)  
 
3.6.2.2 Tracking Error 
Calculation of the tracking error can also clarify the style consistency of a fund. 
Accordingly, the tracking error can be estimated as the volatility of the difference 
between the fund’s returns and those of a corresponding benchmark portfolio 
summarizing the style universe. Simply put, it is the return not explained by the style 
benchmark. Re-arranging Equation 4, it can be observed that the excess return is 
the deviation between the actual unit trust returns and its style benchmark returns: 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖 - [𝑏𝑖1𝐹1 + 𝑏𝑖2𝐹2 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑛]                                                       (5) 
Therefore style consistent funds will have a low tracking error, while style 
inconsistent funds will have a high tracking error (Chen and De Bondt, 2004). The 
objective of Returns Based Style Analysis is to select the set of asset class 
exposures which minimise the variance of the difference in Equation 5, which is 




3.6.2.3 Style Drift Score 
Following the work of Holmes and Faff (2007), the extent of style variation over time 
is ascertained using the Style Drift Score (SDS) method, proposed by Idzorek and 
Bertsch (2004), and has been used extensively in studies like Kurniawan et al. 
(2011), Holmes and Faff (2007) and Ainsworth et al. (2008). Their model 
quantitatively measures the variability of a fund’s asset mix over time as established 
by (Sharpe, 1992, Fuerst and Marcato, 2009)’s returns-based style analysis, around 
the fund’s average effective asset mix or style allocation. Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) 
assert that their Style Drift Score liberates a researcher from being compelled to 
scrutinize numerous rolling window style maps and rolling window asset allocation 
graphs, both of which illustrate the evolution of a portfolio’s investment style. Rolling 
window style maps and rolling window asset allocation graphs are known to be 
excellent tools for developing an intuitive understanding of a portfolio’s style 
consistency, which have been employed thoroughly in most style studies, but they 
do not replace the need for a quantitative measure of style drift (Holmes et al., 2010).  
The Style Drift Score measures style drift by quantifying the style drift of a portfolio in 
a single statistic. Kurniawan et al. (2011) adds that the SDS method is perfect for 
observing a large number of portfolios, monitoring the drift in a portfolio’s style and 
also contrasting the style consistency of these portfolios. Therefore, this study 
utilizes the SDS method as the principal method for measuring drift, above the 
aforementioned R2  and tracking error methods. The SDS is calculated as the square 
root of the sum of the variances of the asset class coefficients (or style weights) 
derived from Equation (4) as demonstrated by Equation (6); 
 
SDS = √𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑖1) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑖2) … … … … … . . +𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑖𝑛)                            (6) 
 
Where 𝑏𝑖1,𝑏𝑖2 .  . . . . . 𝑏𝑖𝑛, represent the style weights obtained from the style 
analysis process in Equation (4). Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) suggest that the SDS is 
an effective, time-efficient way to compare style consistency and eliminates the need 
to examine rolling window style graphs. The SDS’s for all the funds were obtained 
and ranked whereupon an average SDS was found. A fund with a high SDS, relative 
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to the mean SDS, indicates considerable style inconsistency (that is, a drifter), 
whereas a portfolio with an inferior SDS, below the mean SDS, is deemed a style 
consistent fund (Israel and Maloney, 2014).  
For the cross-analysis, SDS was used as the primary measure of style drift as it 
avails an average value of the variation in style index coefficients for each fund.  In 
the fund management sphere, it is believed style consistency can be indicative of a 
skilful portfolio manager and a successful risk management system (Bolton et al., 
2013). Hence, it is an advisable distinction, when searching for and retaining 
managers, in addition to the obvious benefits in the fund’s portfolio construction 
process.  Actually, Brown and Harlow (2002) infer that there is a direct positive 
relationship between investment style consistency and performance. Therefore, the 
SDS method is the primary technique employed for testing drift and subsequently 
separating the funds into drifters and consistent funds. 
 
3.6.3 Performance Measurement Models 
This section addresses the second objective of the study, which was, to find out 
which fund management approach, between style consistent investing and style 
drifting, produces superior risk adjusted results relative to each other. Therefore, 
after establishing the style consistent funds and drifting funds using the style drift 
score, the next mission was to find out which set of funds produce superior 
performances. When evaluating the risk adjusted performance of a portfolio, the 
single factor Capital Asset Pricing Model, the Fama and French (1992) 3-factor 
model and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor models, are some of the most prominent 
models that are widely used (El Khamlichi et al., 2014a). The alpha from these 
models determines whether the portfolio outperformed or underperformed the market 
by being significantly positive or negative. Predominantly, the Fama and French 3-
factor model and the Carhart 4- factor model have been used extensively in previous 
studies both in South Africa and internationally.  
The Carhart model is an extension of the Fama and French model, since it has an 
additional 4th factor, the momentum term, which adds more explanatory power. 
According to studies done on the South African market, the challenge with this 
model, though, is its inaccuracy in capturing the momentum factor in the JSE with 
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precision, since this variable can alter the results of the performances considerably. 
Additionally, the South African market fluctuates wildly at times, due to the volatility 
of the ZAR (South African Rand) currency relative to major world currencies. This 
could potentially exaggerate the momentum factor of stocks in the markets. Hence, 
for this analysis, the study will do away with the momentum factor altogether, and 
employ the widely used  Fama and French (1992) 3-factor model  to measure fund 
performances of the South African unit trusts selected.  
However, before the Fama-French model is applied, the study firstly engaged the 
widely used Capital Asset Pricing model  in order to compare the changes in alpha 
when additional factors are included with the Fama-French 3-factor model, as done 
in most studies of this nature (Eraslan, 2013). For a thorough analysis of 
performance with all the models used, two sets of regressions were performed for 
each model across all the funds. The specific sector index was used for the market 
proxy in the first regressions and then the JSE ALSI index was used as a market 
proxy in the second set of regressions. This allowed a thorough evaluation of the 
effect of investing in style indices as compared to the general market. Changes in 
the models’ resultant R2 values and their log likelihood ratios were also be observed. 
As alluded previously, performance is measured by examining the amount of alpha 
and the associated statistical significance. The explanatory power of the models is 
observed through the adjusted R-squared values.    
 
3.6.3.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)   
Performances of the funds under study will first be evaluated using the CAPM model. 
As highlighted in the above section, the study sought to examine whether style 
models have more explanatory power, relative to general market benchmark models. 
Hence, this test was run twice for all the funds, first with the relevant sector index as 
a market proxy and the second test with the JSE All Share Index, which represents 
the whole market. The model for the CAPM is expressed as follows; 
 





 𝑅𝑖𝑡  = the return of the fund in excess of the risk free rate 
 𝛼𝑖    = Abnormal return of the stock 
 𝛽𝑖    = beta of the fund 
 𝑅𝑀𝑡 = the return of the market 
 𝑅𝑓𝑡  = the risk free rate  
 𝑖𝑡    = the error term.  
 
3.6.3.2 Fama - French 3 Factor Model (FF3F) 
The second model used, for performance evaluation, is the Fama-French 3 factor 
model. Similarly, to the CAPM, regressions under this model were run twice using 
the same reasoning as above. The FF3F model is expressed as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽1𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡)  +  𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +   𝑖𝑡                                           (8)                                             
 
Where;  
𝑅𝑖𝑡        = return of fund 𝑖 at time t in excess of the risk free rate 
𝛼𝑖 = abnormal return of the fund 
𝛽1𝑖  = beta of the fund 
𝑅𝑀𝑡  = the return of the market measured by the JSE relevant market index 
𝑅𝑓𝑡      = the risk free rate 
 𝛽2𝑖     = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the size factor 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  = the small capitalization portfolio less the large capitalization portfolio 
(size factor) 
 𝛽3𝑖     = sensitivity of the fund’s returns to the value factor  
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𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 = the high book-to-market funds less the low book-to-market funds 
(value factor) 
𝑖𝑡 = the error term or residual term. 
 
3.6.3.3 Sharpe ratio 
In addition to the above model, the Sharpe ratio was used to compare performances 
of the mutual funds against themselves and the market, adjusted for risk. It is 
expressed as follows; 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓)
𝜎𝑝
                                                                                                  (9) 
 
Where; 
𝑅𝑝 = return of the portfolio 
𝑅𝑓  = risk free rate 
𝜎𝑝 = standard deviation of portfolio. 
 
3.6.3.4 Market Timing: Treynor- Mazuy model (TM model) 
Over and above measuring the performances of these funds, the study also sought 
to find out whether South African fund managers are able to time the market as they 
engage in active investing. In other words, the study also sought to examine the 
funds’ performances when market timing ability was considered. This process 
remained a quest to measure the funds’ performances, which was part of objective 
two of the study. Various performance measures try to distinguish security selection, 
or share-picking ability, from market timing ability, or the ability to predict the market 
returns.  
Although alpha normally measures both, market-timing models were developed to 
distinguish these two aspects of performance. The Treynor- Mazuy traditional 
market-timing model assumes the approach that any information, correlated with 
future market returns, is superior information which makes it unconditional. The 
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study utilizes the classic market timing regression of Treynor and Mazuy (1966), 
which expresses the regression in a quadratic form as below; 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽1𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) +  Ƴ(𝑅𝑀𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡)
2




𝑅𝑖𝑡       = return of fund  𝑖 at time t in excess of the risk free rate 
𝛼𝑖     = abnormal return of the fund 
𝛽1𝑖    = beta of the fund 
𝑅𝑀𝑡   = return of the market  
𝑅𝑓𝑡     = the risk free rate 
Ƴ    = market timing coefficient 
𝑖𝑡   = the error term. 
 
The sign on the estimated coefficient Ƴ of the quadratic term, and whether it is 
statistically different from zero, evaluates market-timing ability. If it is significantly 
positive, then it represents a convex upward sloping regression line and indicates 
evidence of successful market timing by the fund manager. Thus, the coefficient will 
be positive if the manager increases beta when receiving a positive signal about the 
market. The hypothesis of no timing ability, implies that the coefficient Ƴ on the 
quadratic term is zero or negative. The market proxy for this model is the funds’ 
specific equity style benchmarks.  
3.6.4 Persistence of Performance 
In addition to evaluating performances for these different sets of funds, the study  
then tests whether these performances persist or not. This section addresses the 
third objective of the study, which sought to uncover which of the two approaches, 
between style consistency and style drifting, deliver persistent results relative to the 
benchmark index. Persistence of performance can be defined as a positive 
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relationship between rankings of performance on those of initial periods over 
subsequent periods (Carhart, 1997, Huij and Lansdorp, 2012). 
Performance persistence is therefore very important in portfolio management, since 
it differentiates the winners from the losers over a given time period, a key element in 
explaining the flow of funds from underachieving to skilled fund managers (Barberis 
and Shleifer, 2003). The study of persistence is to determine whether managers can 
systematically beat the market over time. To do so, after choosing and applying the 
performance measurement methods, one has to classify or rank the funds. Using 
statistical tools, it suffices to study the distribution of these rankings to reach a 
conclusion about the persistence of this performance (El Khamlichi et al., 2014b). To 
analyse the persistence of performance, two types of tests are conventionally used: 
1. Parametric tests: using time series (Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994) or regression 
(Christopherson et al., 1998); and 
 2. Nonparametric tests (based on contingency tables) which are proposed for use in 
this analysis. This method has been widely used, throughout relevant literature, to 
assess performance persistence of portfolios, for example, Firer et al. (2001), 
Fletcher and Forbes (2002) and also Clark (2013). 
 
3.6.4.1 Contingency Table 
Formally, the contingency table approach is defined as a method used to establish 
the frequency with which funds are described as winners and losers over 
consecutive time periods (Thomas, 2012). For each classification of the funds 
respectively, contingency tables are applied on the basis of performance 
assessment results, or alphas, to determine the degree of persistence. The funds 
are apportioned into two classes, Winner (W) or Loser (L), based on the median 
abnormal return over the relevant ranking period. Over two consecutive time periods 
P1 and P2, a two by two table is formed  so a fund can have one of four outcomes or 
quartiles, (WW), (WL), (LW) or (LL).The contingency table displays the probability of 
a portfolio in one quartile being in the exact same quartile in the subsequent period 
(Eling, 2009).  
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Supposing pure random performance, one would envisage these probabilities to be 
a quarter, that is, 25%. This means that, there is an identical prospect of a top 
quartile portfolio winding up in any of the four quartiles in the following investment 
period. Such occurrence is based on the premise that the previous evaluation period 
does not have an effect on the future period (Hereil et al., 2010). Winner (or loser) 
designation mainly defines a fund that achieved a rate of return, across the calendar 
year, that exceeds (or falls short of) the median fund return. Therefore W (winner) 
represents returns above the median abnormal return, whereas L (Loser) represents 
returns below the median abnormal return (Clark, 2013). WW refers to a fund being 
a winner this period and the next; LL is a loser fund this period and the next period; 
WL is a winner this period followed by being a loser the next period and LW is a 
loser this period, then a winner next period. For two subsequent sub-periods (P1 and 
P2), a contingency table like the following one is obtained: 
 
TABLE 3-2: Contingency table for testing performance persistence  
                       









below the median 
value 
 


















below the median 
value 
 
Performance    
variable 




     (LL) 
 
CPR, Z-test and 
Chi-square 
Source: (Brooks, 2014) pp 287 
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To analyse the robustness of the phenomenon of persistence, several statistical 
tests are used. The following two statistical procedures are most commonly found in 
the literature used, together with contingency tables, to test for performance 
persistence and robustness of the contingency table method. They are the Cross 
Product Ratio and the Chi-squared test (Norma et al., 2012). 
 
3.6.4.2 Cross Product Ratio 
The Cross Product Ratio (CPR), also known as Odds ratio, is a non-parametric 
method  established by Brown and Goetzmann (1995). The fundamental idea is 
based on performance evaluation; hence the CPR outlines the odds ratio of the 
number of repeat performers against those that do not repeat. In detail, the Cross 
Product Ratio calculates the ratio of ‘Persistence’ (WW & LL) versus ‘reversal’ (WL & 
LW) using the formulae: 
𝐶𝑃𝑅 =  
(𝑊𝑊 × 𝐿𝐿)
(𝑊𝐿 × 𝐿𝑊)
                                                                                                                  (11) 
 
Where;  
𝑊𝑊 = number of winner funds in both formation and holding periods  
𝐿𝐿    = number of losers in both periods  
𝑊𝐿  = number of winners then losers  
𝐿𝑊  = number of losers then winners. 
 
The significance of the deviations of Cross Product Ratio from unity is then tested. If 
the test statistic is significantly positive, then it provides evidence of persistence in 
performance. A significantly negative test statistic provides evidence of reversals in 
performance. In other words, the study observes whether the CPR is above or below 
one. If the CPR is significantly higher than one (equivalent to a positive t-statistic), it 
indicates persistence, that is, winners followed by winners, or losers followed by 
losers (Joaquim and Moura, 2011). Conversely, a CPR lower than one (equivalent to 
a negative t-statistic) indicates a reversal, that is, winners followed by losers, or 
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losers followed by winners. A reversal, in essence, refers to a ‘return reversal’ 
situation where WW*LL is less than WL*LW in Equation (11) above.    
Therefore, a Cross Product Ratio above one signifies evidence of persistence, a 
CPR of one means no evidence of persistence is observed and a CPR below one 
signifies reversals of performance. The study, hence, tests the null hypothesis that 
there is no significant persistence, which must be equivalent to a CPR of one. This is 
on the basis that under the null hypothesis, the probability of winning or losing in 
each period equals one-half and does not depend on the return horizon (Liwei and 
Peng, 2012). In that sense, the four quartiles; Winner-Winner (WW), Loser-Loser 
(LL), Winner-Loser (WL) and Loser-Winner (LW), each has 25% of the funds. 
Basically the test is as follows: 
 
𝐻0:   𝐶𝑃𝑅 = 1   Or   ln 𝐶𝑃𝑅 =  0                                                                                                 (12) 
The statistical significance of the Cross Product ratio was tested using the Z-test, 
which follows a standard normal distribution. This test allows the significance of the 
deviations of Cross Product Ratio from unity to be tested. A Z-statistic test can be 
implemented as outlined: 
 




  ~  𝑁 (0,1)                                                                                                            (13) 
 















2                                                                          (14) 
 
A Z-statistic of 1.96 corresponds to a 5 percent significance level, that is, when the 
Z-statistic is higher than 1.96, the null hypothesis of no persistence is rejected at the 
5 percent significance level. If the Z- test statistic is significantly positive, then it 
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provides evidence of persistence in performance. A significantly negative test 
statistic provides evidence of reversals in performance. 
 
3.6.4.3 Chi-Square Test  
In fulfilment of the last objective of the study, which tests for performance 
persistence, the study further tests the predictability of future returns based on past 
performances. The chi-squared test will be used for this purpose. Since the study 
follows the non-parametric approach of employing contingency tables, similar to the 
studies of Yu (2008), Clark (2013), it will conduct the chi-squared test with 1 degree 


























                                          (15)    
Where N represents the number of observations in the analysis. A positive, 
statistically significant chi-squared statistic supports the hypothesis that abnormal 
past performance can be used to predict future abnormal performance. 
Contrastingly, a negative, or statistically insignificant statistic, suggests that future 
returns cannot be predicted from past performances. Prediction of future 
performances is of interest to portfolio managers and investors alike, since they 
anticipate future market movement in order to earn positive returns, hence the result 
from the chi-square statistic is of paramount importance. It should be noted that the 
chi- squared statistic is premised on the persistence of performances and thus the 
chi-squared test completes the study’s last objective. 
 
3.7 Chapter Summary   
The chapter introduces the specific data and research methodologies to be used in 
attaining the objectives of the study. It provides details on the unit trust data and the 
sample selection criterion, the benchmark return data, which entails the description 
of the JSE style indices to be used, the risk free rate and the models’ portfolio data.  
It then further explores how the styles of the funds are going to be established using 
the RBSA model, and touches on the model’s constraints, its analysis and its 
selected style factors. The chapter then proposes the methods to be used in 
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determining the extent of style drift, which are the R2 statistic, tracking error and, 
most importantly, the style drift score (SDS), which is the primary method used for 
separating the funds into consistent funds or drifters. It details the performance 
measurement models and also the market timing model to be used. The chapter 
concludes with detailing how performance persistence is measured using the 
contingency table approach and also highlights the use of the chi-squared measure 
to predict future returns based on past performances. The next chapter presents the 
results from employing the models highlighted in this section and a thorough analysis 




















EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter commences with the analysis of results from examining the first 
objective, which is the extent of drift of the funds selected.  However, the study first 
ascertained the true styles of the funds using the Returns Based Style Analysis 
(RBSA) method in order to determine whether South African unit trusts are correctly 
classified as stated in their titles. The study then tested whether these funds stick to 
their styles or if they drift from their stated mandates. The data analysis in this 
section is supported with material from the literature review. 
 
4.1.2 Styles of the Funds (RBSA model) 
The following illustration shows the overall objective of this section: 
Research Focus (Investment style consistency) – Approach (RBSA) – Technique 
(Quadratic programming) – Style exposure (Inferred style exposure) – Style 
consistency measure method (Total inter-period distances) – Style consistency 
measure (Style Drift Score) 
 
4.1.2.1 Style Factors Selected  
The study turns its attention to the RBSA model, and its constraints, in terms of the 
relationship between the 12 selected factors for the model. One of the constraints is 
that, while not necessary, it is desirable that the asset classes should have returns 
that have low correlations with one another or, if not, then different standard 
deviations. Therefore, a correlation table, Table 4-1 is constructed on the Stata 
software to check for the correlations between the asset classes chosen and their 
significance. 
 To recap, the 12 factors chosen for the RBSA model were as follows; 
1. J200- JSE Top 40 (Large cap)  
2. J201- Mid cap  
3. J202- Small cap 
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4. J330- Value 
5. J331- Growth 
6. J210- Resource 10 
7. J211- Industrial 25  
8. J530- Consumer Goods   
9. J253- SA Listed Property  
10. J212- Financials 15 
11. J590- Technology   
12. Short term treasury bills (SA Government 91-day T-bill).  
The results from analysing their correlations against each other are presented in the 



















TABLE 4-1: Correlation table 
 
The correlations between the twelve factors chosen for the Returns Based Style 
Analysis are given in Table 4-1 above with their corresponding P-values below them 
. 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
  technology     0.5312   0.6068   0.5728   0.5930   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
       value     0.9292   0.7971   0.7852   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
    smallcap     0.6510   0.8980   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
      midcap     0.6359   1.0000 
              
              
    largecap     1.0000 
                                                           
               largecap   midcap smallcap    value techno~y
              
                 0.3058   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
  technology    -0.0947   0.3835   0.5565   0.5452   0.4836   0.3881   0.4098 
              
                 0.8083   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
       value    -0.0225   0.7804   0.8247   0.7629   0.8421   0.4148   0.6549 
              
                 0.4806   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
    smallcap    -0.0653   0.4318   0.7318   0.7618   0.5895   0.6683   0.5387 
              
                 0.4703   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
      midcap    -0.0668   0.3941   0.7780   0.7926   0.5780   0.6970   0.5503 
              
                 0.9878   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0155   0.0000
    largecap     0.0014   0.9017   0.8199   0.6481   0.9737   0.2214   0.7136 
              
                 0.5105   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0030
   consgoods    -0.0609   0.5149   0.8310   0.5231   0.7025   0.2700   1.0000 
              
                 0.5867   0.9831   0.0000   0.0000   0.0541
  salistprop    -0.0503  -0.0020   0.4055   0.6052   0.1771   1.0000 
              
                 0.9530   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
      growth     0.0055   0.8925   0.7849   0.5670   1.0000 
              
                 0.7644   0.0001   0.0000
financials15    -0.0278   0.3550   0.7543   1.0000 
              
                 0.5437   0.0000
industrial25    -0.0562   0.5364   1.0000 
              
                 0.7539
  resource10     0.0290   1.0000 
              
              
    daytbill     1.0000 
                                                                             
               daytbill resou~10 indus~25 finan~15   growth salist~p consgo~s
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reflecting statistical significance. Accordingly, Sharpe (1992) asserts that the 
applicability of an asset class factor model relies on the asset classes chosen for its 
implementation. In order for this model to be of any significant power, while not 
necessary, it is desirable that the asset classes should have returns that have low 
correlations with one another, in addition to being mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
Therefore, an examination of the correlation coefficients among the twelve asset 
classes provided robustness in the validation of proposed proxies, as measures of 
style attribution of the funds. Table 4-1 reports the correlation coefficients among the 
proxies for asset classes chosen for the RBSA model. The correlations between the 
SA Government 91-day T-bill and the Resource 10, Industrial 25, Financials 15, 
Growth, SA Listed property, Consumer goods, Large cap, Mid Cap, Small cap, Value 
and Technology were quite low, ranging from only 0.02 to as low as -0.02 in absolute 
terms. Such low coefficients were indicative of a stronger mutually exclusive 
relationship among these variables and, accordingly, pointed to their suitability as 
asset class proxies for the model.  
Surprisingly, however, the coefficients between the large caps with any other factor 
were quite high and this can be attributable to the fledgling nature of the South 
African market which does not have clear demarcations between asset classes. For 
example, both value stocks and growth stocks are housed under the large caps, and 
also a lot of stocks in the JSE are found under more than one asset class. Had it 
been the case that the choice of the proxies to be employed was purely based on 
their correlation with other variables, some of the proxies would have been 
considered unsuitable for inclusion in the construction of the RBSA model. 
Nevertheless, given the satisfaction of the other validation constraint imposed on the 
model (that is, exhaustive), the asset class variables chosen for the RBSA model 
were rendered suitable proxies, with very minimal possibilities of multicollinearity.    
 
4.1.2.2 Establishing Styles of the Funds 
As alluded to earlier, the study established the true styles of the funds from which the 
extent of drift could then be ascertained, which was the first objective of the study. 
The styles were established from the Returns Based Style Analysis model through 
the return attribution of the funds, that is, the style factor that accounts for the 
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majority of the funds’ returns. The following tables present a summary of the different 
style estimations of the funds, based on constrained regressions on the funds, as 
required by the Returns Based Style Analysis model. The full regression outputs are 
presented in the Appendices section, at the end of the report. The summarized 
version, presented in these tables, include the weights of the twelve style factors, the 
adjusted R square values and the accompanying P-values, for statistical significance 
purposes for all the funds under review. Accompanying style diagrams are included 
for graphical representation of returns due to asset allocation (style of the funds), 
versus asset selection (skill) of the fund managers in selecting the winning assets for 
their portfolio. Justifications of the style weights presented in the tables are detailed 
in the analyses that follows.  
The study commences its analysis with the presentation of Returns Based Style 
Analysis constrained regression results. As with all the regressions done for this 
analysis, before interpreting the results, diagnostic tests were performed to ensure 
all econometric properties are met. The results passed all these stability tests, which 
were the tests for stationerity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and normality. This 
step was very important in order to avoid getting results which are spurious and also 
uninterpretable statistics. Results from the Financials funds style factor, are 
presented in Table 4-2 as follows: 
TABLE 4-2: Style weights for Financials funds  
   
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.  
FINANCIALS FUNDS
FUND A FUND B FUND C
Coronation Financial Fund Momentum Financials Fund A Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 8,33244E-07 0,64809636 0 0,161750354 0 0,0570958
RESOURCE 10 0 0,72036175 0 0,379658946 0 0,673578203
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,042924223 0,83900818 0 0,223702369 0,25078886 0,503077796
FINANCIALS 15 0,580078184 1,1856E-14 0,901463704 2,37499E-20 2,39885E-05 2,2405E-14
GROWTH 0 0,71434522 0 0,930079878 0 0,359843808
SA LISTED PROPERTY 0,037315358 0,75126599 0 0,405362369 0,152692281 0,787302361
CONSUMER GOODS 0,003786028 0,23748986 0 0,010503375 5,96272E-07 0,012544896
LARGE CAP 7,32009E-07 0,90071556 4,54521E-07 0,843633239 0 0,583901113
MID CAP 0,130385027 0,24131785 0 0,887659324 0,192945376 0,164100864
SMALL CAP 0,205269911 0,01134005 0 0,05185498 0,231422583 0,035983132
VALUE 0 0,89552796 0,098772651 0,142721239 0,171576632 0,933210606
TECHNOLOGY 0 0,6861126 0 0,880279784 1,58464E-05 0,897985064
Sum of Factor Weights = 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,88427006 0,925006516 0,915234892
85 
 
In the above table, the statistics mentioned are presented for the Financial Funds A, 
B and C, together with the full names of the funds. It can be inferred from the table, 
using the adjusted R- square measure, that 88 percent of the returns of Coronation 
Financial Fund is associated with asset allocation (style) with only 12 percent due to 
skill or asset selection of the managers. It is also observed, from the results in the 
table, that style forms the primary factor in influencing returns, with Momentum 
Financials Fund A owing 93 percent of its variation in return to concurrent variation of 
style factors, while Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A relies on style for 92 
percent of its return variations, as observed from the adjusted R2 values.  
Relatively, the study can reconcile the atypically high selection portion of returns by 
considering Coronation Financial Fund (with 12 percent, compared to the 7 percent 
and 8 percent of its peers), and their profitable contrarian investment style. This 
means that the fund’s managers are involved in selecting securities that perform 
well, despite the performances of their relevant sector. Consequently, the returns 
owing to asset allocation are low and there is an increased percentage of returns 
caused by asset selection. 
The same analysis also holds for the funds in Table 4-3, such as Sanlam Financial 
Fund, where 91 percent of its returns is attributable to style, with only 9 percent due 
to skill. Sanlam Financial Fund B1 attributes 88 percent of its returns to style with 12 
percent due to skill, whereas ABSA Select Equity Fund attributes 89 percent of its 
returns to style, with only 11 percent due to manager skill or style selection. For all 
these funds, it can be observed that the largest statistically significant coefficients 
correspond to the Financials 15 style factor, which confirms that the funds are 










TABLE 4-3: Style weights for Financials funds continued 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.  
To create a clearer picture of the information presented in the tables above, the 






FUND D FUND E FUND F
Sanlam Financial Fund Sanlam Financial Fund B1 ABSA Select Equity Fund
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0,004873742 0,76234471 0,01465773 0,496371604 4,17788E-07 0,606216512
RESOURCE 10 1,15144E-06 0,15214138 0,015629871 0,440250241 0,062269304 0,719894214
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,172043827 0,09506396 0,02885208 0,114126089 0,053570965 0,836392312
FINANCIALS 15 0,636763169 4,8505E-16 0,791662879 1,15031E-07 0,065067469 0,615665352
GROWTH 5,26291E-07 0,24966167 9,61429E-07 0,623570003 0,091750842 0,672259908
SA LISTED PROPERTY 0,092570303 0,30708649 6,27252E-07 0,149370691 0 0,095273087
CONSUMER GOODS 0,004454139 0,17021563 0,028355693 0,057375216 0,082120336 0,133191745
LARGE CAP 1,45996E-05 0,18225989 0 0,950652817 1,15051E-05 0,998577404
MID CAP 8,55663E-05 0,0079891 0,120517181 0,444598336 0,257203069 0,03233962
SMALL CAP 0,000140359 0,02349739 5,58006E-07 0,51046724 5,44546E-07 0,447477048
VALUE 0,08840996 0,58067664 1,72242E-07 0,535920101 0,387770284 0,089311406
TECHNOLOGY 0,000178753 0,90416889 8,63841E-07 0,978422856 0,00030536 0,803935424
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1





It can be observed from the style diagrams, that a bigger portion of the funds’ returns 
is attributable to the style of investing that the fund follows, or asset allocation, as 
compared to asset selection. This information consolidates the claim that style 
investing holds some power in explaining the returns of South African unit trusts as 
observed above, with respect to funds invested in the financial sector. From the 
regression results it is also observed that the financials’ funds are correctly classified 
with respect to their styles as the largest statistically significant coefficient belongs to 
the financials style factor.  Thus, the style of the financials funds has been confirmed 
and the extent of drift of these funds from their style is measured in the next section 
to find out whether these funds stick to their style or if they drift.   
The study next analyses funds invested under the Growth style factor, by 
investigating their return attributes in terms of style orientation (asset allocation) and 
skill (asset selection). The results are shown in Table 4-4 and Table 4-5. 
When looking at Table 4-4, the FNB Momentum Growth Fund, like the Foord Equity 
fund and Investec Growth fund, conforms to academic literature (Du Toit, 2012) in 
that the majority, that is, 91 percent of variation in the fund returns can be explained 
by the twelve style factors, with asset selection being responsible for only 9 percent 








TABLE 4-4: Style weights for Growth funds      
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
The FNB Momentum Growth Fund’s target is to attain maximum growth for its 
investors by beating the JSE ALSI over time and, thus, has a moderate to high level 
of risk. The primary reason for analysing this fund is due to its extreme fluctuations in 
returns over the period of observation. The FNB Momentum Growth Fund invests 
across all sectors of the JSE in chosen shares. It can be observed from Table 4-4, 
above, that the fund invests in order to yield returns identical to those attainable with 
a portfolio holding of 13.08 percent in growth stock holdings. However, such 
estimates should be interpreted with caution as the estimate is statistically 
insignificant. The fund’s fact sheet states that shares selected are primarily "blue 
chip" and span the three main equity investment sectors: industrial, financial and 
mining stocks. Therefore, these types of component stocks may explain the wide 
fluctuations observed. Although this fund targets to be completely invested in general 
equities, fixed-interest instruments are sometimes used to protect the fund when 
considered appropriate.  
A noteworthy insight, provided by the regression results of the FNB Momentum 
Growth Fund, is the surprising weighting given to exposures that can be proxied by 
the value style factor. This exposure averages 32.58 percent for the 10-year period 
and is statistically significant. Since growth and value attributes are on opposite 
GROWTH FUNDS
FUND A FUND B FUND C
FNB Momentum Growth Fund (A) Foord Equity Fund Investec Growth Fund Class A 
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 9,74812E-07 0,7489493 0,009247913 0,50696595 0,012554306 0,278061281
RESOURCE 10 2,99706E-08 0,34236089 0,056272511 0,892747923 0,147052645 0,968670245
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,232734418 0,21997329 0,159249807 0,29943681 0,289129912 0,291292267
FINANCIALS 15 8,13464E-07 0,80984024 6,87239E-07 0,47225988 3,05962E-07 0,103006128
GROWTH 0,13081512 0,15050709 2,01955E-07 0,371727218 0,05957238 0,287557941
SA LISTED PROPERTY 8,73992E-07 0,00032888 7,74014E-07 0,811938421 3,02434E-07 0,727069989
CONSUMER GOODS 0,057033287 0,19074142 0,018841567 0,803383973 9,44261E-07 0,756939571
LARGE CAP 0,014958695 0,61479846 0,173569732 0,226682316 9,79792E-07 0,149468586
MID CAP 0,099715502 0,38249073 0,355307596 0,000646533 0,15440912 0,02953517
SMALL CAP 0,117209566 0,01148107 0,203064242 0,020462954 0,22376514 0,016824443
VALUE 0,3258887 0,02247922 0 0,563259713 0,082131526 0,367602399
TECHNOLOGY 0,021045656 0,26784279 0,024312935 0,321385705 0,030747947 0,360605903
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,905923005 0,890565751 0,867270859
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scales, this might suggest a possible movement in the fund’s stock composition over 
time. When looking at the trend fluctuation of the fund, a possible reason for such 
volatility may be the inclusion of fixed instruments, which are characterised as being 
relatively illiquid and inefficient in their pricing, and, therefore, are consequently 
deemed risky. The period under analysis includes that of the sub-prime crisis and its 
adverse effects.   
Foord Equity fund has returns that are proxied by a portfolio with holdings in eleven 
of the twelve asset classes chosen, which is indicative of a diversified portfolio. 
Furthermore, the two statistically significant asset factors (small cap and mid cap) 
have a cumulative weighting of 55.84 percent, which presents robust grounds for 
statistical inference. Consistent with the fund’s title, is the large exposure to returns 
that are best described by various equity classes, with the only exception being the 
0.9 percent exposure to treasury bills. It should be noted that exposures to Treasury 
bill type returns may be indicative of the fund’s regulatory requirement to hold cash, 
which is specified in Foord’s fund fact sheet as a liquidity requirement. Since the 
return exposure is heavily weighted towards stocks, it is hypothesised that this fund 




A noteworthy excerpt from most of these funds’ objectives includes the fact that the 
funds employ active asset allocation strategies through investing mostly in JSE listed 
shares, then least on fixed assets, money market and international assets. This is, in 
addition, to compliance with Regulation 28 of the Pension Fund Act, stating that the 
funds should maintain an equity content of certain bounds. Further diagrams 





Further, it can be noted from the regression results presented in the tables so far, 
some of the funds do not really conform to their stated style, as most of these 
coefficients are not significant. This discrepancy can be explained by one of two 
facts: 
1. The return series of the selected 12 style factors do not accurately describe 
the fund’s exposure. This is feasible given the non-equity holdings of some of 
the funds as highlighted above, and the statistical insignificance of their 
current style return exposure.  
2. Alternatively, the fund may be in breach of their mandate and investing in 
assets with exposures that are best proxied by the return series of exposures 
to other styles, which is termed as drift. 
TABLE 4-5: Style weights for Growth funds continued 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
GROWTH FUNDS CONTINUED
FUND D FUND E FUND F
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R Old Mutual Growth Fund R 
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0,001911037 0,99312098 0,013772909 0,484112744 2,77405E-06 0,76208412
RESOURCE 10 0,050159522 0,92159538 6,02194E-07 0,16642141 0,093873251 0,05867797
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,102998287 0,21585887 0,231652405 0,208236367 0,071244129 0,012580236
FINANCIALS 15 0,002891322 0,7810458 0,021333412 0,562393941 0,113491509 0,230705744
GROWTH 0,06428942 0,32630402 5,02962E-07 0,714877621 0,020220284 0,001792849
SA LISTED PROPERTY 0 0,04896025 0,065216667 0,510698116 0 0,232784014
CONSUMER GOODS 0 0,14553444 0,044200788 0,69722342 0,084570118 0,323682662
LARGE CAP 8,76116E-05 0,23232045 0 0,705458328 0 0,055658117
MID CAP 0,13688851 0,14337609 0,475098332 0,005924817 0,099082275 0,138188802
SMALL CAP 0,398355339 2,7256E-06 0,148182514 0,875950702 0,217757129 0,000378777
VALUE 0,176275867 0,83845497 6,41294E-07 0,82646134 0,196025127 0,184154188
TECHNOLOGY 0,06570041 0,02273389 7,30976E-07 0,270916542 0,103319117 0,04820463
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1





Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R had the highest ratio of skill (asset selection) 
to style, relative to other funds in its sector, with only about 78 percent of its returns 
due to asset allocation and a relatively huge 22 percent due to asset selection. This 
may be due to the fund’s unique strategy which, predominantly, targets the dividend 
yield as stated in its fact sheet. The fund’s goal is to supply investors with a 
reasonable dividend yield and an increasing level of dividend income, which 
differentiates it from other funds. The Marriot Dividend Growth fund invests in stable 
JSE listed companies, which presently pay dividends and have prospects for 
constant and sustainable dividend growth in the future. The fund target is to achieve 
a dividend yield for its unit-holders in excess of the dividend yield of the Financial 
and Industrial index. It also intends to grow distributions above the dividend growth 
attained by the Financial and Industrial index, calculated over rolling two-year 
periods. 
Style weightings of the Marriott Dividend Fund highlight another important aspect of 
the fund, that is, a portion of the fund’s returns act like a cash exposure. This is 
observable on the coefficient on the 91 Day T-Bill which is greater than zero at 1.38 
percent. It is not that the fund holds that much cash, general equity unit trusts in 
South Africa are only allowed to hold 25 percent cash, but rather that the high 
dividend yielding shares’ constant income stream act like a cash return. Hence, its 
strategy of targeting growth in dividends justifies its growth style of investing, whose 
level of drift was established in the next section. 
A similar analysis follows for Industrials funds style returns and the RBSA regression 




TABLE 4-6: Style weights for Industrials funds 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
The returns of Coronation Industrial Fund more closely resemble a portfolio with 
greater weight placed on size style investment. Their returns are identical to those 
that can be achieved with a portfolio holding a 30.09 percent investment in mid-caps, 
33.66 percent holding in small caps and 27.96 percent invested in the industrials 
sector.  
Once more, these estimates are found to be significant – indicating the robustness of 
the analysis. It should be noted that the coefficients under the Industrials 25 index, 
for all the funds, are significant. The proportion of returns variations, due to style and 




FUND A FUND B FUND C
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A Momentum Industrial Fund A Old Mutual Industrial Fund A
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 6,31063E-07 0,51867675 6,26144E-07 0,21966659 2,4139E-07 0,885462245
RESOURCE 10 1,33427E-07 0,54042239 0 0,279478665 0,00755884 0,781630222
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,279609491 0,00302566 0,664105046 2,40389E-05 0,09718143 3,15624E-06
FINANCIALS 15 0 0,0458397 2,36395E-05 0,003085974 5,54933E-05 0,422081808
GROWTH 1,92225E-07 0,03846696 0 0,93167694 0,016368311 0,547087924
SA LISTED PROPERTY 0 0,32921522 0,001505813 0,000957685 0,034480182 0,252085556
CONSUMER GOODS 0,048862565 0,63601059 2,66994E-06 0,986010008 0,213880284 0,439193303
LARGE CAP 9,2223E-07 0,11750101 0 0,815872724 3,00171E-06 0,8086117
MID CAP 0,300949228 0,00016839 0,181696901 0,005746602 0,517890342 0,056482317
SMALL CAP 0,336571482 1,7956E-06 0,079904482 0,002105126 0 0,181658223
VALUE 3,41919E-07 0,0457415 0,072749418 0,914084683 0,042938206 0,785566293
TECHNOLOGY 0,033981376 0,07240195 2,5365E-05 0,242770223 0,069356078 0,008974437
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1





TABLE 4-7: Style weights for Industrials funds continued      
 





FUND D FUND E FUND F
Sanlam Industrial Fund A Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0,027773228 0,61927852 0 0,717094405 3,88908E-07 0,901733385
RESOURCE 10 0,0121284 0,0227863 0 0,450934353 0 0,542966556
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,75921324 0,00468103 0,061150513 0,000787 0,59379581 9,00258E-05
FINANCIALS 15 0 0,00068801 2,33587E-06 0,085087827 1,49733E-06 0,107373063
GROWTH 0 0,019076 0,021246349 0,389430752 9,14336E-07 0,561521699
SA LISTED PROPERTY 0,116992648 0,00220655 0,10195244 0,73780138 0,07294105 0,953112543
CONSUMER GOODS 0,028153904 0,7785671 0,108918584 0,151158654 0 0,161951978
LARGE CAP 0,055353522 0,00817313 9,36524E-07 0,430991546 3,91527E-07 0,628678306
MID CAP 1,27123E-05 0,00026733 0,443485825 0,002952545 1,17642E-05 0,001392564
SMALL CAP 2,26712E-05 1,6956E-07 0,142371151 0,452907496 0,302592679 0,170324282
VALUE 4,38606E-09 0,02225455 0,051739841 0,497603097 0,030641977 0,631539109
TECHNOLOGY 1,5821E-05 0,09945518 0,069209216 0,463052144 1,24392E-05 0,17183294
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,891407575 0,002581415 0,844597381
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The results from analysing the Large cap funds are presented next, in Table 4-8 and 
Table 4-9. 
TABLE 4-8: Style weights for Large Caps       
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
The large caps funds are standout performers when it comes to evaluating returns 
due to style. All of them had style attributions above 90 percent, with the only 
exception being Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 fund which had 87 percent. The results 
offered by Absa Large Cap fund are more aligned to the academic literature (such as 
Thomas, 2012), with 93 percent of variation in Absa’s returns, owing to style, and the 
remaining 7 percent attributable to asset selection. A similar analysis goes for all the 





FUND A FUND B FUND C
Absa Large Cap Fund ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0 0,89419183 0 0,898777955 0 0,089358411
RESOURCE 10 0,216506931 0,05364956 0,126105131 0,553882005 0,181127699 0,547791998
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,054414463 0,01524496 5,05747E-06 0,818696577 0,041948608 0,290282877
FINANCIALS 15 0 0,58698879 0,025857268 0,439214882 5,08572E-07 0,513195621
GROWTH 0,370454279 0,24709672 0,559352414 0,61147255 0,398246429 0,626144777
SA LISTED PROPERTY 0 0,06576612 0 0,145410944 0 0,943544334
CONSUMER GOODS 0,146623115 0,05092352 0,045118554 0,179041362 1,36553E-06 0,406494716
LARGE CAP 4,54521E-07 0,89199067 0,145901629 0,560384314 9,32267E-07 0,006904377
MID CAP 0 0,16542132 0 0,486060841 0 0,190100255
SMALL CAP 1,22215E-07 0,56901379 0 0,148050144 8,60033E-07 0,105716791
VALUE 0,212247274 0,11098555 0,097688934 0,74939071 0,378399378 0,538951214
TECHNOLOGY 0 0,87341496 4,56267E-06 0,338207395 0 0,760938731
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1





TABLE 4-9: Style weights for Large Caps continued      
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results. 
  
 
LARGE CAP FUNDS CONTINUED
FUND D FUND E FUND F
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0 0,40307503 2,3592E-07 0,709039966 0 0,090749131
RESOURCE 10 0,246322845 0,80797898 0,194273841 0,939463342 0,240825771 0,565509462
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,083133139 0,6929711 0,042227684 0,500765659 0,038786332 0,088889434
FINANCIALS 15 0 0,0217491 0 0,878284521 0 0,037130011
GROWTH 0,207074813 0,01682881 0,515672292 0,992606618 0,37719886 0,604230701
SA LISTED PROPERTY 4,73898E-07 0,66628341 0 0,631002421 0 0,811669002
CONSUMER GOODS 0,112637493 0,15635522 0,079383705 0,40037493 0,039546527 0,113053301
LARGE CAP 3,57854E-05 0,00020137 2,74671E-06 0,239237636 0 0,002523745
MID CAP 0 0,40990181 4,38534E-07 0,992380145 0 0,905108779
SMALL CAP 0 0,03028604 3,77762E-07 0,784077501 1,22215E-07 0,231540839
VALUE 0,300213126 0,22871975 0,168154829 0,637733637 0,303413514 0,926826415
TECHNOLOGY 0,050211322 0,06473047 7,85375E-07 0,774888266 2,60219E-06 0,606170466
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,952162253 0,872874058 0,955061708
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The study analyses funds invested in the Resources index next and the results are 
presented below: 
TABLE 4-10: Style weights for Resources funds 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
Style, or asset allocation, accounts for 90 percent of the Investec Commodity Fund 
Class R fund variation in returns, with 10 percent due to asset selection, such as the 
active stock picking strategies. This fund is concentrated in its holdings to six style 
factors which represents increased risk. It can be noted that the largest, statistically 
significant coefficients for all the funds, belongs to the resources style factor which 
confirms correct classification of the funds’ style.    
 
 
It is noted that most of these funds in the Resources sector are concentrated in their 
holdings, as can be seen by the zero weightings in most style factors. This, partly, 
RESOURCES FUNDS
FUND A FUND B FUND C
Investec Commodity Fund Class R Momentum Resources Fund A Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0,013378932 0,270619205 9,90748E-07 0,039669982 5,48666E-07 0,057777791
RESOURCE 10 0,835063607 7,13937E-06 0,764437607 8,72384E-07 0,783900029 1,89388E-13
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,029393318 0,61224726 0 0,827656804 0,031069406 0,848151931
FINANCIALS 15 0 0,006830189 2,84309E-07 0,898320469 0 0,524935537
GROWTH 0 0,112464272 9,00801E-07 0,479144658 0,026809857 0,028753393
SA LISTED PROPERTY 0 0,032212372 0 0,036577092 0 0,642591438
CONSUMER GOODS 0 0,201298152 0 0,036635029 0 0,129541098
LARGE CAP 0 0,159323861 9,37825E-07 0,699252626 0 0,077733731
MID CAP 0 0,195890395 5,32615E-07 0,981668312 0 0,876457007
SMALL CAP 0,090332405 0,003212841 0 0,00442334 0,046209971 0,01086627
VALUE 0,029977413 0,201001495 0,220934818 0,715091762 0,098787575 0,213031523
TECHNOLOGY 0,002054272 0,745920633 0,014402334 0,214705238 0,013327434 0,426535576
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,903031331 0,911962906 0,961404617
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explains the losses incurred by funds investing in this sector since they exhibit 
minimal diversification.  
Old Mutual Gold Fund R has holdings concentrated in only five of the twelve style 
factors, hence the heavy underperformance it exhibited over the evaluation period. 
The fund posted the least monthly average returns compared to its peers and also 
had a very low style attribution in its returns (60 percent) with 40 percent due to 
asset selection.      
 
 
TABLE 4-11: Style weights for Resources funds continued          
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
Consistent with a priori expectation of high tracking error, the Old Mutual Gold Fund 
R indicates that 60 percent of variation in fund return is explained by the fund’s style, 
with the remaining 40 percent deemed attributable to “asset selection”. The low 
RESOURCES FUNDS CONTINUED
FUND D FUND E FUND F
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R Old Mutual Gold Fund R Stanlib Resources Fund R class
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0,033560167 0,778141629 0,011977743 0,187511704 0 0,508803769
RESOURCE 10 0,505916111 9,16245E-09 0,853427848 0,003404746 0,735996567 4,2853E-06
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,043288175 0,012109928 0 0,553253125 0,025171592 0,552831457
FINANCIALS 15 0 0,195879303 0 0,883213861 3,02757E-07 0,090389506
GROWTH 0,058510628 0,737878577 0 0,14043036 0,023525543 0,248357874
SA LISTED PROPERTY 8,19349E-07 4,14193E-05 0 0,79506053 0 0,04542129
CONSUMER GOODS 0,057917387 0,366975875 0,048437016 0,535011501 2,53662E-07 0,044033193
LARGE CAP 2,08298E-06 0,377923959 0 0,391584112 3,47328E-07 0,356739026
MID CAP 0 0,863929645 0,047641716 0,276274985 1,70856E-07 0,547669583
SMALL CAP 0,133874561 0,025234399 0,037585327 0,900933965 0,113652463 0,001740644
VALUE 0,102407599 0,696266968 0 0,079610621 0,101109658 0,666355685
TECHNOLOGY 0,064041835 0,028209164 0 0,316794513 7,97891E-07 0,771321613
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,872849806 0,401091472 0,905917011
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adjusted R2 value may suggest that the managers of the fund engage in active asset 
selection and shifting of the funds across different assets, much to the detriment of 
the fund. The suspicion that the fund may be a drifter is confirmed in the next 
section, where the extent of drift of the funds is tested. However Stanlib Resources 
Fund attributes 91 percent of its returns to style with the remaining 9 percent due to 





Results for funds invested in the Small caps index style sector are presented next. 
TABLE 4-12: Style weights for Small Caps 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
SMALL CAP FUNDS
FUND A FUND B FUND C
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund Investec Emerging Companies R Momentum Small Mid-Cap A
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0 0,919828037 8,50852E-07 0,478665576 1,32762E-05 0,433485498
RESOURCE 10 0 0,983797305 0,004157331 0,088753036 0,029636278 0,636103562
INDUSTRIAL 25 3,73151E-07 0,460920316 0,023599719 0,587137545 0,030351736 0,936713777
FINANCIALS 15 0 0,267826829 0 0,000195698 0 0,067663244
GROWTH 0 0,075555058 0 0,295502356 0,021999144 0,426239895
SA LISTED PROPERTY 0 0,001036154 8,46545E-07 0,00028991 0 2,04723E-05
CONSUMER GOODS 0,024676073 0,066323684 0,00858074 0,230637082 2,73952E-08 0,548956081
LARGE CAP 1,93433E-07 0,305465142 0 0,150019343 0 0,753036058
MID CAP 0,125384119 0,019165877 0,155931543 0,000466682 0,341508361 0,000340135
SMALL CAP 0,849481892 4,07733E-15 0,469787868 3,13002E-10 0,455939163 6,81887E-06
VALUE 0 0,193917509 0,265385032 0,52545764 0,081676784 0,951170411
TECHNOLOGY 1,1794E-05 0,355971352 0,072379353 0,039849413 0,038808053 0,430832379
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,803364013 0,839114628 0,758191918
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Momentum Small Mid-Cap fund posted a higher monthly average return in this 
category followed by the Nedgroup fund, whereas Stanlib Small Cap fund posted the 
least. However, with respect to style attribution, style was responsible for 75.8 
percent of its returns, which may suggest that the fund’s managers are actively 
involved in stock selection that accounts for approximately 24.2 percent of the fund’s 
returns. This information is of interest, since it may suggest the possibility of the fund 
being a drifter, an assertion that is confirmed in the next section. However, style is 
found to be responsible for 80.3 percent and 83.9 percent for Coronation and 
Investec funds, respectively, meaning the funds’ returns are largely due to asset 
allocation. For all the funds in this sector, the coefficients on the Small Cap style are 
large and statistically significant, which confirms appropriate classification. 
    
 
The Old Mutual Mid and Small Cap fund has the highest portion of returns 
attributable to variations in its style factor, with 88.9 percent, followed by Nedgroup 
Investment Entrepreneur Fund R with 84.9 percent. Value funds are known to have 
gradually changing characteristics as they try to move towards Growth status. 
Hence, the study will be on the lookout for the possibility of drift amongst these funds 




TABLE 4- 13: Style weights for Small Caps continued 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
It is observable from the style diagrams that some of the funds in this sector have 
high asset allocation portions. For example, 25 percent of the variation in the returns 
of Stanlib Small Cap Fund are explained by asset allocation. Momentum Small Mid-
Cap A, and Coronation Smaller companies’ fund, attribute 24 percent and 20 percent 
variation in their returns to asset selection which is, somehow, high. This may 
suggest a significant level of active investing and possibly drift. 
   
 
 
Lastly, results for funds invested in the Value index style factor are presented in the 
tables that follow. 
 
SMALL CAP FUNDS CONTINUED
FUND D FUND E FUND F
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0 0,573129911 6,31435E-07 0,946171484 0 0,05078452
RESOURCE 10 0 0,00169679 0,000775889 0,324862684 0 0,661568896
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,103572787 0,972895072 0,041101833 0,879839716 0 0,454241209
FINANCIALS 15 9,25535E-07 1,63136E-05 4,3837E-07 0,116988689 0 0,371704636
GROWTH 0,004132109 0,559653824 9,6017E-07 0,436829519 0 0,444413388
SA LISTED PROPERTY 4,30684E-07 0,002431739 1,07744E-05 8,50225E-06 0 0,000254997
CONSUMER GOODS 0 0,075299184 1,96906E-07 0,979890812 0 0,104621825
LARGE CAP 6,2565E-07 0,112614047 3,30394E-07 0,71038108 8,63357E-08 0,659093176
MID CAP 0,40949431 4,2333E-05 0,337450669 0,000694681 0 0,964016893
SMALL CAP 0,237816454 1,70252E-05 0,472140176 5,92522E-13 0,704976622 1,01665E-12
VALUE 0,21232613 0,811968505 0,081270432 0,598844893 0,28597338 0,56481994
TECHNOLOGY 0,032776544 0,314476153 0,067004391 0,008388482 0,007456836 0,234703313
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,849988313 0,889042129 0,749865413
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TABLE 4-14: Style weights for Value funds 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
In the analysis, standout funds which either posted highest returns, least returns or 
showed distinctive volatility, are examined. 
   
 
 
Shifting the analysis to the Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A, the study forms a priori 
expectation of a variety of different equity level investments. Once again, the study’s 
expectations are satisfied by the use of Sharpe’s Style analysis. According to Cadiz 
(2015), the Mastermind Fund is an active stock picking, long equity portfolio, which 
targets preservation of capital through equity portfolio protection.  
VALUE FUNDS
FUND A FUND B FUND C
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A Element Islamic Equity Fund A Investec Value Fund Class R 
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 0 0,447560773 3,48463E-07 0,494529349 0 0,449892629
RESOURCE 10 0,041923442 0,00094954 0,501629437 0,000110165 0,104162856 2,20526E-09
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,034942554 0,069665532 0,091906151 0,097694522 0,054407864 0,003862947
FINANCIALS 15 0,165522115 0,000793896 0,014724463 0,681033685 0,270082048 2,32849E-06
GROWTH 0,055493256 0,514696426 1,48843E-06 0,453185643 0 0,068995594
SA LISTED PROPERTY 8,71469E-07 0,083433638 0 0,055309629 0,032512267 0,21512764
CONSUMER GOODS 0 0,437354007 0 0,152777077 0,170408801 0,01107455
LARGE CAP 3,1201E-07 0,668972551 0 0,8197818 0 0,39656912
MID CAP 0,00012509 0,178500976 1,62678E-05 0,067515786 1,22466E-05 0,004261056
SMALL CAP 1,42063E-05 0,000137079 0,26303543 0,070418237 0,243460862 0,07512851
VALUE 0,679683803 0,765491957 0,128735857 0,455778684 0,095252535 0,08220226
TECHNOLOGY 0,022081973 0,77260392 9,90232E-08 0,488718878 0,029214029 0,911711584
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,878421259 0,816493834 0,768555772
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The fund aims to provide investors with a superior level of dividend income over the 
short term and maximum capital growth over the medium to long term. It does this 
through seeking ‘deep value' opportunities, such as, stocks trading significantly 
below their intrinsic market value. The analysis finds that this description holds. The 
stated protection comes in the form of the statistically significant exposures to South 
African listed property, small caps and the good performing industrials. However, the 
Value coefficient is statistically insignificant, as also observed in some of the funds 
analysed. This fund is concentrated in its holdings which represents increased risk, 




The Investec Value Fund shows a superior asset selection return (23 percent), 
compared to peer funds, which suggests that a sizeable portion of the returns is 
attributable to stock picking skills of the manager. The portfolio targets the provision 
of investors with capital growth over the long-term and, thus, invests in equities 
trading at a discount to their fair value, such as value shares. From its fact sheet, the 
value is achieved by picking South African stocks with inferior ratings, relative to their 
net asset value, historic performance, earnings potential, or the ratings of peer 
stocks in the same sector. The fund also prefers high dividend yielding equities and 
solid cash flows that are undervalued by the market. Hence, the value style assertion 






TABLE 4-15: Style weights for Value funds continued 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the RBSA regressions’ results.   
STANLIB Value Fund targets medium to long-term capital growth, with income 
generation as a secondary objective. Stocks that the fund purchases have higher 
intrinsic values, relative to those reflected by their share prices in the relevant 
market. Coupled with the fact that this portfolio may have indirect foreign exposure of 
up to 10 percent, this helps explain the fund’s superior monthly average returns in 
this category as observed in the graphs presented earlier.   
 
 
Worth noting with the Value funds is the relatively high asset selection portion, as 
compared to funds in the other styles, which suggest a high level of active investing 
and a possible indication of drift. Stanlib has 17 percent skill attribution, Momentum 
has 19 percent and Nedgroup investments has 18 percent. These assertions of drift 
VALUE FUNDS CONTINUED
FUND D FUND E FUND F
Stanlib Value Fund A Class Momentum Value Fund (A) Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 
STYLE FACTORS WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE WEIGHTING P-VALUE
Intercept 0 #N/A 0 #N/A 0 #N/A
90 DAY T-bill 2,27475E-07 0,928977366 0 0,304046471 0,005061562 0,269812688
RESOURCE 10 0,085309523 0,481214066 0,406271243 9,73581E-06 0,103869616 0,804409733
INDUSTRIAL 25 0,132275131 0,247491167 0 0,132457404 0,092895265 0,88218817
FINANCIALS 15 0 0,107062537 1,3895E-07 0,082798881 0,082031347 0,222175852
GROWTH 0,026796646 0,313864947 0 0,496623344 0,004486985 0,960912464
SA LISTED PROPERTY 0 0,018584556 0 0,015604026 0,008506697 0,326527797
CONSUMER GOODS 0 0,800123925 0 0,811668235 0,100360189 0,211949067
LARGE CAP 0 0,437308001 6,19291E-07 0,12398705 0,025848799 0,775848251
MID CAP 0,350482242 0,000584184 0,273328884 0,247948213 0,470786992 0,000836722
SMALL CAP 0,120499856 0,012638289 9,21406E-07 0,124641608 0,08399246 0,952626244
VALUE 0,278113349 0,905351668 0,294911691 0,206654653 1,56253E-06 0,858473306
TECHNOLOGY 0,006082748 0,922473316 0,024925005 0,498850782 0,021748542 0,960488239
Sum of Factor Weights 1 1 1
Adjusted R Square 0,83245237 0,809302471 0,823281426
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are investigated in detail in the next section. This section has detailed, demonstrated 
and analysed what portion of a unit trust’s returns can be attributed to style factors 
and what can be deemed attributable to asset selection. The next consideration is 
that of style drift. The style or asset allocation of a unit trust may change markedly 
over a period. This could happen as active fund managers respond to changes in 
their external environment, or there is a change in the fund management.  
 
4.1.2.3 Style Analysis Summary   
Style analysis, like most proliferated financial models, holds some degree of practical 
usage, underpinned by theoretical validity (Froot and Teo, 2008). This theoretical 
validity has been exhausted in the literature review and been critically evaluated by 
presenting some of the weaknesses of this technique, for example, by studies like 
Auret and Cline (2011), Cao (2012) and Dickson (2016). This included the fact that 
the analysis is retrospective and relies heavily on past data. The degree of style 
analysis’ practical usefulness also provides an inherent weakness, as its value is 
constrained by the quality of the data obtained (Boyer, 2015). Furthermore, whilst 
some data may be considered as high quality in some applications, the same data 
may be considered poor when evaluating a different unit trust. The study found this 
to be the case as some of the proxies chosen in this quantitative study proved to be 
of minimal statistical significance for some funds, yet highly significant for others.  
This argument is inherent to the interpretation of the adjusted R2 value, as it is 
indicative only to the degree to which a specific model fits the data at hand. In the 
quantitative analysis, the weightings of style factors that would cause a hypothetical 
portfolio to yield the same returns as that of the 42 selected unit trusts have been 
thoroughly analysed. It is noted that, whist the Style analysis lends weight to some 
factors such as Treasury bills, it may be detecting the presence of cash. This links 
back to a potential weakness inherent to its assumptions, where detection of styles is 
based on return characteristics. Common conclusions from the quantitative analysis 
show that funds with more active management tend to exhibit greater portions of 
return attributable to asset selection. Furthermore, it was found that the titles of unit 
trusts may, sometimes, be misleading as they expose the investor to style factor 
returns that are against their mandates, or the investor is unaware of. This forms the 
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principal edge of this technique, as it is able to lift the veil of secretive mutual funds – 
even if to a limited extent – using only easily accessible public information.  
However, in most cases, it was found that these funds comply with their mandates 
and relevant regulation. This is in addition to the funds often fulfilling a priori 
expectations formed by looking at their risk and return profiles – with funds with 
greater returns investing in growth type stocks and safer funds taking minimum risks. 
This was observable when the 12 factors could not accurately proxy the returns of 
the funds, which led to the assumptions that an inherent inclusion of a bond proxy 
may have better explained some part of the returns. The Style analysis tool was also 
able to detect the presence of a style drift, which is important as investors want to 
have adequate knowledge of their investments. 
 
4.1.2.4 Results of Fund Drift 
After establishing the styles to which the funds belong in the previous section, the 
study then assessed how true these funds stayed to their styles. In other words, the 
study undertook to find out the extent of style drift amongst the funds sampled, which 
is a fulfilment of the first objective of the study. The three most prevalent methods 
found in literature for measuring style drift are the R2 statistic, the tracking error 
method and, most significantly, the style drift score. All three these methods have 
been employed in this study, however, the style drift score is the primary technique 
used for measuring the extent of style drift of the funds. The three methods are 
detailed next and the results from their analysis follow. In this section the funds are 
separated into two categories, that is, Style consistent funds and style drifting funds, 
using the style drift score. 
From here the study then contrasts the performances of these two groups in the 
following section and then also investigates whether these performances persist in 
the subsequent section. The results from analysing the extent of style drift of the 
funds, using these three methods, are presented summarily in Table 4-16 below. 






TABLE 4-16: Separating consistent funds from drifters: SDS, R2 
and Tracking Error   
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the style drift measures’ results.   
FUND DRIFT
FUND SECTORS STYLE DRIFT SCORE ADJUSTED R-SQUARED TRACKING ERROR
Mean SDS = 0,9814 Mean Adj.R-squared=0,8621 Mean Tracking error=0,002467
FINANCIALS SDS RANKING ADJ.R-SQUARED RANKING TRACKING ERROR RANKING
FUND A Coronation Financial Fund 0,7648913 C 0,88427006 C 0,001972815 C
FUND B Momentum Financials Fund A 0,9707935 C 0,925006516 C 0,00250388 D
FUND C Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 0,6278492 C 0,915234892 C 0,001619355 C
FUND D Sanlam Financial Fund 0,5816421 C 0,917317118 C 0,001658315 C
FUND E Sanlam Financial Fund B1 1,194669 D 0,88238168 C 0,001446609 C
FUND F ABSA Select Equity Fund 0,7831952 C 0,89164536 C 0,002232962 C
Overall Drift= 17% 0% 17%
GROWTH
FUND A FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 0,7501074 C 0,905923005 C 0,001934685 C
FUND B Foord Equity Fund 0,5725278 C 0,890565751 C 0,00163233 C
FUND C Investec Growth Fund Class A 0,8200536 C 0,867270859 C 0,002112317 C
FUND D Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 0,6464316 C 0,888693577 C 0,001843036 C
FUND E Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 0,7354794 C 0,776359498 D 0,001896956 C
FUND F Old Mutual Growth Fund R 0,7211102 C 0,88982534 C 0,001859895 C
Overall Drift= 0% 17% 0%
INDUSTRIALS
FUND A Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 0,5919021 C 0,890125256 C 0,00152664 C
FUND B Momentum Industrial Fund A 0,8130271 C 0,884818765 C 0,002096968 C
FUND C Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 0,9090402 C 0,85978305 D 0,002344606 C
FUND D Sanlam Industrial Fund A 0,5410129 C 0,891407575 C 0,001542478 C
FUND E Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 1,000855 D 0,819702391 D 0,002581415 D
FUND F Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 0,8365522 C 0,844597381 D 0,002385088 C
Overall Drift= 17% 50% 17%
LARGE CAP
FUND A Absa Large Cap Fund 0,8025997 C 0,925024562 C 0,002288286 C
FUND B ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 1,1952927 D 0,944028686 C 0,001447365 C
FUND C Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 0,6472081 C 0,958031469 C 0,001669286 C
FUND D Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    0,5827785 C 0,952162253 C 0,001661556 C
FUND E Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 1,5339151 D 0,872874058 C 0,003037933 D
FUND F Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 0,6276007 C 0,955061708 C 0,001789348 C
Overall Drift= 33% 0% 17%
RESOURCES
FUND A Investec Commodity Fund Class R 1,055822 D 0,903031331 C 0,002723187 D
FUND B Momentum Resources Fund A 1,0787146 D 0,911962906 C 0,002782232 D
FUND C Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0,6286401 C 0,961404617 C 0,001621395 C
FUND D Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 0,9737689 C 0,872849806 C 0,002511555 D
FUND E Old Mutual Gold Fund R 3,3064722 D 0,401091472 D 0,008528087 D
FUND F Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 0,9912351 D 0,905917011 C 0,002556604 D
Overall Drift= 67% 17% 83%
SMALL CAP
FUND A Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 0,8426732 C 0,803364013 D 0,002173431 C
FUND B Investec Emerging Companies R 1,0939741 D 0,839114628 D 0,002821589 D
FUND C Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   1,085863 D 0,758191918 D 0,003095896 D
FUND D Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 1,010565 D 0,849988313 D 0,002606459 D
FUND E Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 0,8043923 C 0,889042129 C 0,002074697 C
FUND F Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 2,2856114 D 0,749865413 D 0,005004025 D
Overall Drift= 67% 83% 67%
VALUE
FUND A Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 1,2443943 D 0,878421259 C 0,003209554 D
FUND B Element Islamic Equity Fund A 1,2091954 D 0,816493834 D 0,003122059 D
FUND C Investec Value Fund Class R 1,3170472 D 0,768555772 D 0,003396942 D
FUND D Stanlib Value Fund A Class 0,9659978 C 0,83245237 D 0,002754149 D
FUND E Momentum Value Fund A 1,3274511 D 0,809302471 D 0,003423775 D
FUND F Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 0,7465884 C 0,823281426 D 0,002128593 C
Overall Drift= 67% 83% 83%
CONSISTENT 26 62% 27 64% 25 60%
DRIFTERS 16 38% 15 36% 17 40%
TOTAL 42 100% 42 100% 42 100%
C - Consistent Funds D - Drifters
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4.1.2.4(a) R2 Statistic Results 
The R2 statistic usually measures the goodness of fit for the model used, that is, how 
well the model explains the variable of interest being researched. With respect to 
Sharpe’s (1992) Returns Based Style Analysis, [1-R2] captures the portion of the 
fund’s return variability that is not systematically related to co-movements in the 
returns to the style benchmarks. Accordingly, [1-R2] serves as a proxy for the extent 
to which the manager is unable to produce returns consistent with a tractable 
investment style. Therefore, a high R2 value designates a style consistent fund, 
whereas a low R2 value infers style inconsistent investing or a style drifter. Adjusted 
R2 values for all the funds in the sample were taken and ranked, upon which the 
mean value was obtained, that is, the average R2 value. This value was then 
compared to the individual values of the funds. Funds which were found to have 
higher R2 values, relative to the mean, were deemed to be style consistent funds, 
whereas funds which had lower R2 values were deemed to be drifters.  
When using the R-squared method to analyse drift, it can be observed from Table 4-
16, that the highest drift was found in Value Funds and the Small Cap Funds, both 
with 83 percent. Of the sample selected, 5 out of 6 funds were found to be drifters 
which equates to the 83 percent observed. The same group of funds consistently 
recorded a higher drift percentage across all the methods used. This validates the 
assertion that small caps and value funds change their characteristics more 
frequently as they grow in size and improve their fundamental ratios towards growth 
funds. Large Caps and Financials exhibit consistency, that is, they have 0 percent 
drift, whereas Resources and Growth Funds posted a relatively low level of style drift 
at 17 percent. Overall, the R-Squared method depicts the style drift among the 
sample to be at 36 percent, whereas style consistency is found to be 64 percent.    
 
4.1.2.4(b) Tracking Error Results 
The tracking error can be expressed as the volatility of the difference between the 
fund’s returns and those of a corresponding benchmark portfolio summarizing the 
style universe (Muller and Ward, 2013). Simply put, it is the return not explained by 
the style benchmark. The tracking errors of the funds were obtained from the 
regression outputs (standard errors) from establishing the style of the funds using 
the RBSA method. These were ranked and a mean Tracking Error was found. 
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Relative to the mean tracking error, style consistent funds have a lower tracking error 
while style inconsistent funds (drifters) have a higher tracking error.  
The results in Table 4-16 demonstrate the overall extent of drift amongst our sample 
to be 40 percent, while style consistency is proposed to be 60 percent when using 
the tracking error method. The overall drift figures are almost consistent throughout 
the three methods used, which may help validate the reliability of the results 
obtained. Using the tracking error method, the highest drift was observed in the 
Value and Resources funds at 83 percent, followed by the Small Cap Funds at 67 
percent. This observation concurs with the assertion that Value fund and Small Cap 
funds’ characteristics are constantly changing, relative to the other styles. The high 
drift amongst the Resources funds can be traced back to the volatile nature of the 
South African commodity prices, which fluctuate wildly, as does the Rand currency 
itself. Hence, fund managers invested in mining stocks are constantly moving their 
assets in and out of funds in pursuit of a better alpha which leads to the high level of 
inconsistency. Growth Funds exhibit complete style consistency, whereas Financials, 
Industrials and Large Caps display a very low level of drift at 17 percent each.        
 
4.1.2.4(c) Style Drift Score Results 
Instead of examining rolling window graphs, that have been predominantly used in 
past studies, to examine style drift, Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) propose the Style 
Drift Score (SDS) method of measuring drift. They assert that it liberates a 
researcher from scrutinizing numerous rolling window style maps and rolling window 
asset allocation graphs, both of which illustrate the evolution of a portfolio’s 
investment style. The SDS quantitatively measures style drift of a portfolio by 
computing it as a single statistic. This research utilizes the SDS method as the 
principal method for measuring drift, above the aforementioned R2  and tracking error 
methods. It is computed as the square root of the sum of the variances of the asset 
class coefficients (or style weights) derived from the RBSA regressions. 
The SDS’s for all the funds were obtained and ranked, whereupon an average SDS 
was found. A fund with a high SDS, relative to the mean SDS, demonstrates higher 
style inconsistency (that is, a drifter), whereas a fund with an inferior SDS, below the 
mean SDS, is deemed a style consistent fund. 
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The results in Table 4-16, demonstrate that, overall, a modest 38 percent of the 
funds were found to be drifters, with 62 percent of the funds demonstrating style 
consistency. As had been observed from the previous two methods, the funds 
invested in the Value, Small Cap and Resources sectors demonstrated a higher style 
drift relative to the others with 67 percent drift. Growth Funds, again, recorded 
perfect style consistency with 0 percent drift, whilst Financials and Industrials, again, 
recorded low style drift at 17 percent. Large Caps funds displayed a moderate 
amount of drift at 33 percent. The extent of drift for all these funds is presented in the 
graphs that follow. These were derived from the style drift score calculated earlier. 
The average style drift score (mean SDS) is presented first as a benchmark for all 
the funds. Funds with a higher drift than the mean SDS are considered drifters 
whereas funds with a lower drift than the mean SDS are considered consistent 
funds.  
 
FIGURE 4-1: Style drift for Financials funds  
 
 
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 exhibits the highest drift among the financials funds, 
which is 1.097 deviations higher than the mean style drift score. In fact, it is the only 
fund that demonstrates drift amongst the financials as all the other funds are found to 
be consistent with their investment philosophies. 
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FIGURE 4-2: Style drift for Growth funds 
 
 
The Growth funds all demonstrate consistency in their investment strategies, as 
observable from the graph above. Foord Equity Fund is found to be the most 
consistent with the least style drift score of 0.57, which is 0.41 deviations below the 
mean style drift score. The fund attained the highest monthly average return over the 
evaluation period, which adds weight to the claim that consistent funds produce 
better results than drifters. 




All the Industrial funds exhibit a substantial level of consistency, except for Stanlib 
Industrial Fund R Class, which is the only fund exhibiting drift amongst the funds. Its 
drift score is 0.019455 deviations above the mean style drift score. Its lacklustre 
performance is even highlighted in its fact sheet of 31 August 2016, where it is rated 
last in its sector (7 out of 7), whilst its general ranking in the South African unit trust 
universe stands at 655 out of 1033 funds (ASISA, 2015). 
 
FIGURE 4-4: Style drift for Large Caps 
 
Within the Large Cap style factor only two funds are found to be drifters, with the 
remaining two thirds being consistent. Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 fund exhibits the 
highest drift, followed by Absa Large Cap Fund B Class. This observation concurs 
with the assertion of underperformance by drifters, as the Prescient fund posted the 









FIGURE 4-5: Style drift for Resources funds  
 
 
Old Mutual Gold Fund R exhibits the highest overall style drift score throughout all 
the funds sampled for this research. The fund’s drift score has the largest deviation 
from the mean score, at 2.33 points above the mean. It follows that the fund posted 
the least monthly average return in its sector throughout the period of observation.  
The resources sector has been facing tough economic conditions in South Africa for 
quite a while, which may explain the overall drift of the funds in this sector at 67 
percent, that is, 4 out of 6 funds. This may suggest that resources funds’ managers 












FIGURE 4-6: Style drift for Small Caps 
 
 
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class exhibits a standout drift from its peer funds in the 
small caps style. In fact, the fund has the second highest overall style drift score in 
the whole sample after Old Mutual Gold Fund R. As can be expected, the fund 
posted the lowest monthly average return in its sector over the evaluation period. 67 
percent (4 out of 6) of the funds in this sector are drifters. A possible justification may 
be that the characteristics of shares in this sector are constantly changing as the 
companies evolve and grow into bigger entities. Hence, drift may be justifiable on the 
grounds that a change in the stock characteristics is inevitable as the stocks grow 
from small caps to bigger entities. 
Lastly, the study observed drift amongst the Value funds and discovered that it is 
also as high as that observed in the Resources and the Small cap styles. 67 percent 
(4 out of 6) value funds are found to be drifters. This can be justifiable on the basis 
that value shares are constantly trying to grow into growth shares over time. 
Momentum Value Fund exhibits the highest drift among the value funds with a 
deviation of 0.3460511 above the mean drift score. Nedgroup Investments Value 
Fund A displays the most consistency with 0.2348116 deviations below the mean 
style drift score. This seems to be in agreement with its performance as the fund 
posted the second highest average monthly return in the observation period, after 
Stanlib Value Fund A Class fund which also exhibits consistency.   
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FIGURE 4-7: Style drift for Value funds     
 
 
4.1.2.5 Fund Drift Summary 
This section has unearthed that returns to South African unit trusts can be mostly 
attributed to the style of the fund, rather than the skill of the manager. The Industrials 
sector posted the highest average returns for the period of analysis, followed closely 
by the Large Caps index. The Resources sector posted the least average monthly 
returns over the evaluation period. 
It is also established, from the Returns Based Style Analysis, that most of the funds 
are correctly classified, since the largest statistically significant style weights 
confirmed their style attribution. However, some of the style coefficients are found to 
be statistically insignificant which maybe be due to inappropriate style factors used 
as proxies for the style analysis. From the above analysis, it can be observed that, 
on average, South African fund managers stick to their prescribed style more often 
than not. All the methods for measuring drift exhibited at least 60 percent style 
consistency. It can also be inferred that fund managers invested in Value stocks, 
Small Cap stocks and Resources stocks display a higher level of drift compared to 
the other indices.  
This can be attributable to the nature of the South African economy which is heavily 
weighted towards the Basic Materials index, more precisely the mining sector. 
Commodity prices are very volatile within the South African economy, coupled with 
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the wild fluctuations of the South African Rand (ZAR) currency. Hence, fund 
managers invested in these kinds of stocks may be tempted to chase 
outperformance of the market at the slightest positive news, which may lead to a 
deviation from their mandates. Financials and Growth sectors are found to be the 
most consistent with low levels of style drift throughout the three methods used. Van 
Heerden (2014) asserts that the financial sector is very stable in South Africa, which 
was observed in its ability to withstand the 2008 financial crisis. These may help 
explain the consistency phenomenon of such funds.  
In the fund management sphere, it is believed that style consistency can be 
indicative of a skilful portfolio manager, a successful risk management system, and 
is an advisable distinction when searching for and retaining managers, in addition to 
the obvious benefits in the portfolio construction process.  Actually, Brown and 
Harlow (2002) infer that a positive relationship exists between performance and 
investment style consistency. The following sections will test whether this hypothesis 
holds or not. The Style Drift Score method has been primarily used in this study to 
formally separate the funds in our sample into two groups, that is, the consistent 
funds and the drifters. In the subsequent sections, the study analyses the relative 
performances of these two categories of funds and further investigates the possibility 
of persistence in their performances. 
 
4.2 Performances of the Funds 
The study now turns its attention to addressing the second objective of the research, 
which is the measurement of performance of the funds. This section also compares 
the performances of the consistent funds and the drifters, peer-wise, in 
outperforming the benchmark index. Three performance measurement models, 
namely, the CAPM, FF3F and Sharpe ratio, are utilized to thoroughly analyse the 
performances of the funds. This was done to check whether the findings are 
consistent throughout the models, or whether there are any discrepancies observed. 
The study also wanted to observe changes in the variables of interest like Alpha, 
beta, R-squared and the log likelihood of the funds, by generating two sets of results 
using the ALSI benchmark and the style equity benchmarks for the funds as the 
market proxy. This will allow an analysis of whether there is an observed change in 
the funds’ returns when adjusting for style, that us, investing in a style index. Most of 
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the funds invest by utilising the JSE ALSI as their market benchmark, as stated in 
their fact sheets. Hence, the study seeks to find out if their returns could be better off 
after adjusting for style exposure or not. The two categories of funds (consistent 
versus drifters) are thoroughly compared throughout this performance evaluation 
section to find out which set of funds outperform the markets on a risk adjusted 
basis. The study commences the analysis of performance with the results from the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).    
 
4.2.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) Results 
Results for the Capital Asset Pricing model, with the JSE ALSI employed as the 
market proxy, are presented in Table 4-17. The analysis of the performance of 
consistent funds against the drifters follows in Table 4-18. Table 4-19 presents 
results from the CAPM model, this time with the specific equity style indices used as 
the market proxies. Alphas from these results are analysed in Table 4-20 with 
respect to the two categories of funds, that is, the consistent funds versus the funds 
that drift their style (drifters).    
The Jensen alpha tests are therefore summarised in Tables 4-18 and Table 4-20 for 
the two categories. Forty-two alphas are estimated for the 10-year period (one for 
each unit trust). The alphas are divided into four categories, either positive and 
statistically significant, negative and statistically significant, positive and statistically 
insignificant or negative and statistically insignificant. Once again as done for all the 
regressions in this analysis, before interpreting the results, diagnostic tests were 
performed to ensure all econometric properties are met. The results passed all these 
stability tests, which were the tests for stationerity, heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and normality. This step was very important in order to avoid getting 
results which are spurious and also uninterpretable statistics. The results in the 
tables present the following statistics; the alphas for the funds, the beta for the 
market, the adjusted R-squared values, the log-likelihood statistic and the Durbin-






TABLE 4-17: CAPM results from JSE ALSI benchmark 
  
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the CAPM regressions’ results.  
CAPM  RESULTS 1 - ALL  SHARE  INDEX  BENCHMARK  
FUNDS SECTORS
MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  ALSI 
FINANCIALS ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) LOG L. D-W Stat.
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000207 0.976124*** 0.905503 408.6147 1.914162
(-0.422462) (31.58420)
Momentum Financials Fund A 8.41E-05 1.050795*** 0.855685 375.7066 2.006005
(0.125623) (24.85252)
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000232 0.994269*** 0.927519 421.8544 2.037862
(-0.538290) (36.49470)
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000327 0.973791*** 0.922742 479.5213 1.971422
(-0.810874) (37.55470)
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 8.71E-05 0.943797*** 0.947054 275.0668 2.165728
(0.230762) (33.04710)
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000358 1.027489*** 0.970934 534.3007 1.972786
(1.407435) (62.79062)
GROWTH MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE ALSI 
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000243 1.015002*** 0.973197 474.4134 2.368422
(-0.928418) (61.45879)
Foord Equity Fund -1.72E-05 0.968670*** 0.966058 531.7920 2.404074
(-0.066054) (57.96132)
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000475* 0.981562*** 0.971885 527.8163 2.042280
(-1.958145) (63.05838)
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000235 0.987988*** 0.965521 528.4752 2.282965
(-0.878849) (57.49221)
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000248 0.951620*** 0.914249 416.8828 1.661046
(-0.548093) (33.31394)
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000256 0.998945*** 0.967524 465.7049 2.265347
(-0.901349) (55.67232)
INDUSTRIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  ALSI 
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 0.000247 0.973710*** 0.931116 426.9218 1.979803
(0.601418) (37.50727)
Momentum Industrial Fund A 0.000431 0.992965*** 0.934941 428.0774 2.243504
(1.060501) (38.67222)
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 4.92E-05 1.003014*** 0.924816 418.8605 2.350111
(0.110939) (35.78078)
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 0.000113 0.959650*** 0.943545 501.2416 2.171886
(0.336693) (44.42017)
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 0.000353 0.998398*** 0.918164 414.5192 2.394589
(0.763811) (34.17357)
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 0.000330 0.988262*** 0.918674 474.4520 2.351709
(0.785719) (36.52331)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
118 
 
TABLE 4-17 CONTINUED 
 
 Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the CAPM regressions’ results.   
LARGE CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  ALSI LOG L. D-W Stat.
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000519* 1.051662*** 0.959751 511.4829 2.371462
(1.684218) (53.05418)
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000104 1.070418*** 0.975403 291.9262 2.434804
(0.362051) (49.19303)
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -0.000140 1.062675*** 0.971879 467.0034 2.030873
(-0.497632) (59.96105)
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000154 1.047886*** 0.980289 555.6378 2.184310
(-0.723869) (76.61299)
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000511 1.056764*** 0.954406 332.5382 2.160558
(-1.202149) (40.41949)
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A -4.29E-05 1.072853*** 0.969698 526.6073 2.144499
(-0.158078) (61.45834)
RESOURCES MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  ALSI 
Investec Commodity Fund Class R -0.000471 1.007337*** 0.907109 406.3021 1.689953
(-0.941175) (31.88411)
Momentum Resources Fund A -0.000867* 1.073032*** 0.911836 402.6803 1.464306
(-1.675117) (32.81196)
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R -0.000503 1.036732*** 0.935647 424.1604 1.857971
(-1.191259) (38.89831)
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R -0.000766** 1.001064*** 0.943597 435.1986 1.651949
(-2.015737) (41.72359)
Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.001541 0.985158*** 0.675634 327.7142 2.330854
(-1.457273) (14.75214)
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.001117** 1.030763*** 0.927395 417.9723 1.570208
(-2.495650) (36.46096)
SMALL CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  ALSI 
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000370 0.957391*** 0.901176 408.0501 2.092082
(-0.752593) (30.81192)
Investec Emerging Companies R -4.00E-05 0.998909*** 0.908032 407.7609 2.310310
(-0.080983) (32.05968)
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   7.33E-05 0.971968*** 0.907847 468.2946 2.238482
(0.165461) (34.10974)
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000287 1.000166*** 0.918927 414.8685 2.246959
(0.621936) (34.34816)
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000153 0.998437*** 0.917349 413.9489 1.929128
(-0.327980) (33.98978)
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001523* 0.982940*** 0.794722 345.8027 1.344373
(-1.910043) (19.70135)
VALUE MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  ALSI 
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -5.88E-05 1.050550*** 0.909365 403.3113 1.623061
(-0.114237) (32.31812)
Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000294 1.024877*** 0.949559 442.8451 2.278272
(-0.801898) (44.47044)
Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000333 0.981502*** 0.887166 397.6648 1.782076
(-0.613239) (28.61314)
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000256 1.010524*** 0.947438 499.5892 2.065136
(-0.750667) (46.13004)
Momentum Value Fund A -0.000836** 1.049902*** 0.939917 426.6764 1.801031
(-2.028427) (40.34774)
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000311 0.984210*** 0.955398 512.9924 2.434911
(-1.021533) (50.28520)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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It can be inferred, from the results in Table 4-17, that most of the funds 
underperformed the JSE ALSI market benchmark, as observed by the number of 
negative alphas. Under the financial funds, half of the funds recorded positive 
alphas, but these were found to be statistically insignificant. These funds are 
Momentum Financials Fund A, Sanlam Financial Fund B1 and ABSA Select Equity 
Fund. 
Under the growth style, none of the funds were able to outperform the market as 
they all recorded negative alphas. Funds under the Industrial style all recorded 
positive alphas, although these were found to be statistically insignificant. This 
confirms earlier findings using absolute returns that the Industrials sector was the 
best performer, relative to all the other indices, in terms of the average monthly 
return, although these had not been adjusted for risk. In the large caps style factor, 
two out of the six funds obtained positive alphas, although only one of these was 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This is the ABSA Large Cap Fund, 
which falls under the groups of consistent funds as shown in Table 4-17. Ideally, this 
fund is the only one in the whole sample that obtained a positive, and statistically 
significant, alpha from which we can infer that its fund manager is able to beat the 
market with 90% confidence. As would be expected, none of the funds under the 
Resources style factor were able to outperform the market. Three funds from this 
sector recorded statistically significant alphas although these were negative. Two 
funds from the Small Cap style factor exhibited positive alphas which were, however, 
insignificant, whereas no Value fund was able to beat the market. 
If a unit trust, or mutual fund, investment portfolio contained precisely the same 
proportions of assets as those the JSE ALSI is composed of, a CAPM estimate 
would show an R-squared of 100 percent, a beta of unity and an alpha of zero 
(Lizieri et al., 2012). A fund manager who tracks the market will not, of course, be 
able to achieve superior performance according to Jensen’s alpha test. The 
achievement of a significantly positive alpha requires a portfolio biased towards 
those sectors which experience above average returns. As a consequence, the 
CAPM estimates should yield a relatively low R-squared and beta. The selection of 
the JSE ALSI as a benchmark, by the unit trusts in the sample, reflects an intention 
to beat the market. The more defensive a fund manager is, and the more the 
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manager mimics the JSE ALSI, the less likely it is that the fund’s performance will 
meet the alpha test.  
Table 4-17 demonstrates the Jensen’s alphas for the two categories of funds being 
analysed. 8 out of the 26 (30.8 percent) consistent funds exhibit outperformance of 
the index, however, only one alpha value is statistically significant from zero. With 
respect to the drifters, 5 out of 16 (31.3 percent) funds show positive 
outperformance, however, none of it is statistically significant. Hence, it can be 
inferred from this model that the consistent funds exhibit slightly better performance, 
based on that one statistically significant outperformer, as compared to the drifters 
who have none. The results are presented below.        
 
TABLE 4- 18: CAPM analysis using JSE ALSI benchmark   
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the CAPM regressions’ results.   
CAPM  RESULTS 2 - ALPHAS FROM ALL SHARE INDEX MARKET BENCHMARK
CONSISTENT FUNDS ALPHAS DRIFTERS ALPHAS
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000207 Sanlam Financial Fund B1 8.71E-05 #
Momentum Financials Fund A 8.41E-05 # Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 0.000353 #
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000232 ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000104 #
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000327 Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000511
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000358 # Investec Commodity Fund Class R -0.000471
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000243 Momentum Resources Fund A -0.000867
Foord Equity Fund -1.72E-05 Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.001541
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000475 Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.001117
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000235 Investec Emerging Companies R -4.00E-05
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000248 Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   7.33E-05 #
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000256 Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000287 #
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 0.000247 # Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001523
Momentum Industrial Fund A 0.000431 # Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -5.88E-05
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 4.92E-05 # Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000294
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 0.000113 # Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000333
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 0.000330 # Momentum Value Fund A -0.000836
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000519 #*
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -0.000140 # Positive  alphas = 5
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000154 *Positive statistically significant alphas = 0
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A -4.29E-05
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R -0.000503
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R -0.000766
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000370
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000153
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000256
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000311
# Positive  alphas = 8
*Positive statistically significant alphas = 1
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Instead of benchmarking the JSE ALSI, a unit trust managing a portfolio that 
specialised in sector investment could benchmark sector indices. A specific style 
market proxy model would show that a fund specialising in industrial, mining and 
financial shares, and arranging its portfolio to track the Industrial, Mining and 
Financial indices, has a zero alpha, statistically significant betas for all three sectors 
and a R2 close to unity.  
Portfolio theory posits that, if a unit trust focuses its investment strategy on a few 
sectors, then the style model is appropriate and sector indices should be used as 
benchmarks (Eddy, 2014). The style model is appropriate for sector specialisation 
but a fund manager can only achieve a positive significant alpha by arranging a 
portfolio in such a way that its composition differs from that of the indices. A positive 
significant alpha should be accompanied by lower R2 and beta coefficients. Hence, 
the study tested this assertion with the inclusion of the specific equity style indices as 
the market benchmark, instead of the ALSI into the CAPM model, and the results 
obtained are presented in Table 4-19. 
Using the CAPM, a tracker fund, as expected, would have a R2 close to unity. The 
beta coefficient is highly significant and also close to unity. This shows a very close 
behavioural relationship between index fund returns and those of the JSE ALSI. A 
similar conclusion would be reached in terms of a style model. All of the funds 
deemed to be superior performers, should have much lower R2 values and betas. 
This is true in this study’s case, as it can be observed in Table 4-19, with the Growth 
funds. These were all found to be consistent funds and thus it has been noted so far 
that consistent funds outperform the drifters from Table 4-18. 
The Growth funds’ CAPM beta values are less than the market beta (below one) and 
are all statistically different from unity. However, one may argue that if the funds 
have large cash holdings, as may be the case in bear markets, their beta would also 
be expected to be below one. In this case it is assumed that the funds take on less 
risk relative to their market benchmark. The values of the style beta coefficients that 
are statistically significant are relatively lower than those from the CAPM ALSI 
benchmark estimates. These results confirm the proposition that superior 
performance is associated with relatively low R2 values and betas. The low beta and 
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R2 values show that risk adjusted unit trust returns behaved differently from the 
market benchmark because of relatively low systematic risk.  
The above average performance attributed to these funds was achieved by taking on 
more unsystematic risk. A fund manager intending to beat the market must invest in 
assets that do not follow the market trend. This increases the risk of over or under 
performance. The adjusted R-squared figures of the CAPM style regressions for the 
portfolios indicate the proportion of the variance in the portfolio returns explained by 
the variation in the returns on their style indices over the sample period.  As can be 
noted in Table 4-19, the R2 values for the funds are predominantly high, meaning 
that the monthly returns of the funds follow the motion of the index fairly closely.  
One can, therefore, argue that over the sample period analysed, South African fund 
managers do not properly invest actively in order to capitalize on the inefficiencies in 
the markets. They could have either over weighted under-priced stocks, or 
underweighted overpriced stocks, relative to the market index, to which the effect 
would be far lower adjusted R-squared values. Then again, the manifested high 
correlation of equity prices in emerging market economies, like the South African 
market, may also result in the high R-squared figures for the funds. These high 
correlations among stocks in a market causes variations from the market index 
weights to less likely result in sufficiently lower R-squared values.  
The effect of using the style indices market benchmark in the model, to better explain 
the variation in the results of the portfolios, is made clearer by observing the Log 
Likelihood measure. Compared to the CAPM ALSI, the results from the style CAPM 
show that the model’s probability of estimating the portfolio returns improves 









TABLE 4- 19: CAPM results from equity style benchmarks 
   
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the CAPM regressions’ results. 
CAPM  RESULTS 3 -  EQUITY  STYLE  INDICES  BENCHMARKS 
FUNDS SECTORS
FINANCIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : FINANCIALS  15 
ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) LOG L. D-W Stat.
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000121 0.982967*** 0.976409 481.4684 2.414957
(-0.495219) (65.61551)
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000140 1.081716*** 0.964705 449.6406 1.944001
(0.423592) (53.32566)
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000128 0.990268*** 0.978122 484.7421 2.690388
(-0.540346) (68.19628)
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000160 0.982121*** 0.980164 560.4212 2.404508
(-0.784813) (76.36667)
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 -0.000397* 0.999314*** 0.985204 314.5896 2.397099
(-1.974973) (63.73981)
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000675 0.975233*** 0.912421 468.6747 2.397012
(1.531693) (35.07639)
GROWTH MARKET  BENCHMARK : GROWTH  INDEX 
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000615 0.918672*** 0.916818 414.9562 2.261032
(-1.331174) (33.87147)
Foord Equity Fund -0.000294 0.850791*** 0.878129 455.7328 2.307513
(-0.594716) (29.17602)
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000747* 0.870914*** 0.904033 456.6092 2.188449
(-1.658460) (32.92908)
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000523 0.869754*** 0.881724 455.1318 2.243758
(-1.053316) (29.67607)
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000527 0.829672*** 0.798451 372.0169 1.817375
(-0.757466) (20.32250)
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000595 0.891912*** 0.886725 400.1149 2.294849
(-1.118704) (28.55024)
INDUSTRIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : INDUSTRIAL  25 
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A -0.000306 0.977243*** 0.968145 467.4102 2.293194
(-1.089922) (56.22939)
Momentum Industrial Fund A -0.000134 0.997014*** 0.972999 474.2476 2.500381
(-0.509084) (61.22689)
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A -0.000532 1.012053*** 0.972045 470.8019 2.433434
(-1.959265) (60.14403)
Sanlam Industrial Fund A -0.000287 0.966068*** 0.973481 546.1999 2.529360
(-1.240376) (65.82334)
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class -0.000222 1.005677*** 0.961734 454.4271 2.467503
(-0.698501) (51.13511)
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class -0.000102 1.001937*** 0.961461 518.8863 2.395182
(-0.349436) (54.26637)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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TABLE 4-19 CONTINUED: 
  
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the CAPM regressions’ results 
LARGE CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  TOP  40 
ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) LOG L. D-W Stat.
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000540** 1.046522*** 0.968814 526.6617 2.441205
(1.992384) (60.55334)
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000159 1.057202*** 0.983585 304.4646 2.465285
(0.676235) (60.46668)
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -0.000117 1.058317*** 0.980463 486.1246 2.015471
(-0.502083) (72.25164)
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000126 1.040219*** 0.984677 570.6203 2.356809
(-0.674447) (87.08489)
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000372 1.047369*** 0.963339 341.1518 2.128575
(-0.977808) (45.28338)
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A -2.04E-05 1.067296*** 0.978272 546.3984 2.161725
(-0.088914) (72.89605)
RESOURCES MARKET  BENCHMARK : RESOURCE  10 
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0.000359 0.967734*** 0.965944 458.9815 2.312826
(1.189458) (54.32124)
Momentum Resources Fund A 1.89E-05 1.027820*** 0.965225 451.5205 2.251705
(0.058400) (53.73669)
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0.000356* 0.990353*** 0.984989 500.5812 2.484437
(1.753352) (82.61632)
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 8.42E-05 0.931658*** 0.942365 434.0643 2.432083
(0.220213) (41.24858)
Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.000742 0.961532*** 0.743081 339.9526 2.311383
(-0.792157) (17.37231)
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.000259 0.979391*** 0.965801 457.4969 2.423377
(-0.846521) (54.20376)
SMALL CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : SMALL  CAP  INDEX 
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000421* 1.006156*** 0.977350 485.3922 1.984745
(-1.788168) (66.99709)
Investec Emerging Companies R -5.94E-05 1.028898*** 0.945592 435.3202 1.897120
(-0.156493) (42.52641)
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   3.29E-05 1.002024*** 0.941692 495.5291 1.837567
(0.093336) (43.66634)
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000275 1.025493*** 0.948134 438.3199 1.952539
(0.745434) (43.61401)
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000185 1.036539*** 0.970603 468.2198 1.867246
(-0.667199) (58.60693)
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001496** 1.028018*** 0.854604 363.2205 0.929452
(-2.230507) (24.26473)
VALUE MARKET  BENCHMARK : VALUE   INDEX 
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -0.000333 1.007557*** 0.941772 426.5416 1.718983
(-0.806405) (41.02557)
Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000524 0.951242*** 0.924690 421.6026 2.448857
(-1.168318) (35.91980)
Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000545 0.918888*** 0.875039 392.3054 2.019020
(-0.951898) (27.00487)
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000672* 0.936479*** 0.938666 490.4054 2.259540
(-1.817619) (42.50747)
Momentum Value Fund A -0.001069** 0.986213*** 0.933355 421.2346 2.106437
(-2.459381) (38.17731)
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000681* 0.900839*** 0.923127 480.6024 2.184158
(-1.696462) (37.65631)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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A comparison of the R2 values, over the full sample of 42 funds, shows the style 
model to have, on average, higher adjusted R-squared values than those from the 
CAPM. In terms of goodness of fit, the style model is found to be more appropriate 
for measuring superior performance. For funds that give additional weight to certain 
sectors, in order to pursue exceptional returns, a benchmark consisting of at least 
the Industrial, Financial and the Mining indices is, therefore, observed to be 
preferable to the JSE ALSI from the study’s results. 
 
TABLE 4- 20: CAPM analysis using equity styles benchmarks  
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the CAPM regressions’ results.   
Table 4-20, above, validates the study’s finding so far - that consistent funds exhibit 
better performance as compared to drifters. Although both sets of funds had the 
CAPM  RESULTS 4 - ALPHAS FROM SPECIFIC EQUITY STYLES MARKET BENCHMARKS
CONSISTENT FUNDS ALPHAS DRIFTERS ALPHAS
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000121 Sanlam Financial Fund B1 -0.000397
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000140 # Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class -0.000222
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000128 ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000159 #
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000160 Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000372
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000675 # Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0.000359 #
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000615 Momentum Resources Fund A 1.89E-05 #
Foord Equity Fund -0.000294 Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.000742
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000747 Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.000259
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000523 Investec Emerging Companies R -5.94E-05
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000527 Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   3.29E-05 #
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000595 Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000275 #
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A -0.000306 Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001496
Momentum Industrial Fund A -0.000134 Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -0.000333
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A -0.000532 Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000524
Sanlam Industrial Fund A -0.000287 Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000545
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class -0.000102 Momentum Value Fund A -0.001069
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000540 #**
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -0.000117 # Positive  alphas = 5
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000126 *Positive statistically significant alphas = 0
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A -2.04E-05
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0.000356 #
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 8.42E-05 #
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000421
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000185
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000672
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000681
# Positive  alphas = 5
*Positive statistically significant alphas = 1
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same number of positive alphas, only the consistent funds recorded a statistically 
significant alpha compared to none from the drifters. Therefore, from the CAPM 
model, the study observes that consistent funds outperform the drifting funds on a 
risk adjusted level using either the ALSI or the equity style indices to proxy the 
market. However, the study notes that the number of positive alphas decreases 
within the consistent funds when equity style indices are used. The alphas 
decreased from 8 to 5 (an 11.5% decrease), which may exhibit a stricter 
performance measure imposed by style benchmarks than the ALSI benchmark.   
 
4.2.2 Fama- French 3 Factor (FF3F) Model Results  
Still on the measurement of performance, which is the second objective of the study, 
the study presents the results of the Fama-French 3 factor model commencing with 
results obtained using the JSE ALSI as the market benchmark index similar to that 
done for the CAPM analysis. Table 4-21 presents the results of the intercepts 
obtained from the regressions, whereas Table 4-22 analyses the performance of the 
consistent funds against the drifting funds. When observing Table 4-21, it is noted 
that the Financials funds exhibit average performance, that is, half the funds 
produced negative alphas, whereas the other half are positive. However, none of the 
positive alphas are significant at all the levels.  
The Financial funds show a high level of sensitivity to variations in returns of small 
capitalisation stocks, as compared to large capitalisation stocks. This is shown by 
the betas of the size factor (SMB) which are positively statistically significant at all 
levels for all the funds, except for one fund. Returns of the funds also show a positive 
correlation with variations in high book-to-market stocks’ returns compared to the low 
book-to-market ones. The returns of the financials funds show a higher sensitivity to 
movements in the returns of value stocks than those of growth stocks.  
The Financial funds’ betas for the value factor (HML) are all positive and statistically 
significant, at 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels. Compared to the CAPM 
ALSI model, the FF3F ALSI model shows better explanatory power, as observed 
with the relatively higher R2 values and higher log likelihood values. Growth funds 
underperformed the market benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis as they all possess 
negative alphas over the evaluation period. The funds show sensitivity to variations 
in small capitalisation stocks compared to large caps as observed by the positive 
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significant size betas. This is rather strange as the opposite was expected, the 
reasoning being that growth stocks are domiciled under large caps as shown by the 
Sharpe (1992) model, illustrated by Figure 3-1, in the methodology section. All the 
coefficients for the size factor are positive and significant. These funds’ returns also 
show positive correlations with value stocks, as seen by the coefficients on the value 
premium. The researcher is not surprised by this finding, since South African stocks 
have been found to sometimes overlap between different indices like value, growth 
and large caps. Standard Bank and Anglo American stocks are examples of such 
phenomena and literature attributes this to the fledgling nature of the JSE market, as 
there are no clear demarcations between some of the indices (Hodnett et al., 2012). 
Industrials funds exhibit positive alphas against the ALSI, but none of those alphas 
are significant. The returns of these funds also show sensitivity towards variations in 
small stocks’ returns. However, the study obtains mixed results in terms of the value 
premium, as two of the funds exhibit negative coefficients (Coronation Industrial 
Fund and Sanlam Industrial Fund). All the other value betas are positive although 
none are significant. Three large caps funds managed to outperform the ALSI, 
although only one fund exhibits significant outperformance (ABSA Large Cap Fund).  
As expected, the large caps are more sensitive to variations in returns of big stocks 
than small stocks, as observed by the negative statistically significant coefficients 
towards small stocks in the size factor. The Large Caps have mixed results in terms 
of the value premium as both value and growth stocks are part of the large caps. 4 
out of 6 (67 percent) of the value coefficients (betas) are positive, although only two 
of these are significant. The Resources Funds, Small Cap funds and Value funds 
performances are all shown in the last part of Table 4-21, and similar analysis also 








TABLE 4-21: Fama-French results from JSE ALSI benchmark index 
 





FAMA - FRENCH  RESULTS 1 - ALL  SHARE  INDEX  MARKET  BENCHMARK
FUNDS SECTORS
MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE ALSI 
FINANCIALS ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) SMB HML LOG L. D-W Stat.
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000204 1.011548*** 0.668980*** 0.216004*** 0.960550 455.5053 2.282596
(-0.644678) (49.80139) (8.494378) (2.832024)
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000198 1.073696*** 0.362094*** 0.621531*** 0.908724 400.7865 2.117672
(0.370938) (31.39149) (2.730333) (4.839212)
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000219 1.024959*** 0.572840*** 0.233341*** 0.971714 472.2833 2.070975
(-0.812104) (59.20488) (8.533904) (3.589410)
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000385 1.005888*** 0.538385*** 0.240687*** 0.967396 531.8793 2.237538
(-1.471810) (58.49329) (8.334912) (3.811709)
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 1.40E-05 0.983840*** 0.264987** 0.237756** 0.959950 284.7712 2.268566
(0.042193) (37.31780) (2.639606) (2.344953)
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000352 1.033430*** 0.079657 0.217280*** 0.977025 549.3188 2.098408
(1.554473) (69.57988) (1.427829) (3.984112)
GROWTH MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE ALSI 
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000224 1.024311*** 0.164598*** 0.133472** 0.978711 487.5336 2.438211
(-0.960308) (68.41638) (2.835406) (2.374103)
Foord Equity Fund -6.70E-05 0.993768*** 0.438244*** 0.039221 0.986537 587.8369 2.489064
(-0.409408) (92.48271) (10.85782) (0.994030)
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000495** 0.997745*** 0.282067*** 0.017538 0.979812 548.0519 2.013593
(-2.406005) (74.08888) (5.537933) 0.349238
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000277 1.010384*** 0.382982*** 0.104866** 0.984135 575.6881 2.126418
(-1.530247) (84.90328) (8.567761) (2.399848)
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000290 0.989997*** 0.752840*** 0.041732 0.968260 470.0903 1.630256
(-1.051657) (56.00341) (10.98365) (0.628680)***
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000226 1.013598*** 0.258422*** 0.214550 0.982499 499.1912 2.114942
(-1.080908) (75.65046) (4.974371) (4.264384)
INDUSTRIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE ALSI 
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 0.000191 1.012170*** 0.763532*** -0.020393 0.980679 494.6903 2.024012
(0.873498) (72.37402) (14.08056) (-0.388322)
Momentum Industrial Fund A 0.000401 1.018494*** 0.501970*** 0.019709 0.956490 450.2277 2.432862
(1.204456) (47.68528) (6.061318) (0.245738)
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 3.38E-05 1.030023*** 0.520948*** 0.090121 0.951181 442.5607 2.431256
(0.094217) (44.82921) (5.847525) (1.044528)
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 4.05E-05 0.994696*** 0.624956*** -0.057363 0.977699 557.5323 2.254858
(0.191726) (71.75768) (12.00269) (-1.126992)
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 0.000330 1.030414*** 0.620818*** 0.084343 0.954476 446.3390 2.529512
(0.953781) (46.48936) (7.223869) (1.013384)
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 0.000260 1.024055*** 0.623478*** 0.069068 0.957203 513.6764 2.492202
(0.850840) (51.10313) (8.283173) (0.938664)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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TABLE 4-21 CONTINUED: 
 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the FF3F regressions’ results.   
 
LARGE CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE ALSI 
ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) SMB HML LOG L. D-W Stat.
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000567** 1.027785*** -0.421630*** 0.003199 0.973812 538.0799 2.334739
(2.282064) (62.96338) (-6.876519) (0.053378)
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000237 1.031215*** -0.368922*** -0.082840 0.985702 309.7951 2.376566
(1.069903) (58.56353) (-5.502186) (-1.223287)
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -8.60E-05 1.040855*** -0.446692*** 0.103988** 0.983972 497.5455 1.967462
(-0.404993) (76.47672) (-8.464681) (2.034712)
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000123 1.033547*** -0.261907*** 0.077108** 0.984518 571.0325 2.390939
(-0.651343) (83.51751) (-5.634374) (1.696899)
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000173 1.022882*** -0.413222*** -0.093506 0.967935 347.4827 2.111034
(-0.478597) (44.80452) (-4.760323) (-1.103122)
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 6.24E-06 1.049250*** -0.422026*** 0.048289 0.982061 558.8260 2.115431
(0.029899) (76.52056) (-8.193891) (0.959087)
RESOURCES MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE ALSI 
Investec Commodity Fund Class R -0.000448 0.982689*** -0.481039*** -0.043791 0.926248 419.4444 1.750378
(-1.002419) (34.31768) (-4.332575) (-0.407253)
Momentum Resources Fund A -0.000789* 1.043858*** -0.601539*** 0.168445 0.930545 416.2320 1.741168
(-1.712726) (35.35546) (-5.254632) (1.519335)
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R -0.000462 1.010954*** -0.513650*** 0.026502 0.954277 443.1333 2.046167
(-1.295415) (44.23989) (-5.797133) (0.308845)
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R -0.000737** 0.989373*** -0.239059** 0.053748 0.946468 438.9713 1.864425
(-1.988525) (41.61289) (-2.593202) (0.602020)
Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.001632 0.980244*** -0.035583 -0.421629* 0.682458 329.8600 2.335862
(-1.557125) (14.58488) (-0.136544) (-1.670630)
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.001079** 1.009653*** -0.423611*** 0.042034 0.938901 428.0602 1.784566
(-2.621860) (38.27456) (-4.141610) (0.424344)
SMALL CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE ALSI 
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000435* 1.004570*** 0.933706*** -0.004771 0.977270 486.2365 2.011725
(-1.840059) (66.27408) (15.88681) (-0.083819)
Investec Emerging Companies R -5.61E-05 1.032522*** 0.646406*** 0.125425 0.949755 440.5280 1.956913
(-0.153586) (44.07639) (7.116644) (1.425839)
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   6.31E-06 1.006617*** 0.596928*** 0.124176 0.948182 503.5760 1.884249
(0.018994) (46.14525) (7.285105) (1.550279)
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000272 1.031418*** 0.600984*** 0.116693 0.955319 447.1772 1.946196
(0.792257) (46.90761) (7.049122) (1.413303)
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000194 1.038720*** 0.788292*** 0.057047 0.972467 472.6885 1.730987
(-0.719845) (60.23179) (11.78901) (0.880936)
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001497** 1.024789*** 0.805600*** 0.144514 0.851780 363.2796 0.878441
(-2.209028) (23.76329) (4.769906) (0.877235)
VALUE MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE ALSI 
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 3.39E-05 1.054476*** 0.016131 0.421103*** 0.922409 412.4987 1.712249
(0.071145) (34.46755) (0.135984) (3.665583)
Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000283 1.020707*** -0.083320 0.034103 0.948988 443.2781 2.284412
(-0.766381) (43.21311) (-0.908575) (0.383898)
Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000329 1.007650*** 0.492419*** 0.169032 0.915572 413.9197 1.871556
(-0.698844) (33.38575) (4.207750) (1.491423)
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000287 1.028087*** 0.289781*** 0.173281** 0.961687 519.4297 2.110890
(-0.985539) (53.84568) (4.040568) (2.471618)
Momentum Value Fund A -0.000783* 1.046221*** -0.102655 0.204427** 0.941249 428.8830 1.832657
(-1.918305) (39.97284) (-1.011547) (2.079991)
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000361 1.009750*** 0.442582*** 0.069200 0.976870 553.0899 2.449642
(-1.645836) (70.17448) (8.188616) (1.309736)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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The analysis of the performances of the consistent funds against the drifters, with the 
ALSI employed as the market benchmark, follows in Table 4-22. For the consistent 
funds, 9 out of 26 (34.6 percent) funds produced positive alphas, although only one 
of these was statistically significant. With respect to the drifters, 6 out of 16 (37.5 
percent) funds produced positive alphas, however, not even a single one of those 
was statistically significant.  
    
TABLE 4- 22: Fama-French analysis using JSE ALSI benchmark  
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the FF3F regressions’ results.   
The study analysed the performances with the FF3F model again. However, this 
time, employing the relevant equity style indices as the market benchmark. The 
study’s aim was to check whether there is an improvement in the performances of 
the funds if the relevant sector indices are employed, as literature suggests. If found 
FAMA - FRENCH  RESULTS 2 - ALPHAS FROM ALL SHARE INDEX MARKET BENCHMARK
CONSISTENT FUNDS ALPHAS DRIFTERS ALPHAS
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000204 Sanlam Financial Fund B1 1.40E-05 #
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000198 # Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 0.000330 #
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000219 ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000237 #
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000385 Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000173
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000352 # Investec Commodity Fund Class R -0.000448
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000224 Momentum Resources Fund A -0.000789*
Foord Equity Fund -6.70E-05 Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.001632
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000495** Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.001079**
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000277 Investec Emerging Companies R -5.61E-05
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000290 Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   6.31E-06 #
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000226 Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000272 #
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 0.000191 # Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001497**
Momentum Industrial Fund A 0.000401 #  Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 3.39E-05 #
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 3.38E-05 # Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000283
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 4.05E-05 # Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000329
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 0.000260 # Momentum Value Fund A -0.000783*
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000567 #**
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -8.60E-05 # Positive  alphas = 6
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000123 *Positive statistically significant alphas = 0
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 6.24E-06 #
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R -0.000462
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R -0.000737**
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000435*
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000194
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000287
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000361
# Positive  alphas = 9
*Positive statistically significant alphas = 1
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to hold, this will validate the claim that style investing indeed has some effects on the 
performances of unit trusts in South Africa. Table 4-25 presents these results which 
are interpreted similarly to the ones in Table 4-23.  
Worth noting is the increase in the value of the R2  and Log Likelihood, which implies 
that the style model performs much better relative to the market (JSE ALSI) model in 
explaining the variations in the returns of the funds. It is observed that the style 
model properly mirrors the true performance of the funds as compared to the general 
market model. For example, the Resources funds produce 4 positive alphas, with 
one of those alphas being significant, whereas they produced all negative alpha 
values when measured against the ALSI benchmark.  Table 4-24 offers the analysis 
of the consistent funds against the drifters from their performances using the FF3F 


















TABLE 4-23: Fama-French results from equity style benchmarks 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the FF3F regressions’ results.   
FAMA - FRENCH  RESULTS  3  -  SPECIFIC  EQUITY  STYLE  INDICES  MARKET  BENCHMARKS  
FUNDS SECTORS
MARKET  BENCHMARK : FINANCIALS  15 
FINANCIALS ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) SMB HML LOG L. D-W Stat.
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000140 0.985262*** 0.215702*** -0.079953 0.979053 488.7392 2.497633
(-0.607305) (68.99373) (3.813732) (-1.426243)
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000225 1.070297*** -0.112603 0.292916*** 0.968759 457.0749 1.894268
(0.720892) (55.43634) (-1.472573) (3.864844)
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000144 0.992334*** 0.111981* -0.063001 0.978494 486.6700 2.609041
(-0.613119) (68.13303) (1.941245) (-1.101907)
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000163 0.983819*** 0.082872* -0.042339 0.980302 561.8631 2.399338
(-0.801864) (75.75353) (1.679240) (-0.854570)
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 -0.000423** 1.001355*** 0.054442 -0.041045 0.984925 315.0612 2.410447
(-2.067077) (61.61092) (0.895093) (-0.663516)
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000656 0.978189*** -0.398295*** -0.053389 0.927751 481.1499 2.437900
(1.638483) (38.22480) (-4.095869) (-0.546891)
GROWTH MARKET  BENCHMARK : GROWTH  INDEX 
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000637*** 0.986706*** 0.470542*** 0.521290*** 0.977922 485.6233 2.543327
(-2.668458) (67.15605) (7.827800) (9.128108)
Foord Equity Fund -0.000551** 0.941946*** 0.739274*** 0.410889*** 0.972023 544.3181 2.291911
(-2.321091) (63.68936) (12.45951) (7.251439)
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000978*** 0.947802*** 0.589330*** 0.387794*** 0.970961 526.9663 2.062699
(-3.940168) (61.49772) (9.460264) (6.464591)
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000777*** 0.960236*** 0.691874*** 0.482887*** 0.974929 548.4593 2.305629
(-3.391034) (67.22528) (12.07357) (8.823867)
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000661* 0.941256*** 1.035636*** 0.415326*** 0.942036 438.4722 1.601793
(-1.769698) (40.88666) (10.99575) (4.641588)
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000623** 0.971350*** 0.555925*** 0.597811*** 0.971510 473.6086 2.390762
(-2.328921) (58.96288) (8.248280) (9.336224)
INDUSTRIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : INDUSTRIAL  25 
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A -0.000311 0.984145*** 0.385410*** 0.018916 0.981952 498.2699 2.506917
(-1.469129) (74.93146) (7.450316) (0.372969)
Momentum Industrial Fund A -0.000123 0.998881*** 0.124401** 0.057109 0.974819 478.9410 2.563744
(-0.482334) (63.26624) (2.000453) (0.936680)
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A -0.000504** 1.013717*** 0.140303** 0.127059** 0.976283 480.4629 2.434555
(-2.010179) (65.14335) (2.289117) (2.114387)
Sanlam Industrial Fund A -0.000299 0.972574*** 0.266788*** -0.015648 0.979829 563.5058 2.581417
(-1.482580) (75.53213) (5.468097) (-0.323563)
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class -0.000197 1.009163*** 0.238352*** 0.122535* 0.969937 468.1242 2.386523
(-0.699183) (57.66066) (3.457673) (1.813035)
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class -0.000107 1.007245*** 0.257130*** 0.110303* 0.970915 536.6593 2.352494
(-0.423140) (62.42618) (4.205772) (1.820153)
LARGE  CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  TOP  40 
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000582** 1.027055*** -0.286285*** 0.021078 0.974514 539.6980 2.420007
(2.371601) (63.85020) (-4.697427) (0.356616)
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000247 1.030706*** -0.229044*** -0.048888 0.987141 313.0837 2.415862
(1.177453) (61.80616) (-3.569587) (-0.760508)
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -6.53E-05 1.040973*** -0.306508*** 0.121016** 0.985451 502.6295 1.993590
(-0.322791) (80.33471) (-6.054926) (2.486173)
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000109 1.032934*** -0.125697*** 0.095050** 0.985467 574.7982 2.460865
(-0.595777) (86.24625) (-2.770040) (2.159874)
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000136 1.021825*** -0.270893*** -0.072707 0.968843 348.6179 2.126933
(-0.382038) (45.47703) (-3.132717) (-0.870469)
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 2.03E-05 1.048675*** -0.283705*** 0.066489 0.983068 562.2634 2.176020
(0.100200) (78.80654) (-5.627051) (1.359816)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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TABLE 4-23 CONTINUED: 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the FF3F regressions’ results 
 
As noted previously, once the style benchmarks are employed, the number of 
positive alphas produced declines. The study purports style investing to mirror the 
true reflection of the funds’ performance, not inflated ones. From Table 4-24, both 
sets of funds produce the same number of positive alphas, but it is the consistent 
funds that exhibit superior performance with two statistically significant alphas to 
RESOURCES MARKET  BENCHMARK : RESOURCE  10 
ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) SMB HML LOG L. D-W Stat.
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0.000346 0.990076*** 0.214178*** 0.014043 0.968888 464.7584 2.253722
(1.198791) (54.13165) (2.840551) (0.201304)
Momentum Resources Fund A 5.52E-05 1.051015*** 0.135987* 0.230031*** 0.971983 463.8950 1.898817
(0.189721) (56.99287) (1.788769) (3.270545)
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0.000359** 1.013697*** 0.194761*** 0.087078** 0.989361 519.6809 2.293950
(2.099189) (93.50998) (4.358109) (2.106112)
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 7.59E-05 0.980952*** 0.438675*** 0.115500 0.961569 456.3699 2.112757
(0.242617) (49.51476) (5.371252) (1.528589)
Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.000867 1.017567*** 0.699860*** -0.370599* 0.758844 344.3062 2.357910
(-0.952955) (17.66603) (2.947355) (-1.686948)
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.000259 1.012429*** 0.283940*** 0.102524 0.974059 473.0363 2.030721
(-0.969530) (59.89439) (4.074677) (1.590263)
SMALL  CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : SMALL  CAP  INDEX 
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000414* 1.003935*** 0.064440 0.011863 0.977370 486.4679 2.005560
(-1.754375) (66.42367) (1.116409) (0.208950)
Investec Emerging Companies R -3.29E-05 1.031059*** -0.246916*** 0.142737 0.948335 439.0656 2.012424
(-0.088912) (43.43486) (-2.723667) (1.600726)
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   2.40E-05 1.004372*** -0.276240*** 0.142153* 0.946008 501.1307 1.945164
(0.070798) (45.15545) (-3.369367) (1.739331)
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000296 1.029196*** -0.291259*** 0.134190 0.952454 443.9147 2.025886
(0.837197) (45.40561) (-3.364658) (1.576001)
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000170 1.037145*** -0.110376 0.074492 0.970817 469.6335 1.857298
(-0.614458) (58.45578) (-1.628966) (1.117688)
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001482** 1.024698*** -0.082509 0.163255 0.853111 363.7352 0.907727
(-2.196519) (23.88914) (-0.498616) (0.995840)
VALUE MARKET  BENCHMARK : VALUE  INDEX 
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -0.000421 1.029753*** 0.345641*** -0.208020** 0.946970 432.4794 1.842173
(-1.063831) (42.24936) (3.466225) (-2.139811)
Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000697* 0.979724*** 0.220759** -0.561934*** 0.942986 437.3831 2.372751
(-1.780596) (40.74392) (2.237331) (-5.837096)
Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000729 0.967853*** 0.790470*** -0.417590*** 0.909454 410.2475 1.890774
(-1.489614) (32.13230) (6.414480) (-3.475891)
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000809*** 0.981518*** 0.609047*** -0.423351*** 0.961497 519.1342 2.366548
(-2.759375) (53.70686) (8.306850) (-5.870707)
Momentum Value Fund A -0.001206*** 1.008418*** 0.210464** -0.407817*** 0.941624 429.2186 2.052940
(-2.953325) (40.10884) (2.046077) (-4.066762)
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000848*** 0.955754*** 0.746961*** -0.508980*** 0.959781 520.1729 2.291867
(-2.917374) (52.75555) (10.27720) (-7.120031)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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their name. However, the study has noted that the funds, on average, underperform 
their market benchmarks with the models employed so far, which leads to the 
impression that the investor is better off investing in an index fund rather than active 
management. With that mentioned, the study forms the opinion that when investing 
in the style indices, the models yield more explanatory power with respect to the 
variations in the returns series of the funds. 
    
TABLE 4- 24: Fama-French analysis using equity style benchmarks  
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the FF3F regressions’ results.   
 
 
FAMA - FRENCH  RESULTS 4 - ALPHAS FROM SPECIFIC EQUITY STYLES MARKET BENCHMARKS
CONSISTENT FUNDS ALPHAS DRIFTERS ALPHAS
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000140 Sanlam Financial Fund B1 -0.000423
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000225 # Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class -0.000197
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000144 ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000247 #
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000163 Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000136
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000656 # Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0.000346 #
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000637 Momentum Resources Fund A 5.52E-05 #
Foord Equity Fund -0.000551 Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.000867
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000978 Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.000259
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000777 Investec Emerging Companies R -3.29E-05
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000661 Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   2.40E-05 #
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000623 Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000296 #
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A -0.000311 Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001482
Momentum Industrial Fund A -0.000123 Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -0.000421
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A -0.000504 Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000697
Sanlam Industrial Fund A -0.000299 Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000729
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class -0.000107 Momentum Value Fund A -0.001206
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000582 #**
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -6.53E-05 # Positive  alphas = 5
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000109 *Positive statistically significant alphas = 0
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 2.03E-05
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0.000359 #**
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 7.59E-05 #
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000414
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000170
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000809
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000848
# Positive  alphas = 5
*Positive statistically significant alphas = 2
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4.2.3 Sharpe Ratio Results 
The Sharpe ratio is widely utilised in the unit trust industry for risk-adjusted 
performance measurement. The Sharpe ratios for all the portfolios or funds in the 
study’s sample were calculated from which the mean Sharpe ratio was computed, to 
compare the peer-wise performances of the funds. When evaluating whether a fund 
outperformed the market or not, the Sharpe ratio of the fund is compared against the 
Sharpe ratio of the market. Therefore, the next step involved calculating the Sharpe 
ratios of the different market proxies used for this study, which are the style indices 
benchmarks and also the JSE ALSI benchmark.  
In order to perform a fair analysis on each fund versus the market, the study ensured 
that the data points of the funds match exactly the data points of the market proxy, 
since not all the funds had data available for the entire evaluation period. Therefore, 
adjustments were made such that the exact dates of returns of the funds matches 
exactly those for the market. Hence, the Sharpe values under the JSE ALSI and 
Market in Table 4-25 sometimes differ, since these are subject to that specific fund 
being analysed and the length of the time period its data is available for. Table 4-25 
presents the analysis of the consistent funds, whereas Table 4-26 presents the 
analysis of the drifters.   
In analysing the results from the consistent funds in Table 4-25, it is found that only 
19 percent of the funds are able to outperform both the style market proxies and the 
JSE ALSI benchmark. ABSA Large Cap Fund is the star performer in this group as it 
is the only fund that outperforms all the three benchmarks used for analysis (i.e. 
overall mean, style benchmark and JSE ALSI). Its Sharpe ratio is above its style 
market proxy, above the JSE ALSI benchmark and also above the average Sharpe 
ratio for all the funds in the sample. 54 percent of the funds managed to get a 
Sharpe ratio which is above the overall mean Sharpe ratio for the funds. Therefore, it 
can be seen from Table 4-25 that when utilizing the Sharpe ratio performance 
measure, the consistent funds underperformed the market on a huge basis, since 
only 19 percent of the funds were able to beat the market. These performances are 
contrasted with those of the drifters from Table 4-26. The performances of the 




TABLE 4-25: Sharpe ratio analysis for consistent funds 
 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the Sharpe ratio results.   
Next the study analyses the results from the drifters, which are presented in Table 4-
26. It is observed that 25 percent of the funds are able to outperform both their equity 
style market benchmarks and the JSE ALSI benchmark. This performance is better 
than that of the consistent funds with only 19 percent of the funds being able to 
SHARPE RATIOS :  FOR THE FUNDS, THEIR  STYLE  MARKET  BENCHMARKS  AND THE JSE ALSI
OVERALL FUNDS MEAN SHARPE RATIO = 0,375515455
CONSISTENT FUNDS FUND  MARKET JSE ALSI
Coronation Financial Fund 0,297650834 0,327326985 0,359002982
Momentum Financials Fund A 0,348579004 0,327326985 0,359002982 *
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 0,296621042 0,327326985 0,359002982
Sanlam Financial Fund 0,466225034 0,506709322 0,560636881 #
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0,629696467 0,506709322 0,560636881 *#
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 0,302543925 0,452486858 0,359002982
Foord Equity Fund 0,547207032 0,655173473 0,560636881 #
Investec Growth Fund Class A 0,462949085 0,663577124 0,578138316 #
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 0,49846882 0,655173473 0,560636881 #
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 0,288868407 0,452486858 0,359002982
Old Mutual Growth Fund R 0,297973512 0,452486858 0,359002982
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 0,400191146 0,474112241 0,359002982 #$
Momentum Industrial Fund A 0,439184298 0,474112241 0,359002982 #$
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 0,355717716 0,474112241 0,359002982
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 0,570457028 0,64423464 0,560636881 #$
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 0,60964542 0,64423464 0,560636881 #$
Absa Large Cap Fund 0,658042368 0,553507429 0,560636881 *#$
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 0,325604953 0,352884077 0,359002982
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    0,522435626 0,553507429 0,560636881 #
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 0,543297496 0,553507429 0,560636881 #
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0,244660206 0,173239878 0,359002982 *
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 0,186117836 0,173239878 0,359002982 *
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 0,260568504 0,356046956 0,359002982
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 0,311947385 0,356046956 0,359002982
Stanlib Value Fund A Class 0,490464036 0,656241059 0,560636881 #
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 0,478691777 0,656241059 0,560636881 #
* Funds with Sharpe ratios which are above their relative style market benchmark = 5 19%
$ Funds with Sharpe ratios which are above the JSE ALSI benchmark = 5 19%
# Funds with Sharpe ratios which are above the overall mean Sharpe ratio = 14 54%
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outperform the markets. With respect to the drifters, two of the funds are standout 
performers as they have Sharpe ratios which are above their style market proxy, the 
JSE ALSI benchmark and also the overall mean Sharpe ratio for the funds. These 
are ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class and also Nedbank Investment Entrepreneur 
Fund R Class. However, the overall ratio of drifting funds which attained a Sharpe 
ratio above the overall mean Sharpe ratio for the funds is 38 percent. This is 16 
percent lower than the ratio achieved by the consistent funds.          
 
TABLE 4- 26: Sharpe ratio analysis for drifters 
 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the Sharpe ratio results. 
It is observed that the consistent funds outperformed the drifting funds in a peer-wise 
comparison, as a higher percentage of funds attained an above average Sharpe 
ratio compared to the drifters (that is, 54 percent for the consistent funds compared 
SHARPE RATIOS :  FOR THE FUNDS, THEIR  STYLE  MARKET  BENCHMARKS  AND THE JSE ALSI
OVERALL FUNDS MEAN SHARPE RATIO = 0,375515455
DRIFTERS FUND  MARKET JSE ALSI
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 0,711128364 0,825857974 0,70590723 #$
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 0,418414247 0,474112241 0,359002982 #$
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0,722818172 0,689531359 0,70590723 *#$
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 0,821412842 0,913592019 0,946723258 #
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0,244593315 0,173239878 0,359002982 *
Momentum Resources Fund A 0,173916755 0,173239878 0,359002982 *
Old Mutual Gold Fund R 0,013674175 0,173239878 0,359002982
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 0,117291728 0,173239878 0,359002982
Investec Emerging Companies R 0,333915592 0,356046956 0,359002982
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   0,550569645 0,559740215 0,560636881 #
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0,404478279 0,356046956 0,359002982 *#$
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0,679800965 0,360346744 0,379489304
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 0,330822128 0,409035621 0,359002982
Element Islamic Equity Fund A 0,327106989 0,453139023 0,398180936
Investec Value Fund Class R 0,268335586 0,409035621 0,359002982
Momentum Value Fund A 0,179163285 0,409035621 0,359002982
* Funds with Sharpe ratios which are above their relative style market benchmark = 4 25%
$ Funds with Sharpe ratios which are above the JSE ALSI benchmark = 4 25%
# Funds with Sharpe ratios which are above the overall mean Sharpe ratio = 6 38%
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to 38 percent for the drifters). However, on absolute risk-adjusted basis, the drifters 
attained a higher number of funds that outperformed both the equity style market 
proxies and the JSE ALSI benchmark, as 25 percent of the drifters were able to 
outperform the markets compared to only 19 percent from the consistent funds. The 
study, therefore, concludes that the drifters outperformed the consistent funds with 
respect to the Sharpe ratio. However, neither the consistent funds, nor the drifters, 
were able to outperform the market benchmarks. This finding may suggest that 
passive investing may be better than active investing on the observation that the 
fund managers, for both style consistent funds and drifting funds, are not able to 
outperform the markets. The study next analyses if SA fund managers are able to 
time the markets, or not, in search of better performances.   
 
4.2.4 Market Timing: Treynor-Mazuy Model Results 
Still on fulfilling the second objective of the study which examines performance, the 
study embarked on testing whether South African fund managers are able to time 
the markets or not. Literature documents that it is a known practice amongst fund 
managers to increase risk, that is, beta during bull markets and, alternatively, 
decrease it during bear markets (Bolton et al., 2013). The study employs the 
classical unconditional Treynor-Mazuy (1966) model to test whether South African 
fund managers are successful in timing the markets in pursuit of outperformance.  
The model follows the structure of the CAPM model, however, with some convexity 
induced with the inclusion of a quadratic term. The coefficient on the quadratic term 
determines successful market timing by the manager, if it is positive statistically 
significant, otherwise the converse is true.  Table 4-27 presents the results from the 
market timing regressions. It should be noted here that these regressions were 
performed using the equity style market benchmarks as the market proxies, since 
the study is only interested in finding out if the funds are able to time their specific 






TABLE 4-27: Treynor-Mazuy model results  
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the Treynor-Mazuy regressions’ results 
TREYNOR - MAZUY RESULTS 1 : MARKET  TIMING  MODEL  
FUNDS SECTORS
MARKET  BENCHMARK : FINANCIALS  15 
FINANCIALS ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) ϒ (MARKET TIMING) LOG L. D-W Stat.
Coronation Financial Fund 1.02E-05 0.987565*** -0.519951 0.976381 481.9198 2.429506
(0.036187) (62.62374) (-0.938505)
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000483 1.093754*** -1.361265* 0.965500 451.3483 1.951544
(1.283469) (51.83759) (-1.836406)
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000180 0.988440*** 0.206770 0.977940 484.8178 2.690847
(-0.657573) (64.43321) (0.383662)
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000177 0.981480*** 0.074417 0.979997 560.4333 2.401912
(-0.759386) (72.31444) (0.153657)
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 -0.000363 1.002783*** -0.267885 0.984990 314.6649 2.413147
(-1.643408) (54.92924) (-0.378731)
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000408 0.965272*** 1.155723 0.912594 469.3028 2.364966
(0.812572) (33.06812) (1.109556)
GROWTH MARKET  BENCHMARK : GROWTH  INDEX 
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000463 0.927913*** -0.595075 0.916293 415.1379 2.223685
(-0.874095) (29.61476) (-0.594677)
Foord Equity Fund 9.88E-05 0.876888*** -1.653313 0.879435 456.8843 2.213181
(0.177375) (25.95170) (-1.505543)
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000426 0.892673*** -1.346802 0.904726 457.5407 2.150158
(-0.839952) (28.91286) (-1.352598)
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000297 0.884771*** -0.951362 0.881454 455.5068 2.188007
(-0.528087) (25.88365) (-0.856361)
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000263 0.845699*** -1.032053 0.797409 372.2583 1.778747
(-0.329899) (17.94157) (-0.685575)
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000417 0.902765*** -0.698834 0.886025 400.3038 2.242101
(-0.683112) (25.01608) (-0.606356)
INDUSTRIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : INDUSTRIAL  25 
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A -0.000307 0.977181*** 0.006087 0.967832 467.4103 2.293209
(-0.963262) (52.51989) (0.009718)
Momentum Industrial Fund A -0.000126 0.997363*** -0.034114 0.972735 474.2493 2.500286
(-0.420624) (57.21231) (-0.058132)
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A -0.000487 1.013995*** -0.189548 0.971798 470.8522 2.437304
(-1.577999) (56.31459) (-0.312712)
Sanlam Industrial Fund A -0.000420 0.959941*** 0.610338 0.973550 546.8645 2.488168
(-1.623934) 61.49570) (1.141430)
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class -0.000306 1.002064*** 0.352681 0.961452 454.5547 2.467551
(-0.848136) (47.65098) (0.498194)
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class -0.000151 0.999657*** 0.227127 0.961167 518.9442 2.394004
(-0.462403) (50.64719) (0.335932)
LARGE  CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  TOP  40 
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000455 1.040953*** 0.403040 0.968640 526.8414 2.425862
(1.478308) (52.79514) (0.592406)
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 9.01E-06 1.044601*** 1.015328 0.983805 305.4030 2.494442
(0.034900) (52.95225) (1.346554)
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -0.000247 1.050417*** 0.560459 0.980461 486.6315 1.987304
(-0.923549) (63.04026) (0.994812)
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000102 1.041829*** -0.116534 0.984553 570.6517 2.357344
(-0.477689) (76.35662) (-0.247520)
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000324 1.052039*** -0.248322 0.962897 341.1945 2.149772
(-0.778606) (37.04686) (-0.286887)
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A -0.000158 1.058291*** 0.651623 0.978326 547.0556 2.097784
(-0.610094) (63.61218) (1.135116)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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TABLE 4.27 CONTINUED: 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the Treynor-Mazuy regressions’ results 
 
The study’s main focus is on the market timing coefficients of the funds and, of 
course, their associated statistical significance. Throughout all the funds in the 
analysis, it is noted that not even a single fund attained a positive statistically 
significant market timing coefficient, which signals the inability by South African fund 
managers to successfully time the market. Table 4-28 analyses the consistent funds 
against the drifters in terms of market timing. 42 percent (11 out of 26) of the 
RESOURCES MARKET  BENCHMARK : RESOURCE  10 
ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) ϒ (MARKET TIMING) LOG L. D-W Stat.
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0.000255 0.962319*** 0.377564 0.965716 459.1440 2.293914
(0.720057) (47.39725) (0.562338)
Momentum Resources Fund A -0.000120 1.020574*** 0.505227 0.965052 451.7731 2.248724
(-0.315085) (46.85885) (0.701465)
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0.000278 0.986275*** 0.284346 0.984901 500.7849 2.480279
(1.165661) (72.22115) (0.629632)
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 0.000107 0.932866*** -0.084253 0.941805 434.0693 2.427034
(0.238579) (36.18604) (-0.098828)
Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.000594 0.969260*** -0.538839 0.740732 339.9869 2.306488
(-0.539319) (15.34702) (-0.257997)
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.000238 0.980477*** -0.075704 0.965470 457.5033 2.425625
(-0.661802) (47.54284) (-0.111004)
SMALL  CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : SMALL  CAP  INDEX 
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000443 1.005222*** 0.096626 0.977135 485.4081 1.985117
(-1.652282) (62.84140) (0.175854)
Investec Emerging Companies R 0.000196 1.039601*** -1.107442 0.945902 436.1318 1.890575
(0.456168) (40.64780) (-1.2605670
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   -4.61E-05 0.998505*** 0.372055 0.941285 495.6257 1.836454
(-0.116051) (40.90094) (0.434128)
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000175 1.021304*** 0.433479 0.947756 438.4507 1.933997
(0.417007) (40.82410) (0.504433)
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 8.24E-05 1.047762*** -1.161215* 0.971252 469.9034 1.891234
(0.265015) (56.50891) (-1.823230)
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001009 1.048743*** -2.079805 0.855842 364.1651 0.929937
(-1.331466) (23.38180) (-1.360251)
VALUE MARKET  BENCHMARK : VALUE  INDEX 
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -0.000196 1.015144*** -0.538121 0.941394 426.7133 1.720765
(-0.410117) (36.36360) (-0.578122)
Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000196 1.015144*** -0.538121 0.941394 426.7133 1.720765
(-0.410117) (36.36360) (-0.578122)
Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000219 0.936911*** -1.278199 0.875026 392.8118 1.978119
(-0.331725) (24.30053) (-0.994297)
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000590 0.941282*** -0.344522 0.938222 490.4871 2.256178
(-1.391691) (37.39478) (-0.399195)
Momentum Value Fund A -0.001304 0.973237*** 0.920291 0.933283 421.6898 2.121480
(-2.601378) (33.23378) (0.942511)
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000592 0.906040*** -0.373157 0.922570 480.6837 2.180641
(-1.286533) (33.14828) (-0.398183)
t statistics in parenthesis *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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consistent funds have positive market timing coefficients, but none is significant. 44 
percent (7 out of 16) of the drifting funds have positive market timing coefficients, but 
none of them is significant at any level.  
When reviewing the market timing results, no statistically significant conclusions can 
be drawn. However, this does not mean that the above technique adds no value 
when analysing a manager’s performance. As only general equity unit trusts are 
examined, there is not that much room for the fund managers to manoeuvre with 
regard to market timing. In addition, the majority of managers themselves do not 
subscribe to market timing and, by their own admission, they are focussed stock 
selectors. The alphas from this model do not show any outperformance, either, as 
most of them are negative. The few that are positive are not statistically significant. 
This demonstrates that South African fund managers do not, on average, possess 
‘hot hands’ for investing. 11 of 26 consistent funds (42.3 percent) showed positive 
timing coefficients whilst 7 of 16 drifters (43.8 percent) also did, however, all these 
were statistically insignificant. 
While the results are not statistically significant, the economic implications of 
investing in any one of these funds, with superior managers, cannot be understated, 
since both market and style risk is taken into account when evaluating these 
performances. Table 4-28 is presented below, where timing abilities of the consistent 














TABLE 4-28: Treynor- Mazuy analysis  
  
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the Treynor-Mazuy regressions’ results   
While the results of this analysis infer that managers do not add value through 
market timing, the reality, as stated above, is that general equity managers do not 
have that much scope to try and time the market. Therefore, it may be slightly unfair 
to measure a manager using this metric. One needs to consider this when analysing 
the results. Regardless of the above, 6 funds in the sample have both positive 
alphas and market timing returns.  
Three of them are consistent funds and the other three are drifters. The consistent 
funds are; ABSA Select Equity Fund, ABSA Large Cap Fund and Nedgroup 
Investment Mining & Resource Fund R. The drifters are ABSA Large Cap Fund B 
Class, Investec Commodity Fund Class R and Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur 
Fund R.     
TREYNOR - MAZUY  RESULTS 2  : ALPHAS  AND  MARKET  TIMING  COEFFICIENTS  FROM  SPECIFIC  EQUITY  STYLE  MARKET  BENCHMARKS
CONSISTENT FUNDS ALPHAS MKT TIMING DRIFTERS ALPHAS MKT TIMING
Coronation Financial Fund 1.02E-05* -0.519951 Sanlam Financial Fund B1 -0.000363 -0.267885
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000483* -1.361265* Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class -0.000306 0.352681 #
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000180 0.206770 # ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 9.01E-06* 1.015328 #
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000177 0.074417 # Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000324 -0.248322
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000408* 1.155723 # Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0.000255* 0.377564 #
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000463 -0.595075 Momentum Resources Fund A -0.000120 0.505227 #
Foord Equity Fund 9.88E-05* -1.653313 Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.000594 -0.538839
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000426 -1.346802 Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.000238 -0.075704
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000297 -0.951362 Investec Emerging Companies R 0.000196* -1.107442
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000263 -1.032053 Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   -4.61E-05 0.372055 #
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000417 -0.698834 Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000175* 0.433479 #
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A -0.000307 0.006087 # Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001009 -2.079805
Momentum Industrial Fund A -0.000126 -0.034114 Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -0.000196 -0.538121
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A -0.000487 -0.189548 Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000196 -0.538121
Sanlam Industrial Fund A -0.000420 0.610338 # Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000219 -1.278199
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class -0.000151 0.227127 # Momentum Value Fund A -0.001304 0.920291 #
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000455* 0.403040 #
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -0.000247 0.560459 # # Positive market timing coefficients = 7
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000102 -0.116534 *Positive alphas = 4
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A -0.000158 0.651623 # *# Positive timing coefficient and positive alpha = 3 
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0.000278* 0.284346 # Positive statistically significant market timing coefficient = 0
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 0.000107* -0.084253
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000443 0.096626 #
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 8.24E-05* -1.161215*
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000590 -0.344522
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000592 -0.373157
# Positive market timing coefficients = 11
*Positive alphas = 8
*# Positive timing coefficient and and posotive alpha = 3
Positive statistically significant market timing coefficient = 0
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4.3 Persistence of Performance 
This section explores the last objective of the research, which is to find out whether 
the performances documented in the previous section persist or not. The section 
also investigates whether future performances can be predicted using past 
performances of the funds over different time horizons. The contingency table 
approach is employed for this analysis and the results are documented in the tables 
presented in this section. These performances were evaluated using the Sharpe 
ratio. Adopting the style of Kahn and Rudd (1995), Brown and Goetzmann (1995) 
and Dawe et al. (2014), the winning and losing funds are traced over the evaluation 
period, employing different holding periods and ending months, and detailed in the 
2×2 contingency tables. The tables show the number of funds that were winners in 
both periods (WW), losers in both periods (LL), winners then losers (WL) and losers 
then winners (LW). The extent of positive persistence is established by the extent to 
which the WW and LL cells outnumber the WL and LW cells.  
A summary of the results from the contingency table tests is presented in the tables. 
In all the tests, the lengths of the formation period and holdings period are varied for 
robustness of the results. For each length of period studied, different ending points 
were utilised to assess the sensitiveness of the results to the specific test period 
chosen. The analysis was replicated utilising four different holding periods and 
different ending months for successive 6, 12, 24 and 36 month periods.  
Therefore, contingency tables of 4 different holding periods (that is, 6, 12, 24 and 36 
months) are presented. In constructing each of these tables, such as, for the 6 
months holding period table, the holding period was fixed at 6 months and the 
formation period varied from 6, 12, 24 to 36 months. In a similar manner, the tables 
for 1 year, 2 years and 3 years holding periods were constructed in order to ensure 
consistency and comparability with previous studies. Table 4-31 presents the results 
from analysis of the 6 months holding period for all the funds. The cross product ratio 
(CPR) is utilised to test if the relationship between winners and losers in subsequent 
periods is positive or negative, whereas the x² statistic is utilised in evaluating the 
degree of independence of this relationship.  All the tests run were extremely 
sensitive to the number of observations available, time period chosen, and the 
selected ending dates. Altering these can have a remarkable impact on the results of 
an analysis test being run.  
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Table 4-29 also shows that over the sampling period, winner–winner and loser–loser 
persistence is strongest over successive 6-month periods. The test has a fairly 
comprehensive amount of observations, making the results quite robust. The highest 
persistence was found in Small Caps with 4 out of 6 (67 percent) funds recording 
persistence, whereas the least was found in Resources with only one fund (17 
percent) showing persistence. The overall persistence at 6 months holding period is 
43 percent, with 18 out of the 42 funds showing persistence. Table 4-30 shows the 
results from a holding period of 1 year. Worth noting is that only two funds showed 
persistence in the whole sample which brings down the overall persistence to a mere 
5 percent. These funds are Marriot Dividend Growth Fund and Investec Value Fund. 
The analysis shows that persistence diminishes over time as the holding period 
lengthens. 
Table 4-31 and Table 4-32 show results from holding periods of 2 years and 3 years. 
It is observed that persistence has diminished completely in these two holding 
periods and only reversals in performance dominate.  The test results over longer 
periods are highly susceptible to the amount of observations available and, hence, 
may be unreliable. Based on the statistics presented in these tables, there is no 
conclusive evidence that performance replicates itself over holding periods of 1 year 
or longer.  
Results from this study, based on of the Chi-square statistic values, find that for any 
of the holding periods tested, independence cannot be rejected at the 1 percent 
level. No evidence of prolonged winner-winner or loser-loser persistence is 
established. None of the Chi – square statistics is statistically significantly across all 
the holding periods tested. On the basis of the chi-square statistics, there is no 
conclusive evidence that future performance can be predicted from past 
performance over any of the holding periods analysed, that is, 6 months, 1, 2 and 3 
years. The following tables detail the persistence results and the analysis of 







TABLE 4-29: Persistence results at 6 months holding period        
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the performance persistence results.   
It is observed from Table 4-29 that persistence exists in the short run period as 42.8 
percent of the funds (18 out of 42) exhibit persistence. However on closer analysis, it 
PERSISTENCE RESULTS : 6 MONTHS HOLDING PERIOD 
FUNDS SECTORS
FINANCIALS End.Month No. of Obs.(n) % WW % LL % Persistance Chi-Sq.stat. CPR CPR Z-stat. Conclusion
Coronation Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 41 34.15% 17.07% 51.22% 2.41 0.9800 -0.0781 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 31.71% 17.07% 48.78% 1.83 0.8273 -0.0592 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 31.71% 14.63% 46.34% 2.61 0.6446 -0.1101 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 42 33.33% 19.51% 52.84% 2.00 1.1313 -0.4835 PERSISTENCE
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 31-Dec-14 23 21.74% 34.78% 56.52% 1.52 1.6667 0.1810 PERSISTENCE
ABSA Select Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 42 33.33% 19.05% 52.38% 2.00 1.1313 -0.5815 PERSISTENCE
GROWTH
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 34.15% 19.51% 53.66% 2.02 1.2444 -0.3155 PERSISTENCE
Foord Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 42 33.33% 16.67% 50.00% 2.38 0.8909 -0.5888 REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A 30-Sep-14 42 30.95% 16.67% 47.62% 1.81 0.7521 -0.2452 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 42 30.95% 19.05% 50.00% 1.62 0.9630 -0.4383 REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 41 39.02% 21.95% 60.97% 4.37 2.2500 0.0741 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Growth Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 31.71% 19.51% 51.22% 1.44 1.0505 -0.1362 PERSISTENCE
INDUSTRIALS
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 41 36.59% 12.20% 48.79% 5.34 0.6944 -0.1928 REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 34.15% 12.20% 46.35% 4.36 0.5833 -0.4824 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 31.71% 17.07% 48.78% 1.83 0.8272 -0.4954 REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 42 33.33% 11.90% 45.23% 4.29 0.5303 -0.6986 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 41 56.10% 12.20% 68.30% 21.73 2.8750 -0.2866 PERSISTENCE
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 42 54.76% 11.90% 66.66% 20.86 2.5556 -0.7309 PERSISTENCE
LARGE  CAP
Absa Large Cap Fund 31-Dec-14 42 26.19% 21.43% 47.62% 0.29 0.8181 -0.9442 REVERSAL
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 34.78% 52.17% 1.52 1.0667 0.8094 PERSISTENCE
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 31-Dec-14 41 26.83% 24.39% 51.22% 0.073 1.1000 -0.4965 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    31-Dec-14 42 26.19% 23.81% 50.00% 0.095 1.0000 -0.8584 NO PERSISTENCE
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 31-Dec-14 33 30.30% 24.24% 54.54% 2.03 1.6000 0.8147 PERSISTENCE
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 42 26.19% 23.81% 50.00% 0.095 1.0000 -0.8557 NO PERSISTENCE
RESOURCES
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 41 21.95% 26.83% 48.78% 0.66 0.9167 -0.07846 REVERSAL
Momentum Resources Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 17.07% 29.27% 46.34% 3.20 0.7500 0.06530 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 31-Dec-14 41 21.95% 26.83% 48.78% 0.66 0.9167 0.0640 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 26.83% 24.39% 51.22% 1.83 1.2088 0.2321 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Gold Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 9.76% 41.46% 51.22% 8.46 0.6869 0.1419 REVERSAL
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 41 14.63% 26.83% 41.46% 4.17 0.4889 0.09836 REVERSAL
SMALL  CAP
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 31-Dec-14 41 26.83% 24.39% 51.22% 0.27 1.1111 0.04461 PERSISTENCE
Investec Emerging Companies R 31-Dec-14 41 39.02% 14.63% 53.65% 6.32 1.1429 -0.4463 PERSISTENCE
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   31-Dec-14 42 50.00% 16.67% 66.67% 17.05 4.4545 -0.4090 PERSISTENCE
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 48.78% 14.63% 63.41% 15.26 2,1429 -0.5228 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 26.83% 19.51% 46.34% 1.44 0.7521 -0.0748 REVERSAL
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 41 9.75% 36.59% 46.34% 6.31 0.500 0.1156 REVERSAL
VALUE
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 41 24.39% 24.39% 48.78% 0.073 0.9090 -0.4388 REVERSAL
Element Islamic Equity Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 29.27% 21.95% 51.22% 1.24 1.1250 0.1519 PERSISTENCE
Investec Value Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 41 21.95% 24.39% 46.34% 0.46 0.7500 -0.01917 REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 42 30.95% 19.05% 50.00% 13.62 0.9630 -0.3574 REVERSAL
Momentum Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 29.27% 31.71% 60.98% 2.02 2.4375 0.1470 PERSISTENCE
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 42 30.95% 19.05% 50.00% 1.62 0.9630 -0.2760 REVERSAL
*Chi-square statistic is significant at the 1% level of significance
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is noted that these persistence is predominantly negative, that is, loser-loser 
persistence.   
TABLE 4-30: Persistence results at 1 year holding period 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the performance persistence results.   
PERSISTENCE RESULTS :  1  YEAR  HOLDING  PERIOD 
FUNDS SECTORS
FINANCIALS End.Month No. of Obs.(n) % WW % LL % Persistance Chi-Sq.stat. CPR CPR Z-stat. Conclusion
Coronation Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 23 21.74% 13.04% 34.78% 3.26 0.2778 0.8720 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 8.70% 20.09% 6.39 0.1143 0.7068 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 21.74% 13.04% 34.78% 3.26 0.2778 0.7757 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 24 20.83% 12.50% 33.33% 3.52 0.2381 0.3140 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 31-Dec-14 13 7.69% 23.08% 30.77% 6.38 0.2143 3.1337 REVERSAL
ABSA Select Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 24 20.83% 12.50% 33.33% 3.33 0.2381 0.5090 REVERSAL
GROWTH
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 13.04% 30.43% 3.96 0.1905 0.6743 REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 24 41.67% 12.50% 54.17% 4.33 1.0000 0.2150 NO PERSISTENCE
Investec Growth Fund Class A 30-Sep-14 24 33.33% 8.33% 41.66% 4.00 0.3333 -0.2682 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 24 16.67% 16.67% 33.34% 2.67 0.2500 0.2068 REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 23 47.83% 17.39% 65.22% 6.39 2.7500 1.2150 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Growth Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 17.39% 34.78% 2.22 0.2857 0.7664 REVERSAL
INDUSTRIALS
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 23 47.83% 8.70% 56.53% 7.78 0.9167 0.7115 REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 43.48% 4.35% 47.83% 7.43 0.2857 0.6671 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 39.13% 8.70% 47.83% 4.30 0.5000 0.7687 REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 24 41.67% 8.33% 50.00% 5.33 0.5556 0.2043 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 23 43.48% 4.35% 47.83% 7.43 0.2857 0.7642 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 24 41.67% 4.17% 45.84% 7.00 0.2381 0.3101 REVERSAL
LARGE  CAP
Absa Large Cap Fund 31-Dec-14 24 20.83% 12.50% 33.33% 3.33 0.2381 0.4776 REVERSAL
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 31-Dec-14 13 7.69% 23.08% 30.77% 6.38 0.2143 3.2021 REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 13.04% 30.43% 3.96 0.1905 0.8078 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    31-Dec-14 24 16.67% 12.50% 29.17% 4.33 0.1667 0.3586 REVERSAL
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 31-Dec-14 18 22.22% 16.67% 38.89% 3.78 0.5000 2.2989 REVERSAL
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 24 16.67% 12.50% 29.17% 4.33 0.1667 0.4885 REVERSAL
RESOURCES
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 23 8.70% 30.43% 39.13% 4.65 0.3111 1.0878 REVERSAL
Momentum Resources Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 8.70% 30.43% 39.13% 4.65 0.3111 1.0951 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 31-Dec-14 23 13.04% 30.43% 43.47% 2.57 0.5250 1.0951 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 13.04% 30.43% 43.47% 2.57 0.5250 1.0076 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Gold Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 4.35% 34.78% 39.13% 5.70 0.1667 0.8914 REVERSAL
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 23 8.70% 30.43% 39.13% 4.65 0.3111 1.0418 REVERSAL
SMALL  CAP
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 21.74% 39.13% 1.17 0.4082 0.5711 REVERSAL
Investec Emerging Companies R 31-Dec-14 23 39.13% 8.70% 47.83% 4.30 0.5000 0.3187 REVERSAL
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   31-Dec-14 24 41.67% 12.50% 54.17% 4.33 1.0000 0.2740 NO PERSISTENCE
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 43.48% 8.70% 52.18% 5.70 0.6667 0.3959 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 13.04% 30.43% 3.96 0.1905 0.3508 REVERSAL
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 23 13.04% 13.04% 26.08% 5.35 0.1250 0.3681 REVERSAL
VALUE
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 13.04% 30.43% 3.96 0.1905 1.1240 REVERSAL
Element Islamic Equity Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 21.74% 17.39% 39.13% 1.52 0.4167 0.8497 REVERSAL
Investec Value Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 30.43% 47.82% 3.96 1.0370 1.1918 PERSISTENCE
Stanlib Value Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 24 16.67% 12.50% 29.17% 4.33 0.1667 0.4318 REVERSAL
Momentum Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 21.74% 39.13% 1.17 0.4082 0.9800 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 24 25.00% 8.33% 33.33% 5.33 0.2000 0.7399 REVERSAL
*Chi-square statistic is significant at the 1% level of significance
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Persistence diminishes considerably as the holding period lengthens as it can be 
observed above at the 1 year holding period. Only 4.76 percent (2 out of 42) funds 
exhibit persistence, down from 42.8% which is a huge drop in persistence.  
TABLE 4-31: Persistence results at 2 years holding period  
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the performance persistence results.   
PERSISTENCE RESULTS :  2  YEARS  HOLDING  PERIOD 
FUNDS SECTORS
FINANCIALS End.Month No. of Obs.(n) % WW % LL % Persistance Chi-Sq.stat. CPR CPR Z-stat. Conclusion
Coronation Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 11 45.45% 0.00% 45.45% 5.36 0.0000 1.1274 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.8034 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 45.45% 0.00% 45.45% 5.36 0.0000 1.0615 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 11 45.45% 0.00% 45.45% 5.36 0.0000 0.9871 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 31-Dec-14 6 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 7.33 0.0000 4.2887 REVERSAL
ABSA Select Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.5394 REVERSAL
GROWTH
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.5951 REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.1942 REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A 30-Sep-14 12 25.00% 0.00% 25.00% 4.67 0.0000 -0.4901 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 12 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12.67 0.0000 0.1330 REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 5.36 0.0000 1.5387 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Growth Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 10.45 0.0000 0.7748 REVERSAL
INDUSTRIALS
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 11 45.45% 0.00% 45.45% 5.36 0.0000 1.1706 REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.6218 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.9612 REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 12 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 4.00 0.0000 0.3912 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.9005 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.3338 REVERSAL
LARGE  CAP
Absa Large Cap Fund 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 -0.3948 REVERSAL
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 31-Dec-14 6 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 7.33 0.0000 3.9855 REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.4952 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.0186 REVERSAL
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 31-Dec-14 8 37.50% 0.00% 37.50% 5.00 0.0000 1.9325 REVERSAL
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.08276 REVERSAL
RESOURCES
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.7232 REVERSAL
Momentum Resources Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.7582 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.8438 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.7682 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Gold Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 1.0499 REVERSAL
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.6868 REVERSAL
SMALL  CAP
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 10.45 0.0000 0.8132 REVERSAL
Investec Emerging Companies R 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.5090 REVERSAL
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.1869 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.4724 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.5546 REVERSAL
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 11 27.27% 0.00% 27.27% 3.91 0.0000 0.3853 REVERSAL
VALUE
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.8857 REVERSAL
Element Islamic Equity Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 10.45 0.0000 0.8447 REVERSAL
Investec Value Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 11 9.09% 9.09% 18.18% 9.00 0.0714 0.2390 REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.1717 REVERSAL
Momentum Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 10.45 0.0000 0.7727 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 12 41.67% 0.00% 41.67% 4.67 0.0000 0.7159 REVERSAL
*Chi-square statistic is significant at the 1% level of significance
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At the 2 years holding period, persistence has completely diminished and only 
reversals dominate at this point.  
TABLE 4-32: Persistence results at 3 years holding period 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the performance persistence results.   
PERSISTENCE RESULTS :  3  YEARS  HOLDING  PERIOD 
FUNDS SECTORS
FINANCIALS End.Month No. of Obs.(n) % WW % LL % Persistance Chi-Sq.stat. CPR CPR Z-stat. Conclusion
Coronation Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.3050 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.9263 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.3851 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 8 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 2.50 0.1111 -1.1752 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 31-Dec-14 3 0.00% 33.33% 33.33% 3.67 0.0000 n/a REVERSAL
ABSA Select Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.2444 REVERSAL
GROWTH
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -1.0808 REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.00 0.0000 -1.2111 REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A 30-Sep-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.8552 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.5495 REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 0.00% 14.29% 5.00 0.0000 0.7695 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Growth Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.9443 REVERSAL
INDUSTRIALS
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 0.00% 14.29% 5.00 0.0000 0.0520 REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.7185 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.4507 REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.5146 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.4003 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.00 0.0000 -1.0484 REVERSAL
LARGE  CAP
Absa Large Cap Fund 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.7985 REVERSAL
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 31-Dec-14 3 0.00% 33.33% 33.33% 3.67 0.0000 n/a REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -1.3652 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 25.00% 25.00% 4.00 0.0000 -1,891693 REVERSAL
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 31-Dec-14 5 0.00% 40.00% 40.00% 2.20 0.0000 0.0732 REVERSAL
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 25.00% 25.00% 4.00 0.0000 -1.9094 REVERSAL
RESOURCES
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -0.9570 REVERSAL
Momentum Resources Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -1.1163 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -0.8878 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -1.0217 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Gold Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 0.0874 REVERSAL
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -1.0462 REVERSAL
SMALL  CAP
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.7845 REVERSAL
Investec Emerging Companies R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.9308 REVERSAL
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.00 0.0000 -0.8898 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.6591 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.9853 REVERSAL
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.5932 REVERSAL
VALUE
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -0.9793 REVERSAL
Element Islamic Equity Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.7787 REVERSAL
Investec Value Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.0575 REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.4295 REVERSAL
Momentum Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -0.7940 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 8 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 2.50 0.1111 -0.8082 REVERSAL
*Chi-square statistic is significant at the 1% level of significance
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Similarly, persistence has completely disappeared at the 3 years holding period, 
which may validate the claim of high volatility and trend fluctuations in the South 
African market with no lasting clear pattern (Van Heerden, 2014).   
The study then analysed the two categories of funds (consistent funds and drifters) 
for persistence over the different holding periods. Table 4-33 below presents the 
results for the 6 months holding period. It is observed that the drifters exhibit more 
persistence compared to the consistent funds. The study noted, earlier, that drifting 
funds underperform consistent funds in terms of both relative and absolute risk 
adjusted performance. 
Hence, the study concludes that the persistence shown by the drifters is more 
inclined to the Loser-Loser phenomenon than Winner-Winner persistence, as shown 
by the tables from 6 months and 1 year holding periods. The drifters exhibit a level of 
drift which is above 50 percent (that is, 56.25 percent) which means that more than 
half of the time, the drifters’ performances will persist over the short term investment 
period, which is 6 months in our study. The drifters exhibit a 56.25 percent level of 
drift compared to the consistent funds which show only 36.42 percent level of 
persistence. 
















TABLE 4-33: Persistence analysis at 6 months holding period     
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the performance persistence results.   
Over a 12 month holding period, drifters still exhibit a relatively higher level of 
persistence compared to the consistent funds. The same reasoning of loser-loser 
persistence is applied in analysing this observed trend amongst the drifters. The 
drifters record a 6.25 percent level of persistence compared to the consistent funds 






PERSISTENCE ANALYSIS : 6 MONTHS HOLDING PERIOD
CONSISTENT FUNDS CONCLUSION DRIFTERS CONCLUSION
Coronation Financial Fund REVERSAL Sanlam Financial Fund B1 PERSISTENCE*
Momentum Financials Fund A REVERSAL Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class PERSISTENCE*
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A REVERSAL ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class PERSISTENCE*
Sanlam Financial Fund PERSISTENCE* Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 PERSISTENCE*
ABSA Select Equity Fund PERSISTENCE* Investec Commodity Fund Class R REVERSAL
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A PERSISTENCE* Momentum Resources Fund A REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund REVERSAL Old Mutual Gold Fund R REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A REVERSAL Stanlib Resources Fund R Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A REVERSAL Investec Emerging Companies R PERSISTENCE*
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R PERSISTENCE* Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   PERSISTENCE*
Old Mutual Growth Fund R PERSISTENCE* Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R PERSISTENCE*
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A REVERSAL Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Element Islamic Equity Fund A PERSISTENCE*
Sanlam Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Investec Value Fund Class R REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class PERSISTENCE* Momentum Value Fund A PERSISTENCE*
Absa Large Cap Fund REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund PERSISTENCE* * Number of persistent funds 9.00
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    NO PERSISTENCE % Persistence 56.25%
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A NO PERSISTENCE
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R PERSISTENCE*
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund PERSISTENCE*
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A REVERSAL




TABLE 4-34: Persistence analysis at 1 year holding period 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the performance persistence results.   
 
Over a 2 year holding period, there was no persistence observed amongst the funds, 
only reversals are prevalent. This observation confirms the results of earlier studies 
on the South African market that performance persistence seems to diminish as the 
length of evaluation gets longer. In this case, persistence has completely vanished at 





PERSISTENCE  ANALYSIS : 1 YEAR  HOLDING  PERIOD
CONSISTENT FUNDS CONCLUSION DRIFTERS CONCLUSION
Coronation Financial Fund REVERSAL Sanlam Financial Fund B1 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A REVERSAL Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A REVERSAL ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund REVERSAL Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 REVERSAL
ABSA Select Equity Fund REVERSAL Investec Commodity Fund Class R REVERSAL
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A REVERSAL Momentum Resources Fund A REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund NO PERSISTENCE Old Mutual Gold Fund R REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A REVERSAL Stanlib Resources Fund R Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A REVERSAL Investec Emerging Companies R REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R PERSISTENCE* Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   NO PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Growth Fund R REVERSAL Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R REVERSAL
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A REVERSAL Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Element Islamic Equity Fund A REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Investec Value Fund Class R PERSISTENCE*
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class REVERSAL Momentum Value Fund A REVERSAL
Absa Large Cap Fund REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund REVERSAL * Number of persistent funds 1.00
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    REVERSAL % Persistence 6.25%
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R REVERSAL
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A REVERSAL




TABLE 4-35: Persistence analysis at 2 years holding period 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the performance persistence results.   
 
Similarly, the 3 years holding period yielded no evidence of persistence, but only 
reversals in the performances of the funds. This confirms most literature findings 
such as Schiff (2011), Malhotra (2012) and Hsu (2014), that persistence diminishes 
as the length of the holding period increases until it disappears completely in some 
instances. This phenomenon may lead one to conclude that the South African 
market is more volatile in nature and any trends or shocks in the economic system 
do not persist for too long before they die out or change. The mask falls off too 
quickly before the audience can cheer-on the characters on the stage. The analysis 
of the 3 years holding period is presented in the table below. 
PERSISTENCE  ANALYSIS : 2  YEARS  HOLDING  PERIOD
CONSISTENT FUNDS CONCLUSION DRIFTERS CONCLUSION
Coronation Financial Fund REVERSAL Sanlam Financial Fund B1 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A REVERSAL Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A REVERSAL ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund REVERSAL Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 REVERSAL
ABSA Select Equity Fund REVERSAL Investec Commodity Fund Class R REVERSAL
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A REVERSAL Momentum Resources Fund A REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund REVERSAL Old Mutual Gold Fund R REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A REVERSAL Stanlib Resources Fund R Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A REVERSAL Investec Emerging Companies R REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R REVERSAL Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   REVERSAL
Old Mutual Growth Fund R REVERSAL Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R REVERSAL
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A REVERSAL Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Element Islamic Equity Fund A REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Investec Value Fund Class R REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class REVERSAL Momentum Value Fund A REVERSAL
Absa Large Cap Fund REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund REVERSAL * Number of persistent funds 0.00
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    REVERSAL % Persistence 0.00%
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R REVERSAL
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A REVERSAL




TABLE 4-36: Persistence analysis at 3 years holding period 
 
Source: Author’s own. Constructed based on the performance persistence results.   
 
4.4 Summary of Persistence 
The contingency tables were used to investigate persistence, splitting the risk- 
adjusted returns into winners and losers based on the median abnormal return over 
the relevant ranking period. The results shown in Table 4-29 indicate that 
persistence is found when the data is tested in the short run period, that is, 6 months 
holding period. In addition, persistence above and below the median abnormal return 
exists, regardless of the length of time used to form a portfolio or hold a portfolio, i.e. 
loser-loser and winner-winner persistence. The 6 months’ summary tables were 
further analysed in order to get additional insight into the origin of the observed 
persistence.  
PERSISTENCE  ANALYSIS : 3 YEARS  HOLDING  PERIOD
CONSISTENT FUNDS CONCLUSION DRIFTERS CONCLUSION
Coronation Financial Fund REVERSAL Sanlam Financial Fund B1 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A REVERSAL Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A REVERSAL ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund REVERSAL Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 REVERSAL
ABSA Select Equity Fund REVERSAL Investec Commodity Fund Class R REVERSAL
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A REVERSAL Momentum Resources Fund A REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund REVERSAL Old Mutual Gold Fund R REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A REVERSAL Stanlib Resources Fund R Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A REVERSAL Investec Emerging Companies R REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R REVERSAL Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   REVERSAL
Old Mutual Growth Fund R REVERSAL Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R REVERSAL
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A REVERSAL Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Element Islamic Equity Fund A REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A REVERSAL Investec Value Fund Class R REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class REVERSAL Momentum Value Fund A REVERSAL
Absa Large Cap Fund REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund REVERSAL * Number of persistent funds 0.00
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    REVERSAL % Persistence 0.00%
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R REVERSAL
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A REVERSAL




The percentages shown in the tables give the contribution of the winner-winner and 
loser-loser categories to the chi-squared statistic. This analysis was examined in 
conjunction with Table 4-33, which mirrors persistence in terms of the consistent 
funds and the drifters. It can be observed for the consistent funds that winner-winner 
persistence accounts for a high proportion of their persistence in the contingency 
table with figures ranging from 26.83 percent to 54.76 percent.  
However, the overall persistence of consistent funds appears lower than those of 
drifters at 34.62 percent, compared to the 56.25 percent of drifters. Loser-loser 
persistence appears highest with respect to the drifting funds at the lower formation-
holding period combinations, which contributes to the high overall persistence 
percentage. The range of persistence for the drifters falls within 24.24 percent to 
34.78 percent; however, it is the frequency with which the loser-loser phenomenon 
occurs that makes the overall percentage higher. When tested, it is found that a high 
proportion of the observed persistence is due to losers remaining losers. When the 
holding period is increased it is found that persistence diminishes considerably, until 
it completely disappears. Some previous South African researches, investigating the 
persistence of equity unit trust performance, resulted in conclusions different to those 
of this study, although most of them concur. The differences in results may be 
attributed to the size of the data set used, different methodologies used in testing for 
persistence and in the risk-adjustment used in this study. Using the chi-squared test, 
there was no conclusive evidence of the ability to predict future performances based 
on past performances. 
The investment implications of this research are only suggestive. Using historical 
ranking as a guide, investors appear to be able to improve their chances of relative 
performance in general equity unit trusts in the short run. Selection of above average 
funds based on past performance may be possible, but a more detailed analysis, 
taking switching costs into account, needs to be made. Hence, the study does not 
have strong conclusive evidence on predictions of future performances. Drifting 
funds appear to be more persistent than consistent funds, amidst negative 
performances. In summary, it is found that the results for performance persistence 
studies over longer time periods are highly sensitive to the beginning and ending 
dates selected in the test being performed and, more importantly, the sample size 
and methodologies employed.  
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4.5 Chapter Summary 
The chapter explored in detail how the study went about in achieving its objectives. It 
commences with the establishment of the true styles of the funds using the Returns 
Based Style Analysis (RBSA) technique. The RBSA model derives its ability to 
establish the funds’ styles through return attribution, that is, the style factor to which 
a significant portion of the fund’s returns could be attributed. It is found that most of 
the funds are correctly classified in terms of their styles. Once the styles of the funds 
were known, the study then embarked on finding out how true the funds are to their 
styles, that is, the extent of drift of the funds from their styles through employing the 
Style Drift Score (SDS) as the principal method for separating the funds into 
consistent funds and drifters. 62 percent of the funds were found to remain 
consistent to their styles, whereas 38 percent of the funds were found to exhibit drift. 
These two categories of funds (which are, the consistent funds and drifters) were 
then analysed, relative to each other in terms of their performances and performance 
persistence.  Three methods were used to analyse performance, namely, the CAPM, 
FF3F and the Sharpe ratio. The consistent funds outperformed the drifters with 
respect to the CAPM and FF3F models, however, the drifters triumphed when the 
Sharpe ratio was considered. None of the funds were able to convincingly 
outperform the market benchmarks used, which adds some validity into the 
argument that active investing does not possess significant power of passive 
investing. Most literature concurs with these findings, both South African and 
international studies. 
Market timing abilities of the consistent funds and the drifters were then analysed 
using the Treynor-Mazuy model and it was found that none of the funds were able to 
successfully time the market. The “hot-hands” phenomenon that is prevalent 
amongst seasoned managers in international markets is nowhere to be found within 
SA fund managers. The few studies on market timing done on the SA market have 
mixed results with no clear unanimity in terms of whether SA managers can time the 
markets. Lastly, the study tested performance persistence of these two categories of 
funds (which are, the consistent funds and drifters) using contingency tables. 
Persistence was found to be prevalent among the drifters, however, it was mostly 
negative persistence (that is, Loser-Loser) over the 6 months holding period. This 
persistence diminished considerably at 1 year holding periods and disappeared 
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completely as the holding period was lengthened to 2 years and 3 years holding 
periods. Most South African literature on persistence finds similar results. 
Predictability of future returns based on past performances was also evaluated using 
the chi-squared test and the study found no conclusive evidence of the ability to 
predict future returns, since all the chi-squared statistics were insignificant.  
The next chapter gives an overall closure of the study as it will conclude the study 
with the summary of the findings, the recommendations and also the limitations of 























This chapter presents the curtain call of the study. It details a summary of all the 
findings from investigating the objectives of the study, and presents a conclusion to 
the study. The chapter also offers recommendations for future studies along this field 
of research based on findings from undertaking this study. Lastly, the chapter 
highlights the challenges encountered during the inquiry of the study’s objectives, 
which are the limitations of the study.  
 
5.2 Summary of Findings 
It has been noted in the unit trusts universe that style investing is widespread and 
prevalent. As individual investors have lessened the proportions of shares held 
directly, they have resultantly expanded their investments in unit trusts, most of 
which are categorised on account of their investment styles. In the same way, a 
greater number of institutional investors’ allocations to stock holdings are also 
grounded on equity investment styles. It is very common in the investment universe 
to use size and value-growth metrics in comparing different investments. However, 
scholarly research into the effects of style investing on asset prices, performance 
and persistence of unit trusts does not appear to correspond with its perceptible 
significance to investors.  
This study examined the impact of style based investing on the performance, and 
persistence, of South African unit trusts from the view of consistent funds against 
drifting funds. The motivation for this pursuit was the astonishing simple belief in the 
fund management sphere, that style consistency can be indicative of a skilful 
portfolio manager and a successful risk management system. Hence, it forms an 
advisable distinction when searching for and retaining managers, in addition to the 
obvious benefits in the portfolio construction process. Actually, the vast majority of 
academic research infers that there is a positive relationship between investment 
style consistency and performance. 
Consistent with this, the study embarked on investigating the first objective, which 
was the extent to which unit trusts in South Africa maintain or drift from their styles 
stated in their mandates. However, the study firstly examined the return attribution of 
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the funds in order to determine whether they ascribe to their stated titles or not, that 
is, the possibility of misclassifications. In other words, the study probed the true 
styles of the funds using the Returns Based Style Analysis model initiated by Sharpe 
(1992), where detections of styles are based on return characteristics. It was found 
that, in most cases, these funds comply with their mandates and relevant regulations 
and, hence, they are correctly classified. However, in a few cases some of the titles 
of unit trusts may be misleading as they expose the investor to style factor returns 
that are against their mandates, or the investor is unaware of. This forms the primary 
advantage of this technique, as it is able to lift the veil on secretive mutual funds – 
even if to a limited extent – using only easily accessible public information.  
Through employing the Style Drift Score analysis, proposed by Idzorek and Bertsch 
(2004), the study was also able to detect the presence and extent of style drift, which 
is important as investors want to have adequate knowledge of their investments. 62 
percent of the funds in the study’s sample were found to be consistent, whereas 38 
percent of the funds exhibited drift. The level of drift in the sample was verified with 
two other methods, which are, the R-squared and Tracking error methods, and 
approximately similar figures were obtained. Growth funds and the Financials funds 
were found to be the most consistent funds, whereas the Small Caps and the Value 
funds exhibited the highest drift. The few studies that have been done on style 
investing in the South African market found similar results to this study, such as 
Mutooni and Muller (2007) Collinet and Firer (2003) and Muller and Ward (2013). 
The funds were then subsequently separated into two categories, which are, 
consistent funds and drifters, using the style drift score for a thorough comparative 
analysis of their performances.  
The study further investigated its second objective, which was the analysis of 
performances of the two categories mentioned above, relative to each other, using 
three methods, namely, the Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM), the Fama-French 3 
factor model (FF3F) and the Sharpe ratio. The consistent funds were found to 
outperform the drifting funds with respect to CAPM and FF3F models. However, the 
drifters triumphed over the consistent funds when the Sharpe ratio was considered. 
These findings confirm most of the literature in that consistent funds outperform 
drifters. However, it was also observed that, when the Sharpe ratio was used, the 
drifters outperform consistent funds which contrasts some of the literature. The 
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Sharpe ratio is one of the most utilised performance measures in the asset 
management industry, hence, one would have expected the consistent funds to be 
triumphant over the drifters when using it. 
The study further employed the Treynor-Mazuy model to further test the funds’ 
market timing ability, as it sought to deepen its investigation on the performances of 
the funds in order to fulfil the second objective. It was found that neither the 
consistent funds, nor the drifters, were able to successfully time the market. 
Literature has mixed results in terms of the market timing abilities of SA funds, with 
some studies suggesting it is possible for fund managers to time the JSE, for 
example Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) whilst others like Cubbin et al. (2006) contrast it. 
Lastly, the study embarked on fulfilling its third objective, which entailed finding out 
whether these funds’ risk adjusted performances, obtained using the Sharpe ratio, 
were able to persist over different investment holding periods or not. Over six 
months, the drifters exhibited higher persistence and ability to repeat performance, 
albeit it was found to be overall negative performance. That is, more Loser-Loser 
persistence was observed compared to Winner-Winner persistence. Persistence 
declines considerably as the holding period is increased to one year until it 
diminishes completely at two years and three years holding periods. However, the 
study could not find any evidence of predictability in returns across all the time 
periods for the different holding periods. Literature on persistence in the South 
African market that found similar results include Wessels and Krige (2005), Thomas 
(2012) and Eddy (2014). 
 
5.3 Conclusion  
The study therefore concludes that, on average, South African unit trusts are 
correctly classified. From these findings, the study can also infer that unit trusts in 
South Africa exhibit more consistency as compared to drift. That is, South African 
unit trusts stick to their mandates more often than not. The study was also able to 
discern that consistent funds exhibit higher performances than drifters on a style 
adjusted basis. Funds invested in the Growth and Financials stocks were found to 
exhibit the highest consistency. Unit trusts invested in Small Cap stocks and Value 
stocks were found to exhibit the highest level of drift, that is, style inconsistency.  
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When style benchmarks were used, compared to the general market benchmark 
(JSE ALSI), the performance models proved to be better in capturing more variability 
in returns patterns of the funds. This shows the huge impact of style investing on the 
funds’ expected returns. With respect to market timing ability, since none of the 
funds were able to successfully time the markets, the study can thus deduce that 
South African fund managers do not possess the ‘hot hands’ phenomenon. More so, 
in general, active management of funds in the South African unit trusts universe 
does not seem to yield significant outperformance of the markets, since most of the 
funds underperformed the markets across all three performance measures used. 
Therefore, an investment in a passive fund would be recommended based on results 
of this study, for example, index trackers and Exchange Traded Funds (ETF’s). 
 
5.4 Recommendations  
The researcher recommends a more detailed analysis in this area with forward-
looking data to be conducted in the future. A different approach for forecasting 
persistence of performance would also be recommended, since it may yield insightful 
strategies with which investors could exploit market inefficiencies and earn positive 
results. Further studies detailing a comparison of South African unit trusts with those 
of other emerging markets would be also recommended.  
 
5.5 Limitations of the Study  
Some of the funds’ data had different starting points and, thus, not all the funds had 
complete data for the full period of analysis. The data was backward-looking as only 
historical returns were used. Furthermore, the South African market is not fully grown 
yet, hence, some of the stocks held by the funds were found in more than one index, 
which show the blurred lines demarcating these indices. Another limitation 
encountered with the RBSA model was the possibility of overfitting of the chosen 
variables for the model. However this concern was taken care of and addressed by 
the solver function of the Excel software, which was used in the quadratic 
programming of the RBSA regressions. Interestingly, the study found that more new 
funds are being formed yearly, which may present a great platform to further test 
objectives similar to this study’s, with a much larger and contemporary sample in 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
 
ALSI -  J203 All Share Index 
AMEX -  American Stock Exchange  
ANOVA - Analysis of Variance  
APT -   Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
ASISA - Association of Savings and Investments South Africa  
B/M -  Book-to-Market Ratio  
CAPM -  Capital Asset Pricing Model  
CPI -   Consumer Price Index  
CPR -  Cross Product Ratio  
EMH -  Efficient Market Hypothesis 
E/P -  Earnings-to-Price Ratio 
EPS -  Earnings per Share 
ETF -  Exchange Traded Fund  
FF3F - Fama-French 3 Factor Model   
FNB -   First National Bank 
FTSE -  Financial Times Stock Exchange 
GNP -  Gross National Product  
HML -  High-Minus-Low 
JSE -  Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
Log L -          Log Likelihood 
MSCI -          Morgan Stanley Capital International 
P/B -  Price-to-Book Ratio 
P/CF -  Price-to Cash Flow Ratio 
P/E -  Price-to-Earnings Ratio 
P/S -  Price-to-Sales Ratio 
RBSA - Returns Based Style Analysis 
RoMaD - Return over Maximum Drawdown 
SA -  South Africa 
SDS -  Style Drift Score 
SENS - Stock Exchange News Service 
SML -  Small-Minus-Big 
STEFI -         Short Term Fixed Interest 
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TRI -  Total Returns Index 
UK -  United Kingdom 
US -  United States (of America) 
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The 12 factors chosen for the Returns Based Style Analysis (RBSA) model:  
1. J200- JSE Top 40 (Large cap)  
2. J201- Mid cap  
3. J202- Small cap 
4. J330- Value 
5. J331- Growth 
6. J210- Resource 10 
7. J211- Industrial 25  
8. J530- Consumer Goods   
9. J253- SA Listed Property  
10. J212- Financials 15 
11. J590- Technology   
     12. Short term treasury bills (SA Government 91-day T-bill) 
 







































 Corresponding P - Values beneath the correlation coefficients reflect statistical significance. 
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                 0.0000   0.0000
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               largecap   midcap smallcap    value techno~y
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FUND SECTORS STYLE DRIFT SCORE ADJUSTED R-SQUARED TRACKING ERROR
Mean SDS = 0,9814 Mean Adj.R-squared=0,8621 Mean Tracking error=0,002467
FINANCIALS SDS RANKING ADJ.R-SQUARED RANKING TRACKING ERROR RANKING
FUND A Coronation Financial Fund 0,7648913 C 0,88427006 C 0,001972815 C
FUND B Momentum Financials Fund A 0,9707935 C 0,925006516 C 0,00250388 D
FUND C Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 0,6278492 C 0,915234892 C 0,001619355 C
FUND D Sanlam Financial Fund 0,5816421 C 0,917317118 C 0,001658315 C
FUND E Sanlam Financial Fund B1 1,194669 D 0,88238168 C 0,001446609 C
FUND F ABSA Select Equity Fund 0,7831952 C 0,89164536 C 0,002232962 C
Overall Drift= 17% 0% 17%
GROWTH
FUND A FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 0,7501074 C 0,905923005 C 0,001934685 C
FUND B Foord Equity Fund 0,5725278 C 0,890565751 C 0,00163233 C
FUND C Investec Growth Fund Class A 0,8200536 C 0,867270859 C 0,002112317 C
FUND D Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 0,6464316 C 0,888693577 C 0,001843036 C
FUND E Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 0,7354794 C 0,776359498 D 0,001896956 C
FUND F Old Mutual Growth Fund R 0,7211102 C 0,88982534 C 0,001859895 C
Overall Drift= 0% 17% 0%
INDUSTRIALS
FUND A Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 0,5919021 C 0,890125256 C 0,00152664 C
FUND B Momentum Industrial Fund A 0,8130271 C 0,884818765 C 0,002096968 C
FUND C Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 0,9090402 C 0,85978305 D 0,002344606 C
FUND D Sanlam Industrial Fund A 0,5410129 C 0,891407575 C 0,001542478 C
FUND E Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 1,000855 D 0,819702391 D 0,002581415 D
FUND F Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 0,8365522 C 0,844597381 D 0,002385088 C
Overall Drift= 17% 50% 17%
LARGE CAP
FUND A Absa Large Cap Fund 0,8025997 C 0,925024562 C 0,002288286 C
FUND B ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 1,1952927 D 0,944028686 C 0,001447365 C
FUND C Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 0,6472081 C 0,958031469 C 0,001669286 C
FUND D Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    0,5827785 C 0,952162253 C 0,001661556 C
FUND E Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 1,5339151 D 0,872874058 C 0,003037933 D
FUND F Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 0,6276007 C 0,955061708 C 0,001789348 C
Overall Drift= 33% 0% 17%
RESOURCES
FUND A Investec Commodity Fund Class R 1,055822 D 0,903031331 C 0,002723187 D
FUND B Momentum Resources Fund A 1,0787146 D 0,911962906 C 0,002782232 D
FUND C Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0,6286401 C 0,961404617 C 0,001621395 C
FUND D Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 0,9737689 C 0,872849806 C 0,002511555 D
FUND E Old Mutual Gold Fund R 3,3064722 D 0,401091472 D 0,008528087 D
FUND F Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 0,9912351 D 0,905917011 C 0,002556604 D
Overall Drift= 67% 17% 83%
SMALL CAP
FUND A Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 0,8426732 C 0,803364013 D 0,002173431 C
FUND B Investec Emerging Companies R 1,0939741 D 0,839114628 D 0,002821589 D
FUND C Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   1,085863 D 0,758191918 D 0,003095896 D
FUND D Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 1,010565 D 0,849988313 D 0,002606459 D
FUND E Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 0,8043923 C 0,889042129 C 0,002074697 C
FUND F Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 2,2856114 D 0,749865413 D 0,005004025 D
Overall Drift= 67% 83% 67%
VALUE
FUND A Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 1,2443943 D 0,878421259 C 0,003209554 D
FUND B Element Islamic Equity Fund A 1,2091954 D 0,816493834 D 0,003122059 D
FUND C Investec Value Fund Class R 1,3170472 D 0,768555772 D 0,003396942 D
FUND D Stanlib Value Fund A Class 0,9659978 C 0,83245237 D 0,002754149 D
FUND E Momentum Value Fund A 1,3274511 D 0,809302471 D 0,003423775 D
FUND F Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 0,7465884 C 0,823281426 D 0,002128593 C
Overall Drift= 67% 83% 83%
CONSISTENT 26 62% 27 64% 25 60%
DRIFTERS 16 38% 15 36% 17 40%
TOTAL 42 100% 42 100% 42 100%










FINANCIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : FINANCIALS  15 
ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) LOG L. D-W Stat.
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000121 0.982967*** 0.976409 481.4684 2.414957
(-0.495219) (65.61551)
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000140 1.081716*** 0.964705 449.6406 1.944001
(0.423592) (53.32566)
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000128 0.990268*** 0.978122 484.7421 2.690388
(-0.540346) (68.19628)
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000160 0.982121*** 0.980164 560.4212 2.404508
(-0.784813) (76.36667)
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 -0.000397* 0.999314*** 0.985204 314.5896 2.397099
(-1.974973) (63.73981)
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000675 0.975233*** 0.912421 468.6747 2.397012
(1.531693) (35.07639)
GROWTH MARKET  BENCHMARK : GROWTH  INDEX 
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000615 0.918672*** 0.916818 414.9562 2.261032
(-1.331174) (33.87147)
Foord Equity Fund -0.000294 0.850791*** 0.878129 455.7328 2.307513
(-0.594716) (29.17602)
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000747* 0.870914*** 0.904033 456.6092 2.188449
(-1.658460) (32.92908)
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000523 0.869754*** 0.881724 455.1318 2.243758
(-1.053316) (29.67607)
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000527 0.829672*** 0.798451 372.0169 1.817375
(-0.757466) (20.32250)
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000595 0.891912*** 0.886725 400.1149 2.294849
(-1.118704) (28.55024)
INDUSTRIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : INDUSTRIAL  25 
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A -0.000306 0.977243*** 0.968145 467.4102 2.293194
(-1.089922) (56.22939)
Momentum Industrial Fund A -0.000134 0.997014*** 0.972999 474.2476 2.500381
(-0.509084) (61.22689)
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A -0.000532 1.012053*** 0.972045 470.8019 2.433434
(-1.959265) (60.14403)
Sanlam Industrial Fund A -0.000287 0.966068*** 0.973481 546.1999 2.529360
(-1.240376) (65.82334)
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class -0.000222 1.005677*** 0.961734 454.4271 2.467503
(-0.698501) (51.13511)
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class -0.000102 1.001937*** 0.961461 518.8863 2.395182
(-0.349436) (54.26637)




LARGE CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  TOP  40 
ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) LOG L. D-W Stat.
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000540** 1.046522*** 0.968814 526.6617 2.441205
(1.992384) (60.55334)
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000159 1.057202*** 0.983585 304.4646 2.465285
(0.676235) (60.46668)
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -0.000117 1.058317*** 0.980463 486.1246 2.015471
(-0.502083) (72.25164)
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000126 1.040219*** 0.984677 570.6203 2.356809
(-0.674447) (87.08489)
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000372 1.047369*** 0.963339 341.1518 2.128575
(-0.977808) (45.28338)
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A -2.04E-05 1.067296*** 0.978272 546.3984 2.161725
(-0.088914) (72.89605)
RESOURCES MARKET  BENCHMARK : RESOURCE  10 
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0.000359 0.967734*** 0.965944 458.9815 2.312826
(1.189458) (54.32124)
Momentum Resources Fund A 1.89E-05 1.027820*** 0.965225 451.5205 2.251705
(0.058400) (53.73669)
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0.000356* 0.990353*** 0.984989 500.5812 2.484437
(1.753352) (82.61632)
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 8.42E-05 0.931658*** 0.942365 434.0643 2.432083
(0.220213) (41.24858)
Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.000742 0.961532*** 0.743081 339.9526 2.311383
(-0.792157) (17.37231)
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.000259 0.979391*** 0.965801 457.4969 2.423377
(-0.846521) (54.20376)
SMALL CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : SMALL  CAP  INDEX 
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000421* 1.006156*** 0.977350 485.3922 1.984745
(-1.788168) (66.99709)
Investec Emerging Companies R -5.94E-05 1.028898*** 0.945592 435.3202 1.897120
(-0.156493) (42.52641)
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   3.29E-05 1.002024*** 0.941692 495.5291 1.837567
(0.093336) (43.66634)
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000275 1.025493*** 0.948134 438.3199 1.952539
(0.745434) (43.61401)
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000185 1.036539*** 0.970603 468.2198 1.867246
(-0.667199) (58.60693)
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001496** 1.028018*** 0.854604 363.2205 0.929452
(-2.230507) (24.26473)
VALUE MARKET  BENCHMARK : VALUE   INDEX 
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -0.000333 1.007557*** 0.941772 426.5416 1.718983
(-0.806405) (41.02557)
Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000524 0.951242*** 0.924690 421.6026 2.448857
(-1.168318) (35.91980)
Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000545 0.918888*** 0.875039 392.3054 2.019020
(-0.951898) (27.00487)
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000672* 0.936479*** 0.938666 490.4054 2.259540
(-1.817619) (42.50747)
Momentum Value Fund A -0.001069** 0.986213*** 0.933355 421.2346 2.106437
(-2.459381) (38.17731)
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000681* 0.900839*** 0.923127 480.6024 2.184158
(-1.696462) (37.65631)









MARKET  BENCHMARK : FINANCIALS  15 
FINANCIALS ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) SMB HML LOG L. D-W Stat.
Coronation Financial Fund -0.000140 0.985262*** 0.215702*** -0.079953 0.979053 488.7392 2.497633
(-0.607305) (68.99373) (3.813732) (-1.426243)
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000225 1.070297*** -0.112603 0.292916*** 0.968759 457.0749 1.894268
(0.720892) (55.43634) (-1.472573) (3.864844)
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000144 0.992334*** 0.111981* -0.063001 0.978494 486.6700 2.609041
(-0.613119) (68.13303) (1.941245) (-1.101907)
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000163 0.983819*** 0.082872* -0.042339 0.980302 561.8631 2.399338
(-0.801864) (75.75353) (1.679240) (-0.854570)
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 -0.000423** 1.001355*** 0.054442 -0.041045 0.984925 315.0612 2.410447
(-2.067077) (61.61092) (0.895093) (-0.663516)
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000656 0.978189*** -0.398295*** -0.053389 0.927751 481.1499 2.437900
(1.638483) (38.22480) (-4.095869) (-0.546891)
GROWTH MARKET  BENCHMARK : GROWTH  INDEX 
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000637*** 0.986706*** 0.470542*** 0.521290*** 0.977922 485.6233 2.543327
(-2.668458) (67.15605) (7.827800) (9.128108)
Foord Equity Fund -0.000551** 0.941946*** 0.739274*** 0.410889*** 0.972023 544.3181 2.291911
(-2.321091) (63.68936) (12.45951) (7.251439)
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000978*** 0.947802*** 0.589330*** 0.387794*** 0.970961 526.9663 2.062699
(-3.940168) (61.49772) (9.460264) (6.464591)
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000777*** 0.960236*** 0.691874*** 0.482887*** 0.974929 548.4593 2.305629
(-3.391034) (67.22528) (12.07357) (8.823867)
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000661* 0.941256*** 1.035636*** 0.415326*** 0.942036 438.4722 1.601793
(-1.769698) (40.88666) (10.99575) (4.641588)
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000623** 0.971350*** 0.555925*** 0.597811*** 0.971510 473.6086 2.390762
(-2.328921) (58.96288) (8.248280) (9.336224)
INDUSTRIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : INDUSTRIAL  25 
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A -0.000311 0.984145*** 0.385410*** 0.018916 0.981952 498.2699 2.506917
(-1.469129) (74.93146) (7.450316) (0.372969)
Momentum Industrial Fund A -0.000123 0.998881*** 0.124401** 0.057109 0.974819 478.9410 2.563744
(-0.482334) (63.26624) (2.000453) (0.936680)
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A -0.000504** 1.013717*** 0.140303** 0.127059** 0.976283 480.4629 2.434555
(-2.010179) (65.14335) (2.289117) (2.114387)
Sanlam Industrial Fund A -0.000299 0.972574*** 0.266788*** -0.015648 0.979829 563.5058 2.581417
(-1.482580) (75.53213) (5.468097) (-0.323563)
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class -0.000197 1.009163*** 0.238352*** 0.122535* 0.969937 468.1242 2.386523
(-0.699183) (57.66066) (3.457673) (1.813035)
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class -0.000107 1.007245*** 0.257130*** 0.110303* 0.970915 536.6593 2.352494
(-0.423140) (62.42618) (4.205772) (1.820153)
LARGE  CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  TOP  40 
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000582** 1.027055*** -0.286285*** 0.021078 0.974514 539.6980 2.420007
(2.371601) (63.85020) (-4.697427) (0.356616)
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 0.000247 1.030706*** -0.229044*** -0.048888 0.987141 313.0837 2.415862
(1.177453) (61.80616) (-3.569587) (-0.760508)
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -6.53E-05 1.040973*** -0.306508*** 0.121016** 0.985451 502.6295 1.993590
(-0.322791) (80.33471) (-6.054926) (2.486173)
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000109 1.032934*** -0.125697*** 0.095050** 0.985467 574.7982 2.460865
(-0.595777) (86.24625) (-2.770040) (2.159874)
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000136 1.021825*** -0.270893*** -0.072707 0.968843 348.6179 2.126933
(-0.382038) (45.47703) (-3.132717) (-0.870469)
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 2.03E-05 1.048675*** -0.283705*** 0.066489 0.983068 562.2634 2.176020
(0.100200) (78.80654) (-5.627051) (1.359816)












RESOURCES MARKET  BENCHMARK : RESOURCE  10 
ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) SMB HML LOG L. D-W Stat.
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0.000346 0.990076*** 0.214178*** 0.014043 0.968888 464.7584 2.253722
(1.198791) (54.13165) (2.840551) (0.201304)
Momentum Resources Fund A 5.52E-05 1.051015*** 0.135987* 0.230031*** 0.971983 463.8950 1.898817
(0.189721) (56.99287) (1.788769) (3.270545)
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0.000359** 1.013697*** 0.194761*** 0.087078** 0.989361 519.6809 2.293950
(2.099189) (93.50998) (4.358109) (2.106112)
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 7.59E-05 0.980952*** 0.438675*** 0.115500 0.961569 456.3699 2.112757
(0.242617) (49.51476) (5.371252) (1.528589)
Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.000867 1.017567*** 0.699860*** -0.370599* 0.758844 344.3062 2.357910
(-0.952955) (17.66603) (2.947355) (-1.686948)
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.000259 1.012429*** 0.283940*** 0.102524 0.974059 473.0363 2.030721
(-0.969530) (59.89439) (4.074677) (1.590263)
SMALL  CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : SMALL  CAP  INDEX 
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000414* 1.003935*** 0.064440 0.011863 0.977370 486.4679 2.005560
(-1.754375) (66.42367) (1.116409) (0.208950)
Investec Emerging Companies R -3.29E-05 1.031059*** -0.246916*** 0.142737 0.948335 439.0656 2.012424
(-0.088912) (43.43486) (-2.723667) (1.600726)
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   2.40E-05 1.004372*** -0.276240*** 0.142153* 0.946008 501.1307 1.945164
(0.070798) (45.15545) (-3.369367) (1.739331)
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000296 1.029196*** -0.291259*** 0.134190 0.952454 443.9147 2.025886
(0.837197) (45.40561) (-3.364658) (1.576001)
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R -0.000170 1.037145*** -0.110376 0.074492 0.970817 469.6335 1.857298
(-0.614458) (58.45578) (-1.628966) (1.117688)
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001482** 1.024698*** -0.082509 0.163255 0.853111 363.7352 0.907727
(-2.196519) (23.88914) (-0.498616) (0.995840)
VALUE MARKET  BENCHMARK : VALUE  INDEX 
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -0.000421 1.029753*** 0.345641*** -0.208020** 0.946970 432.4794 1.842173
(-1.063831) (42.24936) (3.466225) (-2.139811)
Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000697* 0.979724*** 0.220759** -0.561934*** 0.942986 437.3831 2.372751
(-1.780596) (40.74392) (2.237331) (-5.837096)
Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000729 0.967853*** 0.790470*** -0.417590*** 0.909454 410.2475 1.890774
(-1.489614) (32.13230) (6.414480) (-3.475891)
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000809*** 0.981518*** 0.609047*** -0.423351*** 0.961497 519.1342 2.366548
(-2.759375) (53.70686) (8.306850) (-5.870707)
Momentum Value Fund A -0.001206*** 1.008418*** 0.210464** -0.407817*** 0.941624 429.2186 2.052940
(-2.953325) (40.10884) (2.046077) (-4.066762)
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000848*** 0.955754*** 0.746961*** -0.508980*** 0.959781 520.1729 2.291867
(-2.917374) (52.75555) (10.27720) (-7.120031)









MARKET  BENCHMARK : FINANCIALS  15 
FINANCIALS ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) ϒ (MARKET TIMING) LOG L. D-W Stat.
Coronation Financial Fund 1.02E-05 0.987565*** -0.519951 0.976381 481.9198 2.429506
(0.036187) (62.62374) (-0.938505)
Momentum Financials Fund A 0.000483 1.093754*** -1.361265* 0.965500 451.3483 1.951544
(1.283469) (51.83759) (-1.836406)
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A -0.000180 0.988440*** 0.206770 0.977940 484.8178 2.690847
(-0.657573) (64.43321) (0.383662)
Sanlam Financial Fund -0.000177 0.981480*** 0.074417 0.979997 560.4333 2.401912
(-0.759386) (72.31444) (0.153657)
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 -0.000363 1.002783*** -0.267885 0.984990 314.6649 2.413147
(-1.643408) (54.92924) (-0.378731)
ABSA Select Equity Fund 0.000408 0.965272*** 1.155723 0.912594 469.3028 2.364966
(0.812572) (33.06812) (1.109556)
GROWTH MARKET  BENCHMARK : GROWTH  INDEX 
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A -0.000463 0.927913*** -0.595075 0.916293 415.1379 2.223685
(-0.874095) (29.61476) (-0.594677)
Foord Equity Fund 9.88E-05 0.876888*** -1.653313 0.879435 456.8843 2.213181
(0.177375) (25.95170) (-1.505543)
Investec Growth Fund Class A -0.000426 0.892673*** -1.346802 0.904726 457.5407 2.150158
(-0.839952) (28.91286) (-1.352598)
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A -0.000297 0.884771*** -0.951362 0.881454 455.5068 2.188007
(-0.528087) (25.88365) (-0.856361)
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R -0.000263 0.845699*** -1.032053 0.797409 372.2583 1.778747
(-0.329899) (17.94157) (-0.685575)
Old Mutual Growth Fund R -0.000417 0.902765*** -0.698834 0.886025 400.3038 2.242101
(-0.683112) (25.01608) (-0.606356)
INDUSTRIALS MARKET  BENCHMARK : INDUSTRIAL  25 
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A -0.000307 0.977181*** 0.006087 0.967832 467.4103 2.293209
(-0.963262) (52.51989) (0.009718)
Momentum Industrial Fund A -0.000126 0.997363*** -0.034114 0.972735 474.2493 2.500286
(-0.420624) (57.21231) (-0.058132)
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A -0.000487 1.013995*** -0.189548 0.971798 470.8522 2.437304
(-1.577999) (56.31459) (-0.312712)
Sanlam Industrial Fund A -0.000420 0.959941*** 0.610338 0.973550 546.8645 2.488168
(-1.623934) 61.49570) (1.141430)
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class -0.000306 1.002064*** 0.352681 0.961452 454.5547 2.467551
(-0.848136) (47.65098) (0.498194)
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class -0.000151 0.999657*** 0.227127 0.961167 518.9442 2.394004
(-0.462403) (50.64719) (0.335932)
LARGE  CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : JSE  TOP  40 
Absa Large Cap Fund 0.000455 1.040953*** 0.403040 0.968640 526.8414 2.425862
(1.478308) (52.79514) (0.592406)
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 9.01E-06 1.044601*** 1.015328 0.983805 305.4030 2.494442
(0.034900) (52.95225) (1.346554)
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund -0.000247 1.050417*** 0.560459 0.980461 486.6315 1.987304
(-0.923549) (63.04026) (0.994812)
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    -0.000102 1.041829*** -0.116534 0.984553 570.6517 2.357344
(-0.477689) (76.35662) (-0.247520)
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 -0.000324 1.052039*** -0.248322 0.962897 341.1945 2.149772
(-0.778606) (37.04686) (-0.286887)
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A -0.000158 1.058291*** 0.651623 0.978326 547.0556 2.097784
(-0.610094) (63.61218) (1.135116)











RESOURCES MARKET  BENCHMARK : RESOURCE  10 
ALPHA (α) MARKET (β) ϒ (MARKET TIMING) LOG L. D-W Stat.
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 0.000255 0.962319*** 0.377564 0.965716 459.1440 2.293914
(0.720057) (47.39725) (0.562338)
Momentum Resources Fund A -0.000120 1.020574*** 0.505227 0.965052 451.7731 2.248724
(-0.315085) (46.85885) (0.701465)
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 0.000278 0.986275*** 0.284346 0.984901 500.7849 2.480279
(1.165661) (72.22115) (0.629632)
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 0.000107 0.932866*** -0.084253 0.941805 434.0693 2.427034
(0.238579) (36.18604) (-0.098828)
Old Mutual Gold Fund R -0.000594 0.969260*** -0.538839 0.740732 339.9869 2.306488
(-0.539319) (15.34702) (-0.257997)
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class -0.000238 0.980477*** -0.075704 0.965470 457.5033 2.425625
(-0.661802) (47.54284) (-0.111004)
SMALL  CAP MARKET  BENCHMARK : SMALL  CAP  INDEX 
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund -0.000443 1.005222*** 0.096626 0.977135 485.4081 1.985117
(-1.652282) (62.84140) (0.175854)
Investec Emerging Companies R 0.000196 1.039601*** -1.107442 0.945902 436.1318 1.890575
(0.456168) (40.64780) (-1.2605670
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   -4.61E-05 0.998505*** 0.372055 0.941285 495.6257 1.836454
(-0.116051) (40.90094) (0.434128)
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 0.000175 1.021304*** 0.433479 0.947756 438.4507 1.933997
(0.417007) (40.82410) (0.504433)
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 8.24E-05 1.047762*** -1.161215* 0.971252 469.9034 1.891234
(0.265015) (56.50891) (-1.823230)
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class -0.001009 1.048743*** -2.079805 0.855842 364.1651 0.929937
(-1.331466) (23.38180) (-1.360251)
VALUE MARKET  BENCHMARK : VALUE  INDEX 
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A -0.000196 1.015144*** -0.538121 0.941394 426.7133 1.720765
(-0.410117) (36.36360) (-0.578122)
Element Islamic Equity Fund A -0.000196 1.015144*** -0.538121 0.941394 426.7133 1.720765
(-0.410117) (36.36360) (-0.578122)
Investec Value Fund Class R -0.000219 0.936911*** -1.278199 0.875026 392.8118 1.978119
(-0.331725) (24.30053) (-0.994297)
Stanlib Value Fund A Class -0.000590 0.941282*** -0.344522 0.938222 490.4871 2.256178
(-1.391691) (37.39478) (-0.399195)
Momentum Value Fund A -0.001304 0.973237*** 0.920291 0.933283 421.6898 2.121480
(-2.601378) (33.23378) (0.942511)
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A -0.000592 0.906040*** -0.373157 0.922570 480.6837 2.180641
(-1.286533) (33.14828) (-0.398183)









FINANCIALS End.Month No. of Obs.(n) % WW % LL % Persistance Chi-Sq.stat. CPR CPR Z-stat. Conclusion
Coronation Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 41 34.15% 17.07% 51.22% 2.41 0.9800 -0.0781 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 31.71% 17.07% 48.78% 1.83 0.8273 -0.0592 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 31.71% 14.63% 46.34% 2.61 0.6446 -0.1101 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 42 33.33% 19.51% 52.84% 2.00 1.1313 -0.4835 PERSISTENCE
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 31-Dec-14 23 21.74% 34.78% 56.52% 1.52 1.6667 0.1810 PERSISTENCE
ABSA Select Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 42 33.33% 19.05% 52.38% 2.00 1.1313 -0.5815 PERSISTENCE
GROWTH
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 34.15% 19.51% 53.66% 2.02 1.2444 -0.3155 PERSISTENCE
Foord Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 42 33.33% 16.67% 50.00% 2.38 0.8909 -0.5888 REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A 30-Sep-14 42 30.95% 16.67% 47.62% 1.81 0.7521 -0.2452 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 42 30.95% 19.05% 50.00% 1.62 0.9630 -0.4383 REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 41 39.02% 21.95% 60.97% 4.37 2.2500 0.0741 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Growth Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 31.71% 19.51% 51.22% 1.44 1.0505 -0.1362 PERSISTENCE
INDUSTRIALS
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 41 36.59% 12.20% 48.79% 5.34 0.6944 -0.1928 REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 34.15% 12.20% 46.35% 4.36 0.5833 -0.4824 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 31.71% 17.07% 48.78% 1.83 0.8272 -0.4954 REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 42 33.33% 11.90% 45.23% 4.29 0.5303 -0.6986 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 41 56.10% 12.20% 68.30% 21.73 2.8750 -0.2866 PERSISTENCE
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 42 54.76% 11.90% 66.66% 20.86 2.5556 -0.7309 PERSISTENCE
LARGE  CAP
Absa Large Cap Fund 31-Dec-14 42 26.19% 21.43% 47.62% 0.29 0.8181 -0.9442 REVERSAL
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 34.78% 52.17% 1.52 1.0667 0.8094 PERSISTENCE
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 31-Dec-14 41 26.83% 24.39% 51.22% 0.073 1.1000 -0.4965 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    31-Dec-14 42 26.19% 23.81% 50.00% 0.095 1.0000 -0.8584 NO PERSISTENCE
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 31-Dec-14 33 30.30% 24.24% 54.54% 2.03 1.6000 0.8147 PERSISTENCE
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 42 26.19% 23.81% 50.00% 0.095 1.0000 -0.8557 NO PERSISTENCE
RESOURCES
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 41 21.95% 26.83% 48.78% 0.66 0.9167 -0.07846 REVERSAL
Momentum Resources Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 17.07% 29.27% 46.34% 3.20 0.7500 0.06530 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 31-Dec-14 41 21.95% 26.83% 48.78% 0.66 0.9167 0.0640 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 26.83% 24.39% 51.22% 1.83 1.2088 0.2321 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Gold Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 9.76% 41.46% 51.22% 8.46 0.6869 0.1419 REVERSAL
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 41 14.63% 26.83% 41.46% 4.17 0.4889 0.09836 REVERSAL
SMALL  CAP
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 31-Dec-14 41 26.83% 24.39% 51.22% 0.27 1.1111 0.04461 PERSISTENCE
Investec Emerging Companies R 31-Dec-14 41 39.02% 14.63% 53.65% 6.32 1.1429 -0.4463 PERSISTENCE
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   31-Dec-14 42 50.00% 16.67% 66.67% 17.05 4.4545 -0.4090 PERSISTENCE
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 48.78% 14.63% 63.41% 15.26 2,1429 -0.5228 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 31-Dec-14 41 26.83% 19.51% 46.34% 1.44 0.7521 -0.0748 REVERSAL
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 41 9.75% 36.59% 46.34% 6.31 0.500 0.1156 REVERSAL
VALUE
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 41 24.39% 24.39% 48.78% 0.073 0.9090 -0.4388 REVERSAL
Element Islamic Equity Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 29.27% 21.95% 51.22% 1.24 1.1250 0.1519 PERSISTENCE
Investec Value Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 41 21.95% 24.39% 46.34% 0.46 0.7500 -0.01917 REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 42 30.95% 19.05% 50.00% 13.62 0.9630 -0.3574 REVERSAL
Momentum Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 41 29.27% 31.71% 60.98% 2.02 2.4375 0.1470 PERSISTENCE
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 42 30.95% 19.05% 50.00% 1.62 0.9630 -0.2760 REVERSAL










FINANCIALS End.Month No. of Obs.(n) % WW % LL % Persistance Chi-Sq.stat. CPR CPR Z-stat. Conclusion
Coronation Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 23 21.74% 13.04% 34.78% 3.26 0.2778 0.8720 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 8.70% 20.09% 6.39 0.1143 0.7068 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 21.74% 13.04% 34.78% 3.26 0.2778 0.7757 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 24 20.83% 12.50% 33.33% 3.52 0.2381 0.3140 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 31-Dec-14 13 7.69% 23.08% 30.77% 6.38 0.2143 3.1337 REVERSAL
ABSA Select Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 24 20.83% 12.50% 33.33% 3.33 0.2381 0.5090 REVERSAL
GROWTH
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 13.04% 30.43% 3.96 0.1905 0.6743 REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 24 41.67% 12.50% 54.17% 4.33 1.0000 0.2150 NO PERSISTENCE
Investec Growth Fund Class A 30-Sep-14 24 33.33% 8.33% 41.66% 4.00 0.3333 -0.2682 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 24 16.67% 16.67% 33.34% 2.67 0.2500 0.2068 REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 23 47.83% 17.39% 65.22% 6.39 2.7500 1.2150 PERSISTENCE
Old Mutual Growth Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 17.39% 34.78% 2.22 0.2857 0.7664 REVERSAL
INDUSTRIALS
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 23 47.83% 8.70% 56.53% 7.78 0.9167 0.7115 REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 43.48% 4.35% 47.83% 7.43 0.2857 0.6671 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 39.13% 8.70% 47.83% 4.30 0.5000 0.7687 REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 24 41.67% 8.33% 50.00% 5.33 0.5556 0.2043 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 23 43.48% 4.35% 47.83% 7.43 0.2857 0.7642 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 24 41.67% 4.17% 45.84% 7.00 0.2381 0.3101 REVERSAL
LARGE  CAP
Absa Large Cap Fund 31-Dec-14 24 20.83% 12.50% 33.33% 3.33 0.2381 0.4776 REVERSAL
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 31-Dec-14 13 7.69% 23.08% 30.77% 6.38 0.2143 3.2021 REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 13.04% 30.43% 3.96 0.1905 0.8078 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    31-Dec-14 24 16.67% 12.50% 29.17% 4.33 0.1667 0.3586 REVERSAL
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 31-Dec-14 18 22.22% 16.67% 38.89% 3.78 0.5000 2.2989 REVERSAL
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 24 16.67% 12.50% 29.17% 4.33 0.1667 0.4885 REVERSAL
RESOURCES
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 23 8.70% 30.43% 39.13% 4.65 0.3111 1.0878 REVERSAL
Momentum Resources Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 8.70% 30.43% 39.13% 4.65 0.3111 1.0951 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 31-Dec-14 23 13.04% 30.43% 43.47% 2.57 0.5250 1.0951 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 13.04% 30.43% 43.47% 2.57 0.5250 1.0076 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Gold Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 4.35% 34.78% 39.13% 5.70 0.1667 0.8914 REVERSAL
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 23 8.70% 30.43% 39.13% 4.65 0.3111 1.0418 REVERSAL
SMALL  CAP
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 21.74% 39.13% 1.17 0.4082 0.5711 REVERSAL
Investec Emerging Companies R 31-Dec-14 23 39.13% 8.70% 47.83% 4.30 0.5000 0.3187 REVERSAL
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   31-Dec-14 24 41.67% 12.50% 54.17% 4.33 1.0000 0.2740 NO PERSISTENCE
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 43.48% 8.70% 52.18% 5.70 0.6667 0.3959 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 13.04% 30.43% 3.96 0.1905 0.3508 REVERSAL
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 23 13.04% 13.04% 26.08% 5.35 0.1250 0.3681 REVERSAL
VALUE
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 13.04% 30.43% 3.96 0.1905 1.1240 REVERSAL
Element Islamic Equity Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 21.74% 17.39% 39.13% 1.52 0.4167 0.8497 REVERSAL
Investec Value Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 30.43% 47.82% 3.96 1.0370 1.1918 PERSISTENCE
Stanlib Value Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 24 16.67% 12.50% 29.17% 4.33 0.1667 0.4318 REVERSAL
Momentum Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 23 17.39% 21.74% 39.13% 1.17 0.4082 0.9800 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 24 25.00% 8.33% 33.33% 5.33 0.2000 0.7399 REVERSAL









FINANCIALS End.Month No. of Obs.(n) % WW % LL % Persistance Chi-Sq.stat. CPR CPR Z-stat. Conclusion
Coronation Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 11 45.45% 0.00% 45.45% 5.36 0.0000 1.1274 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.8034 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 45.45% 0.00% 45.45% 5.36 0.0000 1.0615 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 11 45.45% 0.00% 45.45% 5.36 0.0000 0.9871 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 31-Dec-14 6 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 7.33 0.0000 4.2887 REVERSAL
ABSA Select Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.5394 REVERSAL
GROWTH
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.5951 REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.1942 REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A 30-Sep-14 12 25.00% 0.00% 25.00% 4.67 0.0000 -0.4901 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 12 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12.67 0.0000 0.1330 REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 5.36 0.0000 1.5387 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Growth Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 10.45 0.0000 0.7748 REVERSAL
INDUSTRIALS
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 11 45.45% 0.00% 45.45% 5.36 0.0000 1.1706 REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.6218 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.9612 REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 12 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 4.00 0.0000 0.3912 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.9005 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.3338 REVERSAL
LARGE  CAP
Absa Large Cap Fund 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 -0.3948 REVERSAL
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 31-Dec-14 6 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 7.33 0.0000 3.9855 REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.4952 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.0186 REVERSAL
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 31-Dec-14 8 37.50% 0.00% 37.50% 5.00 0.0000 1.9325 REVERSAL
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.08276 REVERSAL
RESOURCES
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.7232 REVERSAL
Momentum Resources Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.7582 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.8438 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.7682 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Gold Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 1.0499 REVERSAL
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 18.18% 18.18% 6.82 0.0000 0.6868 REVERSAL
SMALL  CAP
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 10.45 0.0000 0.8132 REVERSAL
Investec Emerging Companies R 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.5090 REVERSAL
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.1869 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.4724 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.5546 REVERSAL
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 11 27.27% 0.00% 27.27% 3.91 0.0000 0.3853 REVERSAL
VALUE
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 11 36.36% 0.00% 36.36% 3.91 0.0000 0.8857 REVERSAL
Element Islamic Equity Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 10.45 0.0000 0.8447 REVERSAL
Investec Value Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 11 9.09% 9.09% 18.18% 9.00 0.0714 0.2390 REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 12 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 4.00 0.0000 0.1717 REVERSAL
Momentum Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 11 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 10.45 0.0000 0.7727 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 12 41.67% 0.00% 41.67% 4.67 0.0000 0.7159 REVERSAL










FINANCIALS End.Month No. of Obs.(n) % WW % LL % Persistance Chi-Sq.stat. CPR CPR Z-stat. Conclusion
Coronation Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.3050 REVERSAL
Momentum Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.9263 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Financials Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.3851 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund 31-Dec-14 8 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 2.50 0.1111 -1.1752 REVERSAL
Sanlam Financial Fund B1 31-Dec-14 3 0.00% 33.33% 33.33% 3.67 0.0000 n/a REVERSAL
ABSA Select Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.2444 REVERSAL
GROWTH
FNB Momentum Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -1.0808 REVERSAL
Foord Equity Fund 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.00 0.0000 -1.2111 REVERSAL
Investec Growth Fund Class A 30-Sep-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.8552 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Growth Fund A 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.5495 REVERSAL
Marriot Dividend Growth Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 0.00% 14.29% 5.00 0.0000 0.7695 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Growth Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.9443 REVERSAL
INDUSTRIALS
Coronation Industrials Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 0.00% 14.29% 5.00 0.0000 0.0520 REVERSAL
Momentum Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.7185 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.4507 REVERSAL
Sanlam Industrial Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.5146 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.4003 REVERSAL
Stanlib Industrial Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.00 0.0000 -1.0484 REVERSAL
LARGE  CAP
Absa Large Cap Fund 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.7985 REVERSAL
ABSA Large Cap Fund B Class 31-Dec-14 3 0.00% 33.33% 33.33% 3.67 0.0000 n/a REVERSAL
Momentum Top 40 Index Fund 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -1.3652 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Top 40 Fund A    31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 25.00% 25.00% 4.00 0.0000 -1,891693 REVERSAL
Prescient Equity Top 40 A1 31-Dec-14 5 0.00% 40.00% 40.00% 2.20 0.0000 0.0732 REVERSAL
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 25.00% 25.00% 4.00 0.0000 -1.9094 REVERSAL
RESOURCES
Investec Commodity Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -0.9570 REVERSAL
Momentum Resources Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -1.1163 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Mining & Resource R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -0.8878 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mining & Resources Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -1.0217 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Gold Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 0.0874 REVERSAL
Stanlib Resources Fund R Class 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -1.0462 REVERSAL
SMALL  CAP
Coronation Smaller Companies Fund 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.7845 REVERSAL
Investec Emerging Companies R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.9308 REVERSAL
Momentum Small Mid-Cap A   31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.00 0.0000 -0.8898 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investment Entrepreneur Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.29 0.0000 -0.6591 REVERSAL
Old Mutual Mid & Small-Cap Fund R 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.9853 REVERSAL
Stanlib Small Cap Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.5932 REVERSAL
VALUE
Cadiz Mastermind Fund Class A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -0.9793 REVERSAL
Element Islamic Equity Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 14.29% 14.29% 3.86 0.0000 -0.7787 REVERSAL
Investec Value Fund Class R 31-Dec-14 7 14.29% 14.29% 28.58% 1.57 0.1667 -0.0575 REVERSAL
Stanlib Value Fund A Class 31-Dec-14 8 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 5.00 0.0000 -1.4295 REVERSAL
Momentum Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 7 0.00% 28.57% 28.57% 2.71 0.0000 -0.7940 REVERSAL
Nedgroup Investments Value Fund A 31-Dec-14 8 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 2.50 0.1111 -0.8082 REVERSAL
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